Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan⁰

Washington, April 3, 1962, 6:19 p.m.

340. Embtel 466.¹ While latest unofficial reports from Syria indicate accord being worked out between disputants on basis maintenance Syria’s identity, believe Jordanians deluding themselves if they feel Nasser would be deterred from action in Syria by Jordanian threats. In fact overt Jordanian involvement in Syria could have effect of crystallizing Syrian antagonism toward Jordan and result in increased swing toward support for UAR. Similarly Jordanian intervention might well trigger more active UAR role in Syrian situation and in Jordan against present regime. As you deem appropriate you should continue urge Jordanians refrain from involvement under any circumstances, stating USG would regard such actions as serious error of judgment which could have only tragic consequences for Jordan. No indications whatsoever of current UAR intention military intervention Syria.

FYI. Deptel 336.² Inadvisable speak to Nasser as desired by Jordanians; in UAR eyes could only imply indirect threat by U.S. End FYI.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4–362. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Walstrom, cleared by Barrow, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Damascus, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Beirut, Baghdad, and Ankara.
1. Telegram 466 from Amman, April 3, reported that during a conversation with Prime Minister Wasfi Tell, Macomber had reiterated points made previously against Jordanian involvement in Syrian affairs. (Ibid.)
2. Document 233.
3. In telegram 470 from Amman, April 4, Macomber objected to the implication in this telegram that Jordan believed its threats could deter Nasser from action in Syria. Macomber advised that Jordan had not threatened the Egyptians nor anyone else but had calmly and privately stated conditions under which it would feel compelled to intervene in Syria. The Ambassador also assured the Department that while “GOJ sincerely believes that if Nasser allowed restore and maintain by force his authority over Syria, existence of current Jordanian regime doomed along with cause of moderate, progressive, free enterprise and Western oriented governments in this part of Arab world.” The Jordanian Government wished to avoid involvement in Syrian affairs, as it would lead to a break with the United Kingdom and the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4–462)