Office of the Historian

211. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Near Eastern Posts0

Washington, March 10, 1962, 11:46 a.m.

1545. Dept most appreciative posts comments re type of approach US officials should take in discussing Jordan waters problem now and in coming months. Synthesizing these and Dept’s considered views we generally agree Beirut’s thoughtful Embtel 8441 (although we would prefer omit second sentence point (4) substituting “However we not inclined be put in position of guarantor of any party’s intentions”, and would also wish soft-pedal all references to Johnston Plan by that name). Our considerations as follows:

1.
Exacerbation Israel-Arab tensions likely and probably inevitable as time for Israel’s tapping of Jordan River at Tiberias draws near.
2.
USG basic objectives are (a) avert serious clash (b) keep US out of position in which we will become target of Arab frustration at inability forestall Israel action (c) encourage equitable and efficient use of Jordan waters along lines of Unified Plan by international agreement if possible but, since this not now possible, by national plans compatible with Unified Plan and not precluding latter’s eventual implementation.
3.
In implementing its national planning Israel with extensive USG help has moved faster than Arabs. Arab frustration can perhaps be mitigated if they gain sense of parallel movement with equivalent outside help. This will be the more true if Arabs can argue to themselves that they are acting to prevent “theft of Arab water”.
4.
However valid from engineering point of view, and despite 1955 Arab agreement to it on technical level, Unified Plan per se has come to symbolize in Arab eyes USG support of Israel at continuing expense their interests. Unfortunately, therefore, USG considerably discredited as an objective party in position to encourage both sides to equitable accommodation. Further public central role by USG and emphasis on Unified Plan likely further stimulate Arab suspicions.
5.
In view Jordan’s request for IBRD assistance in water development, particularly execution Yarmuk storage (Maqarin Dam), which is last major construction element of Unified Plan yet to be initiated, IBRD appears logical vehicle through which accomplish (3).
6.
Since Jordan can not pursue the IBRD path without support at least of Syria (and hopefully Lebanon), our quiet efforts should be directed to (a) helping Jordan along in its own efforts obtain this support and (b) discreetly making felt a sufficient degree of US influence to prevent problem flaring into major international issue (e.g. in Security Council) while productive and independent involvement of IBRD proceeds.
7.
We have reasonably satisfactory assurances from Jordan and Israel that present programs will not result in water withdrawals in excess of Johnston Plan allocations. We know Israel approves execution of Maqarin Dam. We intend hold these assurances intact and make sure they are adhered to in practice. Although concurring that it is generally desirable demonstrate our even-handedness to the Arabs, we think any major US step at this time (such as public démarche to Israel) would tend put US back in active central role and divert Arabs incipient awareness that they will be on the losing end unless they take advantage of constructive elements in present situation.
8.
Finally, despite present flare-up, we anticipate many steps in evolution this problem before Israel’s diversion in fall 1963. From time to time it may become apparent that US representations can be helpful in allaying area tensions on water issue. In general, however, we are convinced of benefits remaining in background. To extent we do discuss this issue with Arabs our talks should be (a) with a very few key individuals in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and occasionally the UAR only and (b) in vein of low-key objective counsel.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1062. Secret. Drafted by Crawford on March 8; cleared by Sisco, Hewitt (L/NEA), and Strong; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and repeated to Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
  2. Dated March 5. (Ibid., 684A.85322/3–562) For text, see Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.↩