Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

114. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, August 16, 1961, 6 p.m.

217. For USIA—From Murrow to Wilson.² Please convey on my behalf following observations to the Secretary and others who may be concerned: they are based on conversations with Mayor Brandt, with the most influential Berlin newspaper, news service, radio and television editors, and with a senior officer of the German Press Office in Bonn with whom I have had previous contact and whose judgment I value especially. These interviews, particularly those with editors, were under conditions which I am convinced represented most serious reactions which could not have been concerted to take advantage of my presence here.

In essence these people feel that we are facing a crisis of confidence which endangers quite seriously our position. This is based on the absence of any sharp and definite followup action since the Secretary’s statement.³ However this feeling of letdown is the greater because the President’s speech⁴ had had such a large readership and television following and had evoked such widespread public acceptance as a promise of firmness. I have not been impressed by German complaints of the lack of display of US military presence since sector borders were closed. I realize also that the longstanding belief that US support is the main and only German protection makes them impatient of our desire to act in concert with NATO Allies. Taking into account these prejudices and discounting numerous emotional arguments which have been made to me I am nevertheless convinced that what is described as the surrender of East Berlin to Ulbricht with all that this immediately implies has been a shock so severe that it can gravely affect our future relations, first, with the city of Berlin and its leaders, and second with the Federal Republic once the extent of the disillusionment here is recognized in Bonn.

I am concerned less with substantive acts than with a psychological climate which I feel can and should be corrected. Since even the most uninformed here is well aware of the ring of Soviet military forces around the city I do not feel that we are being asked to do anything unreasonable. What I do recommend however is that we should take a number of steps which need not necessarily affect the substance of our position but which if sufficiently well publicized would evidence the interest and support which we have so often pledged. Simply as an example, such a relative simple step as the publicized rupture of current negotiations of new cultural agreements with Communist countries would make an impression as would a well publicized and sharply worded statement of what violations of existing commitments the Soviets have made by allowing Ulbricht to close the borders.

I am aware of the constant need of Berliners for reassurance and of the irritation this often causes. The point I want to make as strongly as possible is that I am convinced we run the risk of an abrupt and serious worsening of our relationship with the people of Berlin and then with the Federal Republic unless we take some immediate steps to reassure them since they are now in a very low state of mind. There is very little that USIA as an agency can do about this until we adopt the necessary public attitude.

Comment: I anticipate Berliners will label our Aug 15 letter⁵ of protest belated and tepid. No one here asking large violent action, merely some action, some proof this is not “another sample of ‘Hitler’s take over of Rhineland’”. I think the timetable for this crisis has been stepped up very considerably and there is real danger that Berliners will conclude they should take themselves, their bank accounts and movable assets to some other place. What is in danger or being destroyed here is that perishable commodity called hope.⁶

Lightner

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1661. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:23 p.m. and passed to USIA at 3:45.
2. Repeated to Bonn. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1989, 724. Murrow, who was visiting USIA offices in Europe, had arrived in Berlin on August 12. Apparently on Monday, August 14, he sent a telegram similar to this one directly to the White House; see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 348-349, and Dulles, The Wall, p. 68. No copy of this telegram has been found.
3. See Document 104.
4. See Document 81.
5. For text of this letter, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-777.
6. On August 17 Ambassador Dowling endorsed Murrow’s analysis of Berlin morale, stating that he also was “sharply disturbed by crisis of confidence in Berlin.” Dowling continued that he favored “some further, dramatic step” which would reassure Berlin, and suggested that the President send a personal message to the people of Berlin. (Telegram 354 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 662 A.62 B/8-1761)