Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, December 18, 1961, 8 p.m.

1451. Eyes only for the Secretary. In my call on him this afternoon, Chancellor began conversation re Paris meeting by saying he simply didn’t understand what had happened. He seemed critical of everyone concerned. He mentioned Sov moves since date of his talk with de Gaulle, including Khrushchev’s speech to WFTU, Menshikov’s speech in Washington, note re General Heusinger,² propaganda attack on Denmark, etc., and commented it was natural that French would want to wait some weeks before we resumed exploratory talks in Moscow. He referred also to his remark in our conversation last week³ re de Gaulle’s fear of reading in press that he had reversed himself, and went on to say he felt we should have intimated our displeasure to Sovs on their recent moves, sent Amb Thompson out for his holiday, and then delayed soundings until first part of January.

I pointed out completely negative position of French, venturing personal view that had it been merely question of few weeks’ delay on talks in Moscow, agreement could undoubtedly have been found. Chancellor rejoined that in light his agreement with de Gaulle, it was impossible that French could have been completely negative, and when I insisted, then said Couve must have been at fault.

I told Chancellor of your statement in telegram to me from Paris⁴ that you would be in further touch with him, endeavored to explain difficulty caused by French unwillingness to join in working out agreed position, and asked if he had any suggestions. His only reply was to say I should tell you he would get in touch with de Gaulle, indicating that he would try to clear up what he seemed to regard as merely unfortunate misunderstanding.

My only comment is that Adenauer must find it impossible to visualize split between himself and de Gaulle, and is endeavoring to rationalize French performance. Reston told me yesterday Chancellor took substantially same line as above in conversation with him on December 16, and with me he seemed careful to avoid any indication of annoyance with de Gaulle himself. I surmise, however, that privately Adenauer will make strong attempt to induce de Gaulle to be more forthcoming.

Dowling

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1861. Secret; Priority.
2. A copy of the December 10 Soviet note on General Heusinger is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2003.
3. See footnote 4, Document 235.
4. Secto 43 from Paris, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1561)