Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Sudan to the Department of State⁰

Khartoum, February 19, 1962, 2 p.m.

477. Eyes only the President and the Secretary from Bowles. Athens eyes only for Talbot. Cairo eyes only for Ambassador. Ambassador Badeau has reported separately on my two long conversations with Nasser.¹ In an airgram which I shall mail from Addis on February 21, I will give detailed evaluation of talks and implications for U.S. policy. In the meantime here is a brief summary:

1. Atmosphere of the visit more encouraging than I had anticipated. In response to frank and detailed exposition U.S. policy throughout world, including such places where UAR has opposed us as Cuba, Congo and Iran, Nasser and his senior UAR officials were most forthcoming. It is clear, for the moment at least, that UAR has made decision to try to improve its relations with us.

2. Pragmatic approach of the UAR gives some hope that most extreme aspects of recent domestic economic moves, which partly reflect frustration after breakup of the UAR, may be modified somewhat. Also some hints in our conversations that arms race with Israel could be scaled down on a de facto basis if UAR reassured of US intent to help preserve peace.

3. Views of Nasser and colleagues on USSR and Communist China appear equally pragmatic: UAR will accept military and economic aid when convenient but will tightly restrict Sino-Soviet activities and will vigorously oppose encroachment of communism into the Middle East. While US will continue to face frustrations in dealing with UAR, those of Kremlin may [be?] equally formidable.

4. Throughout the top level of UAR Government there is genuine fear that Israel, France and Britain are still plotting to bring about Nasser’s downfall. UAR intelligence convinced by what they believe to be strong factual evidence that these three nations are determined to destroy present Government. The alleged evidence is said to be particularly damaging in regard to British activities in Lebanon and current joint British-Israeli activities along Sinai frontier. Whether true or not, it is deeply believed in UAR and this makes it a factor in evaluating Egyptian attitudes. Nasser and his associates are products of the long history of suspicion, fear and weakness which characterized the Middle East for generations and which will continue to plague both them and us.

5. In my five hour discussion Nasser and in detailed discussions with his colleagues I stressed decisive importance of Government’s efforts to improve life of Egyptian people. Nasser’s place in history would be determined not by what he said over the Voice of Arabs but what he accomplished in his own country. If he succeeded in Egypt his influence throughout the world would be constructive and important.

This approach appeared to be effective.

6. Although the three [there are] points of basic disagreement between UAR and US there are also significant areas of shared objectives. We must not let tactical irritations obscure this fact or deflect US from pursuit of our strategic interest.

It would be naive to expect sweeping UAR-US accord or dramatic moves toward solution of the Palestine problem. However at best I believe we can expect tangible progress in these directions; at worst some lessening of UAR active hostility and plotting.

7. My recommendations for US policy in immediate future are:

A) Mason should explore frankly and fully UAR economic difficulties and prospects. If these talks are encouraging our aid should be expanded but heavily qualified by UAR performance. Nasser and senior UAR officials promised me their utmost cooperation with Mason mission and are eagerly awaiting his arrival.

B) The President should invite Nasser to visit US. This invitation should take the form of a letter to Nasser from the President referring to my report of our cordial and constructive discussion emphasizing our desire for close understanding and expressing the President’s wish to continue exchange in Washington. While subject never alluded to in our talks, it is clear that he would be greatly flattered and impressed by such an invitation after years of our cold shoulder.

His talks with the President and the opportunity to clarify his confusion about our country and our economic system would have important psychological effects on him and his policies even though as seems likely Nasser later goes out of his way to demonstrate his non-alignment.

C) The invitation should be for late April rather than November. The mood right now is forthcoming and it would be a mistake not to take advantage of it. If this opportunity for meaningful but modest progress is missed it may not soon reoccur.

Let me add that Ambassador Badeau appears to be doing an excellent job. His relations with Nasser and his associates are cordial and he handled himself with excellent judgment throughout my stay.

Moose

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Bowles, Chester. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens and Cairo.
1. Airgram A–275 from Cairo, February 17 (ibid., 611.86B/2–1762); and airgram A–284, February 20 (ibid., 611.86B/2–2062).