Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

109. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, September 28, 1961.

SYRIAN REBELLION

Assistant Secretary Talbot called S/S this evening at 7:15 p.m. to report the following assessment of the situation in Syria.¹ Major units of the Syrian armed forces have gone over to the rebels and have taken control of military stations and important areas in the city of Damascus. In Mr. Talbot’s view this places Nasser in an almost impossible box. If he accepts what has happened in Syria, he will lose whatever status he has achieved not only in the United Arab Republic but also as the leader of the Arab world. On the other hand if he attempts to crush the rebellion he will confront considerable military difficulties in doing so because of the problems of distance and geography. Such an effort would be an admission of the failures of his own policies to integrate Syria into the UAR. Our first preference, if there is any kind of strife or open conflict which develops between Nasser’s troops and the armed forces in Syria, would be to use our influence to limit such strife to civil war. We would thus use our every effort to forestall active interference by third parties. It is the Department’s conclusion from studying biographic reference material on the coup leaders, that the leaders of this rebellion are the same people as those who planned a coup a year ago. [4 lines of source text not declassified] However, it is the Department’s belief that King Hussein has been caught completely by surprise by the present coup.²

The question now is whether Nasser will send troops into Syria and if so whether King Hussein will order Jordanian troops to come to the assistance of the rebels. If so it seems quite possible that Israel would move troops to the west bank of the Jordan river. Mr. Talbot pointed out that in general the question of movement of troops now is one of pure speculation and conjecture. However there is a report that Hussein has moved some troops to the northern part of Jordan along the Syrian border. There is also a report that Iraq has moved some forces toward the Syrian border although they are sufficiently insignificant to have little effect on the situation. In view of the above possibilities the Department:

(a) is publicly viewing the conflict as strictly an internal matter;³

(b) does not expect any immediate resolution of the situation;

(c) is not sending any messages to the UAR;

(d) is watching the situation closely;

(e) is instructing our missions in Jordan and Israel to exercise a cautionary influence upon the governments to which they are accredited;⁴

(f) is studying evacuation plans in that area in the event they should prove to be necessary.

The 6th fleet is in the area and is scheduled to visit Beirut on Tuesday. However the Admiral in charge of the fleet is aware of the political difficulties that might ensue in the event that he moves in sight of land. Consequently he is maintaining close contact with the appropriate authorities in Washington.⁵

Mr. Bundy has been informed of the above assessment by Mr. Talbot and will presumably pass it on to the President.

Concerning the general orientation of the coup leaders Mr. Talbot indicated that they were rather conservative and fairly well disposed toward the West (albeit within a Syrian context). However Mr. Talbot regarded this as small consolation in view of the considerable repercussions which might occur throughout the Near East if Nasser’s position and prestige were seriously weakened as the result of this rebellion.

WBG

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.00/9–2861. Secret. Drafted by William B. Grant of the Executive Secretariat.
1. Earlier on September 28, Talbot had requested the Department of State Operations Center to initiate a watch on the situation in Syria. (Memorandum from Thurston (S/O) to Johnson (G), September 28; ibid.)
2. In telegram 28 from Amman, received at 3:10 p.m. on September 28, Ambassador Macomber reported that he had met with King Hussein at 3:30 p.m. Amman time and found the King “thoroughly puzzled re what actually happening Syria and, on basis latest radio reports, distinctly pessimistic re success coup effort.” The King said he had decided not to move troops into the northern part of Jordan, and if he decided to do so later, it would be only for defensive purposes. King Hussein later telephoned Macomber to say that, after hearing radio reports indicating the coup had a better chance of success than he had thought, he had decided to move some troops into the northern areas of Jordan. (Ibid., 786B.00/9–2861)
3. In circular telegram 599, September 28, 6:15 p.m., the Department cautioned posts to take the utmost care in public and private discussions to avoid reflecting any bias for or against Nasser and the UAR as opposed to an independent Syria. The telegram noted: “whereas US by no means favors build-up of Nasser neither does it wish in current circumstances to give impression trying weaken his position or rejoicing at blow to his prestige occasioned by present situation. FYI. We believe breakup UAR is not in US interest since an independent Syrian Government likely to be affected with same or worse chaos and rivalry that existed prior to union. End FYI. If queried regarding US attitude posts should state USG regards matter as one of internal origin in which USG hopes there will be no external intervention.” (Ibid.)
4. The Department instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 193, September 28, 6:25 p.m., that, while the United States did not object to the British Ambassador urging restraint on Israel, “at present we do not wish make approach to GOI ourselves. Department believes peaceful reconciliation between Nasser and Syrian military is solution which would impose least strain on area stability. If Israel strikes attitudes or moves forces in manner which in your judgment might increase tensions, you are authorized inform GOI that USG appreciates their apprehension and determination to insure their own security. However, USG assumes any moves deemed necessary will be made in way that cannot be misunderstood. Given Arabs’ deep-seated suspicion Israel’s territorial ambitions such misunderstanding easily created.” (Ibid.) The instructions to Amman were sent in telegram 116, Document 111.
5. According to the September 28 memorandum from Thurston to Johnson, the essence of the guidance given by NEA to the Pentagon liaison officer was that “the fleet might wish to deploy more forces in the Eastern Mediterranean on a provisional basis, this to be done quietly. In general, every effort will be made to avoid the appearance of any external intervention.”