Office of the Historian

204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)0

Washington, March 2, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Possible NSC Standing Group Discussion of Syria1

In a discussion of the policy directive on efforts to help stabilize the new Syrian government,2 you might mention the following:

1.

General

The new Syrian government has frequently reiterated its desire for friendly relations with the U.S. Publicly it will assume a neutralist posture to avoid charges of subservience to the West. A successful parliamentary democracy in Syria with a gradually restored free economy could provide valuable and heartening testimony of the effectiveness of Free World methods. We should do all we can to help it succeed but without seeking or appearing to embrace it.

2.

Stabilization Program

The Syrians are continuing efforts to secure the final $5 million needed for completion of their $40 million stabilization fund.

3.

Syrian Military Assistance Requests

Should the Syrians seek military equipment from the U.S., we would face a delicate problem: we would like to reduce their present dependence on the Soviet Bloc but we do not wish to stimulate Israeli fears, with consequent intensification of the Near East arms race. We propose to take quiet, tentative soundings with several European governments as to what they might be prepared to supply.

4.

Syrian Delegations to U.S.

Plans are not yet firm for visits of either the economic or parliamentary delegations (the latter as guests of the U.S. Government), but we [Page 505] may well need assistance of other Agencies in assuring their success. Ambassador Knight has made clear that, while we extend a sincere welcome to the economic delegation, we can provide no assurance more aid will be forthcoming.

5.

Jordan Waters

The attached memorandum (Tab A)3 outlined the steps we proposed to take with regard to the Syrian note handed us February 21 on Jordan waters. Our Ambassador in Damascus has informed the Syrian Prime Minister that we have no evidence the Israelis are able to take water out of Tiberias at present and that any resort by the Arabs to military means would be strongly opposed by the U.S. (Tab B).4

The attached memorandum to Mr. Bundy of November 16, 1961, sets out our earlier policy viewpoint on the situation in Syria (Tab C).5

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/3–262. Secret. Drafted by Thacher. Tabs A–C are listed at the bottom of the memorandum but are not attached to the source text.↩
  2. The agenda for the NSC Standing Group meeting, scheduled for March 2, included Syria as an item for discussion. According to the Record of Actions for the meeting, the Standing Group: “a. Discussed and agreed in general with the paper entitled ‘Efforts to Help Stabilize the New Syrian Government’ [Document 200]. b. Agreed that the State Department could proceed to consult with other friendly governments on the assumption that Syria would be made eligible for U.S. military sales assistance, if requested by Syria, and if found necessary.” The Record of Actions also indicates that Strong attended the meeting during discussion of this item. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, 3/3/62)↩
  3. Document 200.↩
  4. Document 197.↩
  5. Documents 203 and 198.↩
  6. Document 141.↩