Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

143. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, November 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Military Security

Problem

You raised orally with me recently the question of Israel’s security against Arab attack in light of continuing acquisitions of advanced equipment by the UAR.

Conclusions

In NEA there is frequent consideration of this problem. For a combination of reasons we believe (a) that for some time to come, if not indefinitely, Israel can expect to enjoy relatively good security despite the hostility and gradually increasing strength of her neighbors; and (b) there is no good reason for the United States to change its arms policy toward Israel. Our reasoning follows:

Discussion

A. Military Capabilities

We understand that last spring Defense reviewed Israel’s situation thoroughly from a military viewpoint and concluded that, while UAR (then including Syrian) capabilities have increased relatively in recent years, there is still a considerable Israeli advantage over-all and that acquisition of “Mirage” aircraft by Israel should give Israel a clear edge in the air. Informal advice from the Pentagon assures us that there have been no developments since then that would alter this assessment, nor does the Pentagon support the Israeli assertion that in certain categories of ground equipment the combined Egyptian and Syrian forces outnumber them. In terms of leadership, morale, organization, training, logistics, maintenance and intelligence the Israelis enjoy clear superiority. There is no sign of an abnormal arms buildup.

B. Resources

While the national resources of the Arab neighbors of Israel are greater in total than those of Israel, several factors favor Israel: mobilization capability, massive financial and material support from abroad, a modern industrial base, scientific know how, skilled manpower, and a reasonably satisfied population.

C. Political and Psychological

1. Arab fear of Israel is deep-seated and can be overcome only by a wolf pack approach, wherein all Eastern Arab forces are united, gain courage from being united, and believe they are vastly superior to Israeli forces.

2. The deep internal Arab cleavages have been bared to the world twice recently in the Kuwaiti and Syrian crises. The likeliHood that all Eastern Arab forces will in the near future unite under one command and operate according to one master plan is too remote to discuss seriously. The split-up of the Egyptian-Syrian union enhances Israeli security. Lebanon and Jordan have no intention of engaging in another round with Israel, and Syria will be slow again to divest itself of command of its own Army. The UAR alone cannot possibly cope with Israel; and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen are incapable of bringing effective military force against Israel.

3. The Arabs know and openly admit that, if they were to launch a major attack against Israel, the West would intervene. Where the West would stop in such intervention the Arabs could not be sure, for they do not trust the West. So long as the West maintains a military capability of intervening rapidly in force in the Near East and is known to be disposed to use it if necessary, Israel is protected by an external factor. Israel refuses to admit this, claiming to fear a surprise air assault.

4. In the 13–1/2 years since hostilities occurred in 1948 between Arabs and Jews, there has not been a major Arab military action against Israel. Whereas perhaps a large majority of Arabs would like to destroy Israel by military means, they show no early intention (not to mention capability) of trying to do so despite Israeli claims that the Arabs plan a major attack in 1963. No Arab leader can run the risk of sustaining serious military defeat, nor is the domestic situation of any Arab state so desperate as to drive it to foreign aggression. We simply cannot accept the Israeli thesis.

5. The UAR needs too much economic assistance for too long a time from the West to undertake a major attack on Israel, except under the most severe provocation.

6. For many months no competent observer has reported trends indicating a drift toward hostilities.

7. Israel has adequate sources of weapons other than the United States, including Israel’s own rapidly developing armaments industry.

Concerns

In dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict we have two main concerns:

1. That Israel not come to feel politically isolated and/or in grave military jeopardy, lest she be tempted to engage in pre-emptive military attack against the UAR or Syria, or both. Hence our need to give adequate heed to Israel’s political interests and particularly to her requests for economic aid.

2. That the Arabs not come to feel so threatened by Israel (nuclear weapons capability along with guided or ballistic missiles) that they launch in desperation a combined arms attack on Israel. Hence our need to assure ourselves and others regarding the Israel atomic energy program.

0. Source: Department of State,NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Chron. Memo to Secretary or Under Secretary. Secret. Drafted by Strong on November 21.