Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

227. Memorandum From the Department of State to the British Embassy⁰

Washington, March 29, 1962.

ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR REACTOR

The Department of State is grateful for the careful consideration given by the Foreign Office to the dangers of a nuclear race among countries of the Near East set out in the Embassy’s communication of February 14.¹ The Department fully shares the Foreign Office conviction that an adequate safeguards system for nuclear reactor development in that area is essential.

2. We concur in the desirability of working for introduction of the IAEA inspection system into the Near East countries and acceptance by Israel would seem to be the logical starting point. However, two significant objections can be foreseen: One is Israel’s clear opposition to submission to IAEA controls until these are generally accepted by other nations, and the other is that, under IAEA procedures, both parties to any agreement would probably have to agree to IAEA supervision. The Israel bilateral is with France, and it seems doubtful France would agree to inspection by the IAEA of irradiated elements after their return to French soil. A further problem, recognized by the Foreign Office, is that IAEA inspection, even if accepted, would not commence until the Dimona reactor goes critical, some two years hence, and it is in the intervening period that Arab suspicions and the probability of sharp Arab reactions are likely to be greatest. While we wish ultimately to see all nuclear reactors under IAEA inspection, we doubt Israel’s present objections can be overcome regardless of the amount of suasion used, and thus question the value of the sort of immediate, intense effort envisaged by the Foreign Office. However, in forthcoming renegotiation of the United States-Israel atoms-for-peace bilateral,² which covers the reactor at Nabi Rubin, we will make a strong effort to obtain Israel’s agreement to transfer to the IAEA of the specific inspection function now allowed to the United States. In any case, we would propose to make clear that the IAEA system is ultimately the one we believe should exercise safeguards functions with regard to peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Near East area and that, as the IAEA system evolves and gains additional adherents, we would expect Israel to accept its supervision.

3. However, ad hoc inspection that will satisfy both ourselves and the world at large as to Israel’s actions in the period before the Dimona reactor is completed seems imperative. As to suitable interim, neutral inspectors, we doubt Canada is well qualified since it is closely identified with the West in the IAEA. We think the Swiss, the Swedes, or some other Scandinavian country would be better suited to provide the desired “neutral” confirmation of Israel’s peaceful intentions. We have already had some discussion with the Swedes about this and hope to be able to work out something pursuant to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s May 1961 assurances to President Kennedy.

4. A further complication to the introduction of IAEA controls has been the UAR attitude toward these. It has voted against the IAEA system at every step. With the object of reducing its suspicions and, ultimately, of winning its acceptance of IAEA controls after these have been accepted by Israel, we intend to encourage the fullest possible working relationship between the UAR and the IAEA in other matters.

5. We are asking the West Germans for a report on the status of their present dealings with the UAR. As the Foreign Office is no doubt aware, the Germans have repeatedly assured us that they have no intention of assisting the UAR in reactor development without adequate safeguards.

6. Lacking early arrangement of an open, neutral visit to Dimona, the United States is prepared to consider another secret visit to Dimona, roughly on the one-year anniversary of our last visit in May 1961.

7. We will welcome continued close consultation with the United Kingdom on all aspects of this issue. We will keep the Embassy in Washington informed of our progress and of the reply we receive from the Germans to the approach described in (5).

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.1901/3–2962. Secret. Drafted by Crawford and cleared by Thomas (S/AE), Ludlow, Talbot, Thacher, and Owen (BNA). According to a note on the source text, Strong handed the memorandum to First Secretary of the British Embassy Denis Speares on April 9.
1. Not found.
2. Documentation on the negotiations is in Department of State, Central File 611.84A45. The agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, signed at Washington by the United States and Israel on July 12, 1955 (6 UST 2641), was renewed on June 22, 1962 (13 UST 1289). The renewal contained an amendment relating to IAEA inspection.