Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

114. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, September 30, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Tentative Analysis of the Situation in Syria as of September 30, 1961

The following is our tentative analysis of the situation in Syria as of 2 p.m. September 29, 1961:

1. Military Situation: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces appears to have control of the entire country except perhaps an area at the port of Latakia and at the airfield of Dumayr, north of Damascus. The Egyptians are reported to have 3,000–3,500 troops at their disposal, mostly at the Latakia area, but it appears possible, on the basis of a statement made by President Nasser today, that some of these troops have been or are being withdrawn. Nasser has indicated that he does not intend to use force against the Syrians, and it is our estimate that he will not take the great risk of outside intervention or the onus he would suffer, should he engage in a full-scale military onslaught on his Arab brethren in Syria.

2. The Constitutional Situation: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces (SARC) has seized power in Syria and announced a formation of a Syrian cabinet, headed by Ma’mun Kuzbari as Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister, and has empowered the cabinet to govern by decree. Although the term Syria is now being used in communiqués, formal secession from the UAR has not yet been announced, nor has a chief of state to replace President Nasser been named. Theoretically, the way would still be open for the new Syrian regime to remain in the UAR, but this seems unlikely in view of the bitter attacks which the SARC has now begun to launch on the person of President Nasser and which Nasser has been reciprocating in his speeches in Cairo. The fact that the constitutional position is still unclear temporarily provides us with a reason for avoiding the problem of recognition, although this lack of clarity has apparently not deterred Jordan from quickly extending recognition and Iran from offering to do so.

3. The Political Complexion of the New Syrian Regime: The political orientation of the individual members of the military junta which carried out the revolution remains somewhat unclear, although some, such as Colonel Haydar Kuzbari, a cousin of the newly named Prime Minister is clearly rightist. Ma’mum Kuzbari, himself, is something of a political enigma. He comes from a conservative land-owning family which was affiliated with Col. Shishakli’s so-called pro-Western regime of 1952–54. However, he also participated in subsequent Syrian governments which were controlled by anti-Western military juntas. Aside from the fact that he seems capable of changing his political orientation at will, he is not a particularly forceful or colorful figure nor are others in the cabinet, though some seem considerably competent in their respective fields. It seems clear that the members of the all-civilian cabinet which has been named will be, as in the case of all Syrian civilian politicians since 1949, the instrumentalities through which the military junta will carry out its policy rather than the creators of policy themselves. It will be difficult to determine, therefore, what the future direction of the regime’s policy is likely to be until more is known about the background and intentions of the military officers who carried out the coup. It should be emphasized, however, that the Syrians have traditionally been highly individualistic and undisciplined people and that Syrian political movements, no matter what the coloration or how well unified at the inception, have always degenerated into squabbling factions and rivalries, turning Syria itself into a dog-eat-dog political jungle, which the communists are better equipped to deal with than we are. We thus cannot take too much comfort from the relatively conservative complexion of the new government. Additionally, for reasons that are not yet entirely clear to us, the important post of Minister of Interior in the new government, with its implied control of the Internal Security apparatus, may have been given to a pro-Communist (Dr. Adnan Quwatli) and would seemingly afford an effective point of penetration by the communists into the otherwise rightist regime. There is another Adnan Quwatli of less political prominence; therefore, we are seeking clarification as to which one has been named Minister of Interior and also an evaluation of him.

4. Implications as Regards the Political Situation in Egypt: There can be no doubt that the loss of Syria constitutes a body blow to the prestige of Nasser, both externally and internally, and it seems to us likely that, unless he can recoup some of his losses, Nasser’s position in the area and at home will gradually deteriorate. He is believed well enough entrenched in Egypt to survive for the time being, but he has many enemies who will be sharpening their knives in anticipation of the day when his crown falls. The danger is that his increasing feeling of desperation may cause Nasser to lash out in some other direction in an effort to restore his stature in the eyes of the Arab people. He has turned defeat into victory in the past by such methods and will be sorely tempted to try to do so again. Already Nasser is endeavoring to blame the events in Syria on imperialist machinations. The speed with which the Jordanians and the Iranians acted to recognize the new Syria revolutionary regime, together with the rightist leanings of at least some of the cabinet, tend to lend credence to Nasser’s charges. Further fuel would be added to this fire, if, for example, such Syrian exiles as former President Adib Shishakli, Mikhail Ilyan (Nationalist Party leader now in exile in Turkey) and a number of other Syrians who were banished because of their alleged pro-Westernism should return to the Syrian political scene. One of the basic problems we faced is that of discouraging any rash action on Nasser’s part and in endeavoring generally to stabilize the Egyptian political position. It would thus seem essential, even though recognizing that Nasser’s position is likely to decline, that we continue our policy of reasonable cooperation with his regime in the hope of influencing him toward moderation. With that thought in mind we have authorized our Ambassador to Cairo to inform the UAR Government that we intend to continue a “business as usual” policy with the regime irrespective of the present crisis, and that we are taking favorable action on the UAR request for additional PL–480 commodities.¹ Ambassador Kamel has been similarly informed.

5. Area Repercussions on the Syrian Uprising: We believe that most of the Arab governments will be inclined viscerally to react in favor of the restoration of independent Syria. Since most Arab leaders either overtly or privately have long distrusted Nasser and feared that the latter, in pursuit of his ambitions for Arab unity, would attempt to undermine their positions, they are likely to shed very few tears about the fact that Nasser’s prestige has been dealt an apparently vital blow. Some of these governments may well have second thoughts, however, about the prospects of having a shaky, unreliable Syria in their midst and of possibly having to face up to the prospect of an unstable Egypt in the near future. Additionally, although the relations of the new Syrian regime with Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, and perhaps Turkey are apt to be good, its relations with leftist-oriented Iraq are likely to be unharmonious at best.

Israel naturally also welcomes the blow to Nasser’s prestige, but it will have to face up to the prospect that an independent Syria may again become activist in its hostility toward Israel to a greater degree than is the UAR regime of President Nasser at present. Israel’s gains from the present situation are likely to be ephemeral at best.

The Department’s conclusion is that on the whole the defection of Syria from the UAR is not necessarily in the U.S. best interests, and in the unlikely event that there is an opportunity for preservation of the UAR without bloodshed, we should welcome it. However, from one point of view, the complexion of the new Syrian regime might well have been worse and, in our public statements and actions, we should take care not to prejudice our future relationships with it. For that reason we urge that we carefully refrain from offering analysis or interpretation to the press or others which might be misinterpreted as representing a bias toward one side or another.

As of noon, September 30, the situation was approximately the same except that the Syrians have sought recognition, are issuing a statement of policy and have been recognized by Turkey.²

Walt Collopy³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/9–3061. Confidential. Drafted by Barrow (NEA/NE) and cleared by Talbot.
1. In telegram 480 to Cairo, September 28, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the UAR Government at an early opportunity that the Interagency Staff Committee had approved 200,000 tons of corn for human consumption and 18,000 tons of soybean oil subject to the completion of the usual consultations. In presenting this information, the Embassy should convey the U.S. intention to continue business as usual with the UAR irrespective of the current Syrian crisis. (Ibid., 411.86B41/9–2861)
2. On October 1, the Department, in circular telegram 624, informed Near Eastern and other concerned posts: “Assuming continued effective control by new government, we contemplate responding favorably in next few days to Syrian request for recognition presented today. Timing of recognition dependent in part on prior action by several Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iraq; in part on consultations with other governments; and in part on administrative factors. While we shall speak with UARG prior to granting recognition and are hopeful UARG will accept practical situation, we shall proceed with recognition within reasonable time even though UARG would prefer we not do so. We are consulting with UK Embassy here.” (Ibid., 786B.00/10–161)
3. Collopy signed for Battle above Battle’s typed signature.