Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

44. Scope Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

SET–D–1/1

Washington, June 11, 1962.

SECRETARY’S EUROPEAN TRIP

June 18–29, 1962

SCOPE PAPER

General

In the four principal capitals the Secretary will be visiting, the central preoccupations will be the same: Berlin; the UK-EEC negotiations on British membership in the Common Market and their political implications; and the problems of national, European and NATO nuclear capabilities.

The leaders in Paris, Bonn, Rome and London will be listening not only to what we say to them directly, but also to the reports they receive on what we say in the other capitals. Our proposed presentation in the countries visited therefore must be viewed as parts of a coherent whole, in the following context.

1. American interests in the present complex are essentially those we have been pursuing over more than a decade: to hold the line against Soviet expansion and insure the continued freedom and viability of West Berlin; to build Western Europe into an effective entity; to promote British membership in this entity; and to insure that a united Western Europe works with us ever more closely in the framework of an Atlantic alliance for ensuring our common security and a close partnership for carrying out our common responsibilities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

2. The great mass of public opinion and political leadership in Western Europe shares a deep commitment to these same objectives—European unity, NATO and partnership with the United States.

3. The principal current obstacle to our objectives lies in General De Gaulle’s policies:

a. De Gaulle has a different concept of the future shape of Europe, based on a loose cooperation of states guarding their sovereignty jealously, a conception which is designed in particular to insure French hegemony, at least on the continent.

b. In De Gaulle’s view the main thrust of the policy of such a Europe should be independence of action from the United States, and the capacity to act together separately from the United States. This is particularly important to him in matters of defense, and most important of all in the key nuclear field.

c. De Gaulle’s views on British entry into the Common Market—and hence into a political Europe—are resolutely obscure. His doubts appear based on the fear of British challenge to French hegemony and on a sense that Britain would be a permanent spokesman for American interests within the European complex.

4. De Gaulle’s power to inhibit progress towards our objectives depends on his ability to seduce Chancellor Adenauer into support of his policy line. Without this support he is isolated in Europe. Experience has shown that De Gaulle will bend his policies away from his real objectives to the extent necessary to prevent such isolation which would threaten his claim to continental leadership. Therefore Chancellor Adenauer is the key to the situation.

5. Adenauer’s fundamental purposes and convictions are the same as ours. The two equally important cornerstones of his foreign policy have been (a) the preservation of the U.S. political and military commitment to Europe; and (b) Franco-German rapprochement and the integration of Germany into the West on a basis of equality. He tends to favor British entry into a united Europe as consistent with these objectives. So far he has felt that Franco-German reconciliation, European unity and the American Alliance were mutually consistent objectives, and he has tried to manage things in such a way as to avoid having to face a situation where he might have to choose among them.

6. De Gaulle’s basic tactic in order to get Adenauer’s support has required him to undermine the Chancellor’s confidence in the United States over the problem of Berlin and relations with the Soviet Union. In pursuing this tactic, he has been able to take advantage of the Chancellor’s basically suspicious temperament, of German concerns arising from their exposed position, of their fear of being discriminated against, and of the Chancellor’s deep distrust of British policy on the German problem.

The result of the Chancellor’s suspicions and De Gaulle’s play on them has been manifested in a periodic mistrust of American policy, which seems to us unjustified, and in a continual demand for reassurance which seems to us unnecessary. Needless to say we cannot afford to yield to the natural tendency to be irritated by these manifestations of insecurity. Rather we must be prepared to reiterate to the Chancellor as often as necessary our assurance that the United States is firmly on his side on the problem of Berlin and Germany and to encourage him not to desert his own deep convictions on the future shape of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, convictions which we fully share.

7. At the same time our objective in the rest of Europe should be not publicly to attack and isolate De Gaulle, but to let him draw for himself the conclusion that he cannot bring the Germans along with him on his conception of the shape of Europe. Experience indicates that if he recognizes that his present tactic will not work, De Gaulle will adjust to the situation by moving in the direction of policies more nearly consistent with our own.

8. As a part of this same strategy, it is important to avoid the impression in Paris and Bonn that we are the principal sponsors of British membership in the Common Market, or that our objectives are identical with those of Britain on Berlin and East-West policies. We must also avoid anything which extends or calls undue attention to the special US-UK relationship in the nuclear field. Such actions can only play into De Gaulle’s hands by strengthening the image of an “Anglo-Saxon” bloc in opposition to continental interests.

9. In summary the following basic objectives are recommended for the four principal capitals visited:

a. In Paris, to create a general impression of good will (especially in connection with our wholehearted support of De Gaulle’s Algerian policy), while adhering firmly but politely to our policies which involve differences of opinion with De Gaulle on assistance to national nuclear weapons capabilities in Europe, on the collective defense concept, and on trie future shape of Europe.

b. In Bonn, to reassure the Chancellor in the strongest terms of our determination to preserve the freedom of Berlin and Allied rights there; to recall to the Chancellor our wholehearted support of his own basic convictions on the creation of a strong united Europe (including the UK) in close and continuing partnership with the United States within a strong Atlantic Alliance; and to emphasize the close inter-relation of our nuclear policies to these goals.

c. In Rome to stress our common dedication to European unity and Atlantic partnership, and to try to secure Italian support of nuclear policies which are consistent with this purpose.

d. In London, to reiterate our support for British membership in the Common Market and in a united Europe on terms which will safeguard the interests of non-member countries as a group; to suggest to the UK our view that the nuclear future of Europe lies via the multilateral, not the national, route; and at the same time to avoid saying anything which would strengthen the image of an “Anglo-Saxon” bloc on the problem of Germany and East-West relations.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2126. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but other papers in the SET series were drafted in the Department of State. Briefing papers, telegrams to and from Rusk, and memoranda of his conversation during his visit to Europe are ibid., CFs 2121–2127.