Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State⁰

Beirut, January 16, 1962, 6 p.m.

691. Rome for Rood. Following were highlights of extremely cordial conversation with Chehab 16th:

1. Personal situation: President, who seemed relaxed and in good spirits, stressed he had taken office only reluctantly. He is not attached to job, although he is very much devoted to Lebanese independence. In this respect, he mentioned that when he heard plotters were coming to get him he ordered guards not to fire, not wanting to be cause of bloodshed. This was first time guards had disobeyed his orders.

2. Communist tactics: Communists have taken advantage of every crisis in mid-East since Arab-Israel war and were attempting likewise to make most of recent disturbance by sending delegations and messages of congratulations to President. Fortunately mass of well wishers was such that Communists went almost unnoticed. Expressing extreme repugnance for communism, Chehab said confidentially he found even shaking hands with Soviet Ambassador distasteful.

3. Foreign involvement in plot: President stated on this subject he could as yet neither say “yes” nor “no”. Although he would personally prefer to give negative response, any reply will have to await results investigation. Government has particularly been checking frequent recent travels to other countries by “certain persons”.

4. Lebanon’s orientation: When I mentioned Karame had stressed at outset our talk yesterday (Embtel 688)¹ Lebanon non-aligned, Chehab laughingly declared Karame merely being “protocolaire”. He repeatedly emphasized Lebanon’s pro-West orientation despite fact that for tactical political purposes GOL professes neutrality. In this connection he cited Takla’s good work at Belgrade and at Arab League meetings.

5. AID: President stressed his interest in fostering economic development throughout Lebanon and indicated GOL might ask US for “a few technicians” and perhaps some small loans, these particularly in connection with projects studied earlier by US AID missions.

During discussion I handed Chehab informal paper² stressing US friendship for Lebanon and admiration for his leadership, pointing out accusation of Western complicity obviously being exploited by those who wish divide us, recalling our past support for Lebanon and reaffirming our intention to pursue like policy in future. President said there had been speculation re US attitude toward plot because US looms so large in Lebanese mind that people could not imagine US would not take some stand. Seen in this perspective, our very silence to some Lebanese seemed strange. President suggested I discuss with Takla possibility some type of declaration re US position which however, would not give grounds for criticism by inimical elements. I will of course discuss this with Takla. My own feeling remains, however, as indicated Embtel 683,³ that such a statement would not serve useful purpose at this time and I suspect Takla will agree.

Re point six, I indicated in my understanding that termination technical assistance program did not rule out occasional US assistance for certain specific projects of limited nature.⁴

Meyer

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83A/1–1662. Confidential; Noforn. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, London, Paris, Rome, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.
1. Not printed. (Ibid., 611.83A/1–1562)
2. The text of the note, as transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A–139, January 23, reads as follows: “1. The United States remains Lebanon’s true friend. 2. Accusations of Western complicity in the recent coup attempt are obviously being exploited by those who are interested in alienating Lebanon from its most steadfast friends. 3. Lebanon’s friends, who have never failed Lebanon in past times of distress, have every intention of continuing to support Lebanon in the future. 4. The United States, which has admired President Chehab’s firm and statesmanlike leadership, continues to have every faith in that leadership.” (Ibid., 611.83A/1–2362)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 611.83A/1–1562)
4. Foreign Minister Takla pressed more strongly for a public statement of U.S. assurances toward Lebanon during a conversation with Meyer on January 18. (Telegram 699 from Beirut; ibid., 611.83A/1–1862)