135. Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS PUT TO THE PRESIDENT

The following program was presented to the President for use in the event of interruption of civil air access to West Berlin.

The Soviets may seek to accomplish this interruption in either of two ways: first, by administrative procedures or warnings or threats which would have the consequence of leading the airlines to make their own decisions not to fly, or, second, by a military act such as forcing a plane down in East Germany, which would then be followed by a decision of the civil airlines to stop flying. It was the recommendation to the President that in the former case we should move to military transport without fighter escort, and in the latter case we should move to military transport with fighter escort.

In the event that there is attempted interference with an unescorted military transport, the pilot is to attempt to continue to his assigned landing field in West Berlin, but if the safety of the aircraft requires it, he may make a forced landing under direct threat, in East German territory or in East Berlin. The President wishes to review this recommendation in the light of comments which General Taylor and I made to him after the meeting.2

In the event that a military aircraft is forced down or shot down, we would proceed at once to the use of air cover, and the fighter aircraft would have instructions to respond by force to any air attack and to drive off any buzzing aircraft by force if necessary. They would not be authorized to engage in deep pursuit or to attack airfields, and the President overruled a recommendation that they should have standing instructions to respond to anti-aircraft attack by counterattack. He wished to review this question after the first such episode had occurred.

In the event of any interference with civil air access, the allies have agreed to block access of Bloc civil aircraft to their own countries, and to [Page 385] all NATO countries if agreement can be reached. The case will also be taken at once to the Security Council.

Finally, it was agreed that the Secretary of State will call in the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires and give him a stern warning against any interference with air access, civil or military, to West Berlin.

McG. B.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret.
  2. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book the Berlin Steering Group met at the White House beginning at 3 p.m. (Johnson Library) The President joined the meeting shortly after 4. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log Book) In addition to the decisions recorded here, at 9 p.m. on August 31 Lemnitzer cabled Norstad and reported that the President had approved reinforcement of U.S. Air Force units in Europe and instructions dealing with possible Soviet harassment of U.S. air access. (Memorandum to Lemnitzer, September 1; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 71 A 3470, 092 Berlin)