Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

416. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 26, 1963.

SUBJECT

• General Discussion

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • President Johnson¹
  • Under Secretary Ball
  • Assistant Secretary Tyler
• United Kingdom
  • Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister
  • Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador

After a brief discussion of the events of the last few days, the President said that the United States and the United Kingdom had many problems which must be faced in common. He was looking forward to having the same cordial and intimate relationship with UK as President Kennedy had. The Prime Minister echoed these sentiments with great emphasis. He asked the President if he would let him know when he would have time for a more extensive meeting in order to discuss world problems together. He said he would like to be able to tell the press today that he feels sure that the United States intends to keep up the same close and friendly relationship which had existed up to now. The President agreed to his doing so.

The President said that there was a good deal of Congressional and budget business that he must attend to first, and that when this had been taken care of, he would be glad to see when it would be possible to have a meeting. The Prime Minister said that he might perhaps say to the press that a meeting would be held next year, and the President said that he could say “some time early in the New Year.” The Prime Minister said that Chancellor Erhard was coming to London in the middle of January. There might be a possibility of having a meeting either before or after that date. Mr. Ball said that we would have to take a look at the calendar.

The Prime Minister asked whether the President thought that we were going to have much trouble with the French. The President gave an account of his conversation with President de Gaulle on the previous evening.² He said that it had been surprisingly warm, but there had not been much substance. He had found de Gaulle very affable. The Prime Minister observed that de Gaulle certainly was very friendly in manner, but that this did not necessarily reflect a change in his views or intentions. Mr. Ball said that Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told him on the previous day that he did not expect anything of very great importance to come up in the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris in December.³ The Prime Minister said that he was worried about the French position on strategic problems. He thought that the French might now block outright any further progress to harmonize the views of the Alliance on strategy. The curious thing was, he said, that de Gaulle had told him only about eighteen months ago all about the concept of forward strategy, which should be supported with mobile divisions. And now, he had switched to an entirely different concept of the “absolute trip wire,” under which if one single Russian crossed the frontier, we would all find ourselves in nuclear war.

The Prime Minister said he assumed that the United States Government continued to attach great importance to the German question. The President agreed and Mr. Ball added that he felt that Chancellor Erhard was creating a good impression in his first weeks of office. Foreign Minister Butler in London had told him that he had also been favorably impressed by Erhard. The Prime Minister said that he thought Erhard was much more flexible than Adenauer and that he had a certain element of laziness in his makeup, so that he was much less arbitrary.

The Prime Minister referred to the message he had received from Khrushchev on Berlin four or five days ago, in which Khrushchey suggested the possibility of an additional parallel declaration on Berlin by the Soviet Government. He said that the language which the Soviet Government had proposed was not really much good, but he thought the idea was worth looking at carefully to see if it might lead to further progress. The Prime Minister said that a copy of Khrushchev’s message to him had been sent to Bonn to be given to the Germans, and that he would tell Chancellor Erhard about it at lunch today. The Prime Minister went on to say that he felt it was most important that contact between President Johnson and Chairman Khrushchev should be maintained. He said he thought it was also very important to keep in close touch with Chancellor Erhard. Ambassador Ormsby Gore also said that, in spite of the difficulties involved, it was most important to continue to work at keeping the dialogue with the Russians going.

The President said he hoped there was no feeling, or conclusion in Europe that there would be a change in the approach of the United States to international problems. He said that he had embraced President Kennedy’s approach. The United States was not coveting any territory, nor seeking any aggrandizement. The United States was seeking to find a common ground for the peaceful solution of problems. He said we must lead from strength; but at the same time make some progress. He had been encouraged by the conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty,⁴ and by the fact that it had found support both in Congress and from the American people. He had also been encouraged by the prospects of the sale of wheat, to the Soviet Union. All this showed, he said, that President Kennedy’s leadership had some effect in the country at large. He did not want to reverse this trend. The major problem of our time is: Can we live together? In order to find this out, we should keep our contacts with the Soviet Union and try to meet them more than half way.

The Prime Minister said He was much gratified by the President’s words. He said that the principal difficulty before us was “this wretched business of Berlin.” He said this was an awful thing to have been left with. The commitment of the West to protect and defend Berlin must be firm, but he wished that the necessity for it had not arisen. The President said that perhaps there was some increased flexibility in the new German leadership which would enable us to make some progress. This had not been possible when Adenauer was Chancellor. The Prime Minister agreed, and said he thought it would be easier to discuss the German problem with Erhard.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on December 2. A memorandum of the President’s conversation with the Prime Minister on Indonesia is ibid.
1. President Kennedy was assassinated November 22 in Dallas, Texas.
2. See Document 276.
3. No record of the conversation has been found.
4. For text of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed August 5, 1963, at Moscow, see 14 UST 1313.