103. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

SUBJECT

  • President Nasser’s Reply to President Kennedy’s Letter of May 11, 1961

Enclosed is an English translation of a letter from the President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, which was personally delivered to the Department of State on August 30 by Ambassador Kamel. Also enclosed is a memorandum of conversation of Ambassador Kamel’s call on the Department.1 This letter is in reply to President Kennedy’s letter of May 11, 1961.

The letter appears to conform to the pattern of the replies from other Arab leaders, viz: (a) the Arabs are appreciative of President Kennedy’s letter; (b) in replying, President Nasser felt it necessary to make the usual remarks about Israel; and (c) the Arab countries nevertheless continue to leave the door open as far as movement on the Palestine question is concerned.

[Page 243]

The letter is lengthy and rambling. Factually, it appears to be generally accurate. Frequent references are made for [to] our past support of the Israeli cause in reviewing the history of United States relations with the United Arab Republic. However, the letter broadens its context beyond Israel and places considerable stress on new forces of revolution and nationalism in the Middle East with which President Nasser believes the United States should accommodate itself. President Nasser apparently believes that President Kennedy is appreciative of these new forces and seems to have considerable hope that, in the future, United States policies will recognize these forces. Recognition is given to United States assistance to his country during the Suez crisis and economic aid in the form of wheat shipments and loans that have been provided since 1958.

An expression of gratitude to the Soviet Union for its help in meeting United Arab Republic defense requirements is also included. The forthrightness with which this is asserted is probably in the interest of keeping the message balanced and as a means of answering any Soviet protests that might arise over the message’s otherwise friendly tone.

In general, given Arab bitterness regarding Israel and the fact that President Nasser must assume that his letter will eventually be published, we believe that the letter is extraordinarily warm in tone, mild in language, forthcoming, and hopeful for the relations of the two countries in the future. It is quite clear that President Nasser wants to have friendly and continuing contacts with President Kennedy. The letter does not refer to the present approach of the Palestine Conciliation Commission but, by its very absence, it does not close the door to further initiatives with respect to the Palestine question.

The Department’s recommendations concerning a reply to the letter will be forwarded shortly.2

N.A. Veliotes3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/8–3061. Confidential. The source text indicates NEA/NE as the drafting office. Attached is an earlier draft of the memorandum which indicates Dickman as the drafter. Cleared by Strong, Cottam, and Dickman.
  2. Neither printed. Nasser’s letter is dated August 22.
  3. On September 8, the Department of State, with White House approval, instructed the Embassy in Cairo to “take early informal occasion to state to appropriate senior UAR official with access to Nasser that President Kennedy was pleased with friendly tone Nasser’s Aug 22 letter. Also pleased at Nasser’s forthright denunciation of Soviet resumption nuclear testing and reported efforts secure moderate resolution on German question at Belgrade. Although our views are naturally not totally in accord with Nasser’s on a number of issues discussed in the letter and at Belgrade, we nevertheless regard the foregoing actions as concrete, positive contributions to the strengthening of US–UAR relations which US earnestly desires.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786B.11/9–861) On September 9, Battle informed Bundy in a memorandum that the Department of State felt no further reply to Nasser’s letter was required. (Ibid., 611.86B/9–961)
  4. Veliotes signed for Battle above Battle’s typed signature.