37. Memorandum From Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Mac—
1.
I agree that taking a philosophic view of the peace treaty will trouble the West Germans.
2.
On the other hand: The West Germans will be even more troubled if we keep on building up the peace treaty as a big issue, and then it happens—as it will—despite our protests.
3.
Which is worse—
(a)
Bothering the Germans now by putting main emphasis on access, rather than the peace treaty?
(b)
Bothering them a lot more in six months, by huffing and puffing about the treaty until it occurs—and then laughing it off (which is all we’ll be able to do)?
4.
I would suggest placing increasing stress on these points (which are not new), in our public posture:
(a)
A peace treaty would have no validity; it would change nothing as far as Western rights are concerned.
(b)
Access is a critical issue. The U.S. must stand firm on this issue if it is to fulfill its obligations to the people of Berlin.
5.
An additional consideration: World opinion will understand the issue of keeping the traffic moving to Berlin; the Soviets lost propaganda-wise from the last blockade. World opinion will not get excited about the treaty issue.
Henry Owen2
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Henry Owen. Secret.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.