Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel⁰

Washington, April 14, 1962, 5:01 p.m.

655. Tel Aviv Deptel 653¹ and Embtel 686.² Following from uncleared memcon thirteenth in which Secretary urged Israel,³ along lines Deptel 641 to Tel Aviv,⁴ to adopt receptive attitude towards Johnson’s PCC mission. Secretary conceded US does not expect sudden resolution refugee problem but stressed importance of seeking forward movement. He assured Harman anew US would resist proposals which would jeopardize Israel’s vital interests.

Harman said he could repeat assurances Foreign Minister Meir had given US Ambassador Barbour in meeting earlier thirteenth of open minded reception for Johnson. He added progress wholly dependent on Arab attitude and asked whether démarche to Israel would be duplicated to Arabs. Secretary replied US will do everything practicable ensure Johnson receives full hearing.

Secretary invited Harman’s forecast area developments as influenced, among other things, by Algerian settlement. Harman expressed pessimism stating even before end of Algerian situation Israel had observed hardening attitudes among Arabs and sensed comparative calm recent years might soon end. He referred to Ben Bella’s declarations that Israel is Arabs’ next target and he would contribute 100,000 men to cause. In rising current of hostility, according to Harman, it important not to encourage Arabs even by such unconscious acts as equating Syrian and Israeli declarations. Syrian threat to exterminate Israel is in simple justice not to be equated with Israel assertion of determination to defend itself against aggression. Secretary observed that in such era as Harman envisaged Israel might be well advised cooperate to fullest extent with UN as source great political strength.

Harman declared this is exactly what Israelis are doing, and had done in recent Tiberias troubles. He criticized UNTSO’s performance and definition its responsibilities. Citing Von Horn’s suggestion Israel had not given him adequate access, he declared UNTSO has much greater freedom of movement on Israel’s side than Syria’s, where observers are not permitted to move fifty yards beyond their stations. He expressed resentment with Von Horn’s alleged practice of describing facility as absolutely imperative and then making public issue of this requirement. When Secretary asked him elucidate, he referred to UNTSO boat on Tiberias. According to Harman there no need for boat because tiny Lake Tiberias can be adequately “covered” from shore stations. Violence is not from vessel to vessel but from shore to ship or ship to shore. In second place Syrians are making determined effort obtain rights to Tiberias and introduction UNTSO boat would be regarded by them as great advance. Secretary asked if Harman thought in fact that boat would impair Israel’s claims, Harman replying probably not except for Syrian aspirations. He complained also about UNTSO’s recent use of stickers on their vehicle windshields describing themselves as road patrol regulating traffic of their vehicles on Israel roads.

Secretary said he would like to ask informally if Israel in its relations with UN would not be wiser in long run regard it as an ally and try to grant its requests unless such concession materially affected Israel. Secretary said suggestion made in all friendliness on basis his own personal experiences. In relations with other governments he supposed at least once weekly US Secretary of State could take umbrage at attitudes or requests other governments. US had learned to try not let problems develop in this atmosphere and instead do what needs to be done. He observed psychology of Israel’s relations with UN is most important both to Israel and its friends if Middle East is in fact moving into new era increased tensions. Impression US public opinion has of Israel’s relations with UN is important to Israel’s security.

Harman described Israel as wedded to principles of UN and cooperating with it but on basis of UNTSO having understanding of its role. He was particularly critical of ISMAC, asserting it should not be umpire keeping record of balls and strikes; its job is keeping borders quiet, which is easier of accomplishment by diplomacy. (He broadly hinted UNTSO might function better if headed by civilian with military advisor.) Israel prepared rejoin ISMAC at any time Syria will drop demand for consideration D/Z status as agenda’s first item. According to Harman, this is not unreasonable requirement inasmuch as General Riley, former UNTSO Chief of Staff, ruled in 1951 that disputes about D/Z were to be referred to him rather than ISMAC. He made usual reference to Lebanon-Israel MAC as model which should provide pattern for all others. It meets, he said, to correct difficulties not to engage in futile exercises as to where responsibility lies.

Secretary remarked Harman may have misunderstood him. He had not meant to suggest specific relations with Von Horn or UNTSO but UN and all its agencies as complex with which it Israel’s advantage to cooperate. It difficult to escape conclusion there is element of pugnacity in Israel’s attitude.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4–1362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hamilton (NEA/NE); cleared by Strong in draft, Wallner (IO) in draft, and Breisky; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, USUN, London, Jidda, Baghdad, Rome, Paris, and Ankara.
1. In telegram 653 to Tel Aviv, April 13, the Department of State reported that during a conversation with Secretary Rusk on April 13, Israeli Ambassador Harman had mentioned three recent incidents relating to Lake Tiberias and vicinity, including the ambush and killing of an Israeli truck driver. The Department emphasized to the Embassy that UNTSO should move quickly to investigate these incidents. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 686, April 13, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported on Ambassador Barbour’s conversation with Foreign Minister Meir regarding the Johnson mission as requested in telegram 641 to Tel Aviv (see footnote 4 below). (Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/4–1362)
3. Secretary Rusk’s meeting with Ambassador Harman on April 13 is recorded in two memoranda of conversation, one dealing with the Johnson mission and the other with Israel’s relations with Arab States and UNTSO. (Ibid., and ibid., 684A.86/4–1362) A briefing memorandum from Talbot and Wallner to Rusk, April 13, is ibid., 325.84/4–1362.
4. In telegram 641 to Tel Aviv, the Department of State instructed Ambassador Barbour to make a high-level démarche in support of the Johnson mission to coincide with Rusk’s démarche to Harman on April 13. Among other points, Barbour was to point out that, given Ben Gurion’s assurances to President Kennedy, the United States hoped that Israel would listen to Johnson with an open mind and be flexible in considering his suggestions, as the Johnson initiative offered a unique opportunity to remove a major element of instability in the region. Barbour was also to remind the Israelis that the United States had assured Israel that it would not support proposals endangering Israel’s real security or economic interests and that Johnson would not propose, nor would the United States support, unilateral concessions by Israel. (Ibid., 325.84/3–1162)