361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal0
318. Following FYI only. Based uncleared memcons and subject amendment on review memcons.
During Nov 6 and 7 visit to Washington, Portuguese FonMin received by Under Secretary, Secretary and President.1 On Nov 7 he addressed National Press Club and answered questions. In these conversations FonMin repeatedly stressed following points:
- (1)
- Difference in attitudes of moderate Africans in private talks with Nogueira and in their public statements. Privately moderates willing to admit that what Portugal said in New York was satisfactory and that Portuguese claims of good conditions in African territories were valid. They did not hesitate criticize extremists such as Ben Bella. In public, however, they dominated by extremists, who insisted only their point of view acceptable.
- (2)
- Lack of Portuguese surprise at communiqué issued Nov 6 by African group in UN. Communiqué reflected extremism of radicals and showed Africans continued insist only independence acceptable as outcome self-determination.
- (3)
- Disadvantages of premature independence as conducive to communism in Africa and detrimental interests of people.
- (4)
- Disagreement on urgency of situation and on premise that tidal wave running in Africa. If so, it is only because US supports it. A timetable not possible. One starts with period of 10 years and ends up with 10 months.
- (5)
- Stability, both political and economic, in Portuguese African territories. Situation far more encouraging than 2 years ago.
- (6)
- Unlikelihood that Africans could in final analysis turn to Sovs for help. Latter could not support burden.
- (7)
- Unjustified nature Congolese charges of Portuguese planning aggression. US should tell Congo (Leopoldville) its fears groundless. Portugal would continue try to be patient.
- (8)
- Consonance between program outlined in talks with Africans and self-determination. Was not self-determination result of such things [Page 985] as increased franchise, elections, plebiscite, acceleration of economic development plans and education?
- (9)
- Adoption by Portugal of US definition of self-determination. However, Portugal refused to accept African definition, i.e., that only one option—independence—is possible.
Under Secretary stressed advantages to Angola of UN presence in Congo. Re self-determination, said full range of options needed together with recognition of right of majority rule and freedom of choice in form of government. Emphasized need to compress and telescope time to accommodate great rush of events of modern world. Ten years with urgent educational program would seem be maximum period for creation conditions necessary to exercise self-determination. Secretary pointed out value of words “self-determination” and urged Portuguese champion them.
President agreed US bore some responsibility in Security Council matters and said this was reason we interfered to extent we do in Portuguese affairs. We have been attempting find a way in which we can be more helpful to Portugal. FonMin’s optimism re conditions in African territories and problems regarding timing showed we not in complete accord. We did agree that in exercise of self-determination all options should be open. Anticipating UN debate and resolution, President said we shall exert moderating influence and try make the resolution as restrained as possible. We will keep in close touch with Portuguese. President pointed out this debate likely to be difficult, for discussion such issues in UN becoming more extreme.
Full memcons pouched when cleared.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 Port. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques.↩
- Memoranda of Nogueira’s conversations with Ball and Rusk on November 6 are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330; a memorandum of the conversation with the President on November 7 is ibid., Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.↩