39. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville
- Under Secretary of State George W. Ball1
- Ambassador James M. Gavin
I had a one-hour conversation with the Foreign Minister Monday, May 21, with only the Ambassador present. The discussion was confined very largely to the problems and implications of the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Community.
I began the discussion by recalling the consistent American support for the Community and for the development of a United Europe. This support had been motivated primarily by political considerations. We [Page 92] had seen in the development of a United Europe, a means of containing Western Germany and tying it irretrievably to the Western World. Because of our emphasis on political unity we had discouraged British efforts either to build a European Free Trade Area or to merge the Free Trade Association with Europe, since we had regarded these efforts as a step toward diluting the political content of Europe. However, we were persuaded that the British were now on the verge of a major national decision. While no British politician would dare to admit it, we were persuaded that the British were preparing to reverse four hundred years of policy toward the Continent. More and more thoughtful Englishmen recognized that their destiny no longer lay in being the center of a world system—a posture they could no longer afford—and that their historic role should now be played out within a European framework. We were therefore of the view that if the United Kingdom became a full member of the European Community, the British would work toward progressively greater unity and would not drag their feet.
I reminded Couve that when this matter had been originally discussed with the British we had made clear that we would welcome their decision to seek membership in the Community only if they were, on their side, ready to accept the full commitments expressed and implied of the Rome Treaty and were willing to regard the Treaty not as a static document but as a living process.
They were now, we felt, prepared to play a full role in Europe. What remained was the working out of technical problems. This required good faith and pragmatism on both sides. Obviously not only the United Kingdom but the Six had to show flexibility. Some accommodation would have to be made for the special problems of Britain just as major accommodation had been made for the special problems of France at the time the Treaty was negotiated originally.
We felt it necessary to emphasize that while we did not think it useful for Britain to seek a relationship with Europe that would compromise the political character of the Community, we had always felt that the Community would be incomplete without British participation. So long as Great Britain remained outside the Community, it would operate as a lodestone drawing with unequal degrees of force on different parts of the body of the Community. Thus Britain, outside the Community, would remain an element of disintegration but, inside the Community, Britain would ensure European cohesion.
The Foreign Minister replied to this long statement by the assertion that he agreed with most of what I had said. However, he was inclined to disagree somewhat on our appraisal of British intentions. This was of course a matter of judgment in which we might be right or the French Government might be right.
[Page 93]The French concept of the Community of the Six had been based fundamentally on a political relationship. The French Government felt that, if not expanded beyond its present membership of Six, the Community would probably move toward a progressively higher degree of economic—and ultimately—political integration. It might well become a kind of Federal system; in fact, he would not exclude the possibility that it might become a true United States of Europe. He stated emphatically that this view was shared by General de Gaulle. The General did not exclude the possibility that the Community in its present form could evolve into a true United States of Europe.
As now constituted the Community was relatively homogeneous. It consisted of Continental powers except for one nation that was not so much a European as a maritime nation. The Netherlands was an island in the same sense that the United Kingdom was an island. The Dutch had never really been interested in Europe; they had always been looking out over the waters at other areas of the world. As a consequence they had resisted the development of Europe at almost every point. The Dutch were, of course, in many ways the best of the partners in the Community since they were the most honest and the most steady. But they were not Europeans—at least they were not Continental Europeans—as were the French and Germans.
This was a point that bothered the French very much in considering the problem of the adhesion of the United Kingdom. What British adhesion meant was not merely United Kingdom membership in the Common Market; it meant also that the United Kingdom would bring with it Denmark and Norway. These were not true European nations. Denmark was a small country concerned primarily with butter and eggs and bacon. Norway was preoccupied with fishing and shipping. Neither cared much about Europe.
If British accession were to mean also the accession of the Scandinavian countries and Ireland, then, after the Community had passed into the next Treaty phase in which decisions would be made not by unanimity but by some form of qualified majority, Germany and France might be outvoted by countries that were not really European but maritime in character.
As a result of these considerations, he and General de Gaulle had become persuaded that if the United Kingdom should become a part of the European Community, the nature of the Community would be transformed. One could no longer expect progress towards a United States of Europe; the Community would assume the character of an economic or commercial arrangement, which was something very different. It would be more like NATO or the EEC. France had had long [Page 94] experience with Great Britain in European enterprises and his conclusions reflected that experience.
Nevertheless he and General de Gaulle felt that if Great Britain was, in fact, prepared to accept the Rome Treaty, the British were entitled to join and the same would be true of their Scandinavian colleagues.
I told the Foreign Minister that I thought our difference of view lay to considerable extent in the different appraisal we made of British intentions. We would not be very enthusiastic about British membership if we thought that it would involve a weakening of the Community, an influence that would transform the Community into a mere commercial arrangement.
I reminded the Foreign Minister that the Britain of today was very different from the Britain they had known in the past. A new class was coming into power which had not been oriented to the concept of Empire. It would readily adjust, in my view, to a major role within the European framework. It was a mistake to assume that Britain’s adhesion to the Rome Treaty would mean a watering down of political progress. So far as the United States was concerned we had always been interested in the idea of Europe as a full partner with us in our endeavors. We wanted very much, therefore, for Europe to move toward as much political integration as possible.
We were not very much concerned about the problems of a third force since we were persuaded that all of us were committed to the same general objectives. On our side we were prepared to develop the Atlantic institutions as rapidly as possible to make it practicable for Europe speaking with one voice and America to work in the closest of harmony and the closest of cooperation toward the achievement of common goals.
I then turned the conversation to the question of a political treaty asking the Foreign Minister how he envisaged the development of the negotiations for such a treaty.
The Foreign Minister replied that he thought that the process had now been stopped until such time as it became clear whether or not the British were going to join. After the last meeting it was made clear that the Six were not in full agreement to go forward without British participation. Mr. Spaak had been quite emphatic about it and as far as the French were concerned they were now prepared to wait until it was clear whether or not Great Britain would come in. He was not impressed with the Italian idea that they could negotiate a political arrangement, that there would then be a meeting with the British who would agree on it and that then there would be a signature of the Treaty prior to British participation but nothing coming into effect until after British adhesion. [Page 95] This, he said, seemed to them to be a device which added very little and they were prepared to wait now until after the British came in.
The discussion then turned to the economic problems involved in British accession to the EEC. I said that I did not believe that any of these problems was insuperable. The position of the temperate agricultural products of the Commonwealth presented, of course, the most difficulty. The Foreign Minister stated that he agreed this was the principal problem. British domestic agriculture also faced difficult problems but he thought these could be worked out. Temperate agriculture of the Commonwealth remained, however, hard to resolve.
I then stated that so far as we were concerned we saw the possible key to a solution in proposals along the general line of the French initiative for some kind of global solutions. We were prepared to work toward such global solutions with the understanding, of course, that there would have to be some transitional arrangements in the meantime. He agreed that this seemed to be the proper course. He recognized that there would have to be some transitional arrangements but felt that they should be short. He volunteered one specific comment regarding the British insistence on a review of Commonwealth preferential arrangements at the end of the transition period. He felt that such a preferential provision was undesirable. The whole matter should be settled immutably during the course of the present negotiations just as it had been settled at the Treaty of Rome itself.
He then said that I had not noted two problems which were of importance. One was the question of tropical products on which he thought that France and the United States were farthest apart. The second was the problem of the neutrals. I said that I did not regard either one of these problems as constituting a breaking point. Our views on tropical products were motivated by two considerations; one was our sense of responsibility for Latin America and the second was our concept of what the trading world of the future should be like. Nevertheless we would be content if we felt that there was progress being made in the right direction. If, as I understood, arrangements were being completed for a new treaty of association to last for the next five years but at a lower level of preference we would want to work with the Community during this five years to try to bring about some commodity-by-commodity solutions that would make possible free access to Northern Hemisphere markets on a nondiscriminatory basis for all tropical products. The same principle might well be applied to the products of the African states and territories of the Commonwealth. At this point the Foreign Minister raised the question as to what kind of commodity arrangements we envisaged. He suggested that we might do better to approach the problem by trying to ensure income rather than price stability for [Page 96] these products. I told him that income stability and price stability were both within the range of our consideration.
He then turned to the question of the neutrals. I told him here again that we were not adopting a doctrinaire position. However, we saw nothing but disadvantage to the United States in the neutrals having exclusive trading arrangements with the Community if that was what “association” involved. So far as I was concerned I had never been able to find out what the neutrals meant by “association”, and I didn’t think that anybody knew.
The Foreign Minister agreed, saying that he appreciated that the association of the neutrals, if that meant a mutual trading arrangement, would be disadvantageous to us and that he could understand our position. He also did not know what was meant by association but thought that what concerned the neutrals principally was their trading problems. I told him that I did not believe that the question of the neutrals would ever be a breaking point and he agreed.
We then turned to a discussion of the time schedule of the UK-EEC negotiations. I asked him if he thought it possible that the British time schedule might be met; that is, did he think it likely that the outline of a solution might be seen by the latter part of July so that the British would have something reasonably concrete to present to the Commonwealth Conference in September. He said that he thought this was not impossible; in fact he said he thought it was quite possible that such a time schedule might be kept.
We then spoke briefly of both Laos and the Congo. So far as Laos was concerned he had taken a strong line with Souvanna and thought that Souvanna realized that he had better get back to Laos before his position was eroded. He said he felt confident that there was only one course for us to pursue and that was for us to try to bring about a neutral government under Souvanna with Soviet agreement and support.
So far as the Congo was concerned, I reported on recent efforts to get Adoula and Tshombe to compare their differences. He said that he was persuaded that this again was the only course to follow. The two must be brought together if there were to be a peaceful solution to the Congo.
In conclusion I expressed the hope that we could work toward improving Franco-American communications. He replied he hoped to have some systematic talks with the Secretary before too long. He understood that this could probably not be arranged until Congress adjourned. I did not reply directly other than to say that we had many matters before Congress this year that were of particular interest to the Department and that required the Secretary’s personal attention. He then asked me when Congress might adjourn. I told him that I hoped it [Page 97] might be not later than the middle of August or Labor Day at the latest. He then commented that in his experience Congress always adjourned later than anyone predicted.
While I did not raise the question of any discussions with General de Gaulle, Couve himself volunteered the comment that in his view no purpose would be served by any direct contact between the heads of our two states at the moment. Such a meeting, he said, would be necessary at some point but certainly should not occur before the end of summer.