41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium0
3382. Brussels USEC for info. Personal for Ambassador from the Secretary. Please deliver following as personal message from me to Spaak.
Begin text.
Dear Mr. Minister:
I know that the carpets and glass problem has been a serious preoccupation of the Belgian Government and that the matter has been widely discussed in the councils of the European Community. Since returning from Athens I have personally reviewed the situation. Because I [Page 101] am persuaded that events may get out of hand and seriously damage the whole fabric of our Atlantic relationships, I feel that I must write to you personally.
As you know the President decided only after long consideration that he must invoke the escape clause with respect to these two products. Under existing legislation this was the only mechanism available to him for dealing with a critical domestic problem.
I must tell you frankly that there is no possibility, under present circumstances, that this action can be reversed. However, it was always the President’s intention to take the necessary measures to provide adequate compensation. We have already made some initial proposals in this direction. These represent the most that can be offered under existing legislation. But the President has definitely in mind that when the new trade legislation becomes effective we can work out with you a mutually satisfactory arrangement.
Compensation is, of course, the traditional method by which such matters are arranged between friends under the provisions of the GATT. I am concerned, therefore, that the member nations of the European Community may elect not to pursue this normal course but instead to take retaliatory action against American exports.
I cannot over-emphasize the lamentable effects of such a decision for Atlantic relations. It would be deeply disturbing to America. It could unleash formidable pressures here to continue the process. At the very least, it would almost certainly lead to the imposition of legislative rigidities in our policy and foreclose any possibility of an amicable readjustment at a later date.
For the Community to insist on retaliation as almost its first exercise of a common commercial policy would be regarded here as presaging a future of strained commercial relations just at a time when we are attempting, through the development of far-reaching trade legislation, to enter a new age of commercial cooperation that can mark a long forward step toward an effective Atlantic Partnership.
Because of the grave consequences of the situation that I fear may be developing I am appealing to you as a friend and statesman—as the man who almost more than anyone else has provided the inspiration and drive for a united Europe and a strong Atlantic Partnership. I want you to know I fully understand the difficulties this problem created for you, and I will do my best to work for an eventual solution which would be mutually agreeable. I ask you to do everything possible to avoid an action that could mark a serious setback for the great common enterprise we are undertaking together. End text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/5–3162. Confidential. Drafted by Ball and Vine, cleared by Trezise and Cleveland, and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, and The Hague.↩