Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

145. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

848. Re Berlin tel 299.²

Recognize that in dealing with recent developments in Berlin we have to consider psychology of Germans and particularly West Berliners as well as effect our actions or inaction on Soviet appraisal our intentions. Nevertheless believe we must not be led by events and must keep in mind our long range national interests. In this context desire point out we cannot realistically expect to reach agreement with Soviets on Berlin question without dealing with problem of refugees. I do not believe we could ever formally agree to turn control over to East Germans and therefore if we expect peaceful solution only way this problem could be handled is for us to be able eventually to accept de facto that East Germans will prevent refugees from reaching West Berlin. I therefore believe that in any actions we take we should not preclude this possibility. If UN debate should take place believe emphasis should be on general subject of self-determination for Germany as a whole rather than on problem of Berlin. With regard to reftel while I believe threat to incorporate West Berlin in West Germany can be of utility if used carefully since this is something Soviets very anxious avoid, believe actual taking of this action not in our interest. (German Ambassador is convinced, and I believe rightly, that in any settlement Soviets will demand legal separation West Berlin from West Germany. He indicated his belief that Adenauer would be prepared de facto to put stop to such actions as holding Bundestag meetings in Berlin but implied he could not formally do so.) If we expect Soviets to accept peaceful solution we must be prepared find some way of reducing Berlin’s role in cold war along lines of our Geneva proposal. Soviets would have little faith in such proposals if West German politicians, particularly those who may come to power in future, were relatively free to exploit Berlin situation and Khrushchev would certainly not be in position to convince Ulbricht and his other allies that they should accept settlement which would in fact worsen position from his point of view. Believe this card akin to Khrushchev’s peace treaty which is more useful as threat than as fact.

While for present we must clearly maintain our own right of free circulation in East Berlin I would go so far as to suggest that with foregoing considerations in mind we should avoid taking position on this matter from which it would be difficult for us later to retreat. In this connection I am somewhat more pessimistic than formerly on possibility reaching agreed settlement and something along lines of Solution “C” may be our only out. In short, while I believe we must take account of psychological factors, we should be very careful not to bar any of few remaining roads to a peaceful settlement.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-961. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.
2. Telegram 299, September 8, reported that the Western countermoves to Soviet and East German actions since August 13 had been largely ineffective other than as morale boosters for West Berlin. Since the Soviet Union had been trying for some time to weaken the ties between West Berlin and the West, the Mission at Berlin suggested that a dramatic way to strengthen those ties would be to allow West Berlin to become the 12th Land in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Ibid., 762.00/9-861)