Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, November 9, 1963.

2994. Please deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Butler.

Begin verbatim text.

I am most grateful for your personal message of October 28.¹ I personally much regretted that the timing was not right for a brief visit with you in London, but I hope that we can find time at the NATO meeting for full talks.

Your reflections on the WEU meeting were most valuable to us. We felt encouraged by the general atmosphere of UK-EEC cooperation reflected both in the press and by comments made by the participants.

I found similar encouragement in my visit to Bonn,² although the necessity for still another “reassurance” about the United States commitment to the defense of Europe was a bit tedious. However, it did pay a more important dividend than I expected when I left Washington. I would suggest that you look at the two speeches made by Chancellor Erhard and me at Frankfurt as somewhat related to each other. He and I did not review each other’s speeches in advance but I have reason to believe that my statement helped to provide both encouragement and freedom of action to the Chancellor for what was a most important statement of German policy. I also have reason to believe that after I had indicated to him the general line that I expected to take, his own statement was strengthened in relation to European unity and Atlantic partnership. I found Chancellor Erhard confident and in good spirit and not inclined to look over his shoulder unduly at either Chancellor Adenauer or President DeGaulle. Both he and Schroeder seemed to have a clear view that the interests of Germany itself lie in the larger framework of Europe and the Atlantic in political, defense and economic fields.

In private talks with German leaders and with a few of the press people, I was quite frank about the growing sensitivities in the United States about double standards within the alliance. A certain bluntness on my part may have stirred the dovecotes a bit, but it is necessary that they understand that we, too, have some problems.

I send you this message while the Soviet motivations in the most recent convoy incident³ are still unclear. This occurrance reminds me, however, that the most important problem that we have in the alliance is not so much our own Western housekeeping affairs but the need for a common, penetrating and sophisticated examination as to how we and the West look upon events within the communist world and what these might mean for East-West relations. Nothing is more urgent, in my view, than to find the right line between naivete and illusion, on the one side, and a certain blindness to the possibilities of major changes which could benefit the free world and contribute significantly toward peace. An example of what I have in mind is the need for a common Western position on credits to the Soviet bloc.

At the moment I must confess that I am not too optimistic about early additional agreements in the multilateral field. The Soviets have been unwilling, to come clean, for example, on the relation between their non-aggression pact proposal and the situation in Berlin. Static observation posts are linked to a nuclear free zone in Central Europe and to a mutual reduction of forces in Germany. The non-dissemination agreement is temporarily stalled and not just because of the multilateral force. The prospects for significant moves ahead at Geneva are not very good. We are ready to continue our explorations on these matters but I see real difficulty.

On the bilateral Washington-Moscow line, we may be able to make a certain headway. We have had some difficulty in adjusting ourselves to the sudden interest of the Soviet Union in buying wheat, but we are doing our best on that. A possible consular convention is under discussion in Moscow. We can proceed with technical talks to clear the way for an exchange of one or two civilian air flights each week between New York and Moscow. We are also taking a look at broader trade problems despite obvious legislative and economic limitations on our side. We will do what we can to find additional points of agreement both with Moscow and other Eastern European countries.

I might conclude by saying that we are most anxious to find ways and means of bringing France back into the common discussion of the serious matters in front of us. This will not be easy because of very farreaching differences between President DeGaulle and his own immediate neighbors on the content. But this is something which you and we should talk about; it is regrettable that we in the West should be in some disarray about our own arrangements just at the time when the communist world is faced with many difficult problems.

My warm best wishes to you as you take up your heavy responsibilities.

Cordially yours, Dean Rusk. End verbatim text.

[Here follows the remainder of the telegram.]

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Bundy.
1. Not printed. In it Butler gave his impressions of the WEU meeting at The Hague and summarized his conversations with Schroeder and Couve de Murville. (Ibid.)
2. Rusk visited Germany at the end of October for the dedication of a memorial to George C. Marshall. For text of his address at Frankfurt on October 22, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1963, pp. 726–731.
3. On November 4 Soviet military authorities had prevented a U.S. convoy from proceeding to Berlin along the autobahn.