Here, drafted as memo for President, is my case for a new initiative toward
Nasser. As you’ll see, I feel
that now is the time to move, and suggest how.
Am sure Walt at least agrees, particularly in light of his latest chat with
Kamel. Phil Talbot may still counsel waiting till January when
we’ll have a better idea of whether Nasser will still be Mr. Big. However, this is already
December, so unless we get decision now we won’t be ready then.
What I’m proposing is really little different from State’s own thinking. The
chief difference is one of style. I’d like to see us give Nasser the impression we’re opening a new
chapter, using as bait the very substantial aid we’re probably going to give
him anyway. Otherwise we’ll tend to dole out this aid in little packages,
without getting as much leverage from it as we might reasonably expect.
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT
A Shift in Policy Toward Nasser
Attached are two State Department papers bearing on what your staff has
regarded from the beginning as one of the major foreign policy problems
confronting your Administration. The first is in response to NSAM #105 asking what policy we should
pursue toward Egypt in the aftermath of the Syrian coup,1 and
the other draft State Department policy guidelines toward the UAR.2
In both, State cautiously suggests a somewhat more forthcoming policy
towards Nasser—a policy of
limited objectives but one which will set us on the path toward a more
constructive relationship resembling that of the pre-1955 period, and
break the vicious circle of aloofness in US/UAR relations which has persisted since the Aswan Dam
fiasco.3 State stresses, however,
the basic conflicts of interest which sharply limit the feasible extent
of any rapprochement. Of course, dealing with Nasser partakes of all the problems of
dealing with a charismatic neutralist leader whose ambitions and
interests in many ways run athwart our own. In particular, the
Arab-Israeli vendetta and Nasser’s ambitions in Africa and the Near East create
special difficulties in our relationship.
Meanwhile, we are processing a whole series of UAR aid requests of one sort or another, arising largely
from UAR’s current desperate economic
straits: (a) the multi-year PL-480
request; (b) a grain storage project for which a $72 million DLF loan is requested; (c) a request for
350,000 bales of short-staple cotton; (d) a probable request for rice;
(e) the Nubian monuments; (f) the insecticide request; and (g) Kamel’s recent approach requesting
economic planners as preliminary to a US-backed consortium. State would
apparently continue to dole these out gradually without any fanfare, as
an exercise in quiet diplomacy.
[Page 361]
However, the time may be ripe for a more positive
initiative, aimed in the same direction State proposes and with the
same objectives, but designed to optimize the impact on Nasser. The reasons would be
as follows:
- 1.
- The “aid” requests mentioned above add up to a very
substantial total, which if properly packaged and presented to
Nasser should amply
demonstrate that we really are seeking to open a new chapter in
US-Egyptian relations. Why not use it in this manner?
- 2.
- Aside from one factor (see below), there has hardly been a
better psychological moment for such an approach to Nasser. He is in a chastened
mood after the Syrian debacle. This, plus serious domestic
economic difficulties and some concern over his internal
political position, is leading him to turn more inward, in an
effort to revivify the Egyptian revolution. To help him do so
would be quite in our interest. And Egypt’s near bankruptcy,
which has led to his new aid requests, creates a real
opportunity.
- 3.
- Ambassador Kamel is
trying as hard as he can to sell us on seizing it, and claims to
have Nasser’s backing. It
is hard to separate out how much this is based on Kamel’s own desire to promote a
rapprochement, but his arguments are not to be ignored.
Kamel’s latest
approach to Walt Rostow
for planners and consortium aid is the most forthcoming
yet.
- 4.
- Nasser himself seems to
look on the new Administration as potentially more favorable
toward him than the old. Your exchange of letters has been
helpful, and US caution in the Syrian crisis has gained us
credit.
- 5.
- Meanwhile Soviet/UAR relations
are uneasy, with obvious divergencies over Syria and Iraq,
creating an opportunity we can exploit. Nasser has already reoriented
his policy to a significant extent: (a) he has put the Israeli
issue on ice, at least for the moment; (b) he has apparently
decided to rely primarily on the West for new development aid if
he can; and (c) he has been shifting Egyptian cotton trade back
toward Western markets after some unhappy experiences with the
USSR. Moscow’s veto of
Kuwait’s UN application is merely
the latest indication of divergent Soviet and UAR aims. Both realize this, but
Moscow is making new aid offers in an effort to keep Cairo from
moving even farther away. Nasser will feel compelled to accept them if he
has no other recourse.
On the other hand, Nasser’s
current domestic difficulties may make it premature to attempt a major
approach to him now. Who knows, he may not survive. This may be the
case, though most Arab specialists doubt that he’s as shaky as all that.
In any case, if Nasser
disappeared, he would probably be succeeded by one or another of the new
military elite who would be equally susceptible to a more forthcoming
U.S. policy. I
[Page 362]
doubt that
withholding greater support from Nasser because of the possibility he may fall is a very
useful playing of the odds.
What could we accomplish? As State points out, the
best we could achieve from a more forthcoming policy toward Nasser would be a strictly limited
marriage of convenience; our interests run sharply athwart each other at
too many points. At least in the early phases, moreover, we would be
giving a lot more than we would get in return. Nor can we woo Nasser away from being a neutralist and
nationalist (any more than Moscow could).
But what we might hope to achieve through a more professedly forthcoming
policy is to create a vested interest on his part in better US/UAR relations, which would in itself
inhibit him from taking actions which would upset it. Let us remember
that Nasser could cause us a lot
more trouble if he were actively hostile—in Libya, North Africa, Sudan,
Syria, or on Suez transit and ME oil, to
mention but a few instances. Thus perhaps our greatest gains would be
negative; we would not get a great deal from Nasser, but at least we might restrain him from doing a
lot of things we don’t like. Finally, let’s not forget we also share
certain common interests with Nasser—he’s as anxious as we are not to see undue Soviet
penetration into the Middle East. A more satisfactory relationship would
enable us to talk more frankly with him about where we agree as well as
disagree.
This immediately brings up the Israeli problem.
One cannot propose a new initiative toward Nasser without assessing its likely impact on Israel and
its supporters in the US. The Israelis have said they would applaud
rather than oppose an effort to turn Nasser’s energies inward, but they are not unaware that
any strengthening of the UAR may
eventually be at their expense. However, any rapprochement which led to
increased US influence over Nasser would give us more leverage to restrain him to
some extent. Indeed, as part of any new policy initiative, we should
make perfectly clear to Nasser
our inability to support him against Israel; and, being on a more
friendly basis with him, we would be better able to make such noises
without generating a sharp reaction. The Arab-Israeli issue is one on
which the UAR and US would simply have
to agree to disagree.
Finally, what would this initiative cost us if it
failed? It would not involve spending much more money on Egypt
than I daresay we will spend in one way or another anyway (without
getting full benefit from it). And if Nasser rejects our feelers, or if a rapprochement later
became unstuck, it’s hard to see how we would be much worse off than we
were before. Would it precipitate Egypt any further into the arms of the
Russians than if we had not tried at all?
What Next?—An Action Program. Since we are already
contemplating some very substantial aid to Egypt (especially if we form
a consortium),
[Page 363]
what is needed
is to package and present this in a manner which will signal to the
Egyptians the New Frontier’s desire to be more forthcoming than its
predecessor (and also what we might expect from them). Thus the chief
ingredient to be added would be a new style and tone in our approach.
What we might do is package the several aid projects under consideration
in such form as to make them cumulatively impressive, and use them as
the basis for a new diplomatic initiative, perhaps along the following
lines:
- 1.
- Prompt feelers to Nasser entourage to find out whether UAR is really interested in closer
relations (a logical response to Kamel’s overtures). This could be done in such a
way as to whet Egyptian appetite, while still committing us to
nothing if response were unsatisfactory.
- 2.
- If these went well, next step could be a stop-over in Cairo by
a senior US official known to have President’s ear. If a new
tone is our objective, it would be better to start ball rolling
this way. Bobby Kennedy
or Chester Bowles come to
mind; indeed this might be a good assignment for Mr. Bowles (though we would have to
reassure UAR beforehand that he
still has your confidence). This gambit would raise the level of
dialogue a notch further.
- 3.
- A visit by Nasser to US
in early spring, at which time you and he could have a full tour
d’horizon and jointly discuss the new relationship. Nasser would be greatly pleased
by such an invitation.
- 4.
- If all had gone well, our next major initiative would be to
promote a consortium for support of a major Egyptian development
effort sparked by a US commitment to contribute a substantial
sum.
In sum, I cannot help but feel that a series of moves along these lines
over next few months might start things moving in the right direction.
They are designed to capitalize on aid we will probably give anyway, and
they could be cut off at any point if UAR response was unsuitable to us.
Recommendation. That you discuss these proposals
with SecState, with an eye to possible NSC debate and decision on new policy line, or ask us [?]
to press with Ball in Sec/State’s
absence.4
