339. Letter From the Ambassador to Portugal (Elbrick) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler)0
Dear Bill: We have just received today uncleared accounts of the Secretary’s conversation with Franco Nogueira in Athens.1 They certainly offer us no encouragement, although I think it was useful that the Secretary should hear at first hand the charges that have been thrown at me frequently in Lisbon. I am sure that Foy2 has given you an even more vivid picture of what transpired. Nogueira’s comments and attitude give a rather clear idea of how frantic these people are and to what lengths they can go. The local political situation is now adding to the Government’s troubles and, bereft as they are of friends, they make no effort to hide their anger and chagrin.
Incidentally, we were embarrassed by the fact that we only received the first account of the Rusk-Nogueira conversation today. I should like to have seen Nogueira immediately after his return from Athens, but I could hardly do so without any knowledge of what had happened there. I shall try to arrange a meeting with him now, but meanwhile some valuable time has been lost as well as some of the atmosphere. It would have been most helpful to us if the memoranda of conversation (or summaries) could have been cabled.
I have just read The New York Times editorial entitled “The Tragedy of Portugal,” in last Saturday’s edition.3 Coming on top of everything else—particularly the statement that Portugal is “one of the poorest and worst administered nations of non-Communist Europe”—we expect the Portuguese to be even more acid than before. Actually, The Times on this occasion went out of its way to be nasty to Portugal for reasons of its own, but I think it was unnecessary to resort to exaggeration. Portugal, like Greece and others, is poor—although this has never been considered a sin—but I would take definite issue with the statement that it is the worst administered. However, The Times has always had its knife out for Salazar (as well as for Franco) and apparently had to take this cut at him. I agree that it will be difficult for Portugal to hold on to its overseas territories indefinitely, but the kind of attack Portugal has been subjected to from various quarters recently will only serve to increase the [Page 927] magnitude of the disaster resulting from the possible loss of the territories.
Jimmy Minotto of Arizona, who was once head of the aid mission to Portugal, has been here recently in the service of Senator Carl Hayden and the Senate Appropriations Committee. In advance notice to me, he billed the visit as a private one and, for the most part, made his own arrangements to call on various people here, including some officials. He turned down an offer to accompany him on these calls, although he did fill me in to a certain extent subsequently.
He is very interested in Portugal and unhappy over the present state of our relations. Having known Salazar fairly well in the old days, he spent an hour and a half with him, having made the appointment himself. He heard the usual story, but in addition Salazar commented that the people of Portugal would not countenance his agreeing to an extension of our Base rights agreement in the Azores under present conditions. This sounds ominous; the most hopeful interpretation may be that it is an expression of gamesmanship, since Salazar could be fairly sure that the word would get back to us. (Minotto said he is making no written report of his visit and hoped we could refrain from mentioning the substance of his talks in official despatches. Actually, he learned little that is new.)
When the Secretary raised the question of the Base negotiations with Franco Nogueira in Athens, Nogueira said it would be up to the “interested party” and refused to be included as an interested party himself. This, too, is not encouraging, though not unexpected. I note that the Secretary told Spaak in Athens that our delay in beginning negotiations was not unintentional.
As I wrote you previously, the delay may have worried the Portuguese Government to a certain extent, but I felt that we should not delay unduly. I still feel the same way. While the indications are all bad, we shall never know how the Portuguese may react until we actually pop the question. I am afraid that nothing that may happen in the near future will make our presence in the Azores any more—or less—acceptable to the Portuguese Government and I am anxious to get started. While the military people here can see no alternative to renewing the agreement, the political people have other ideas which we will only learn about when the negotiations begin.
There is a certain amount of political ferment locally, as we reported. More and more responsible people are beginning to question the course which Salazar seems determined to follow. The handling of the students recently was very ill-advised and the Government has made more enemies in the universities. The military remain quiet, although it is known that some important figures are giving very serious thought to the future. As usual, there are numerous rumors and these [Page 928] have been encouraged by the demonstrations on May 1 and May 8, both of which surprised the Government by the obvious disregard of the demonstrators for police authority. These demonstrations were brief and somewhat abortive, but they may well breed others. If they do and real violence erupts, there is a good chance that any change of government which results may be far to the left and this would be very unhelpful to us, to NATO, and the Western world. We can only hope that wiser and cooler heads, foreseeing some such eruption, will force Dr. Salazar’s hand and oblige him to step down. In the latter case, we can hope for a continued tenure of our Base in the Azores; in the former, our position would be most precarious.
This letter has been much too long. I do hope that our negotiating instructions will be forthcoming soon. Many thanks for taking the time to read these lines.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.53/5–1462. Confidential; Official-Informal. The source text was initialed by Tyler and Rusk.↩
- See Document 338.↩
- Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.↩
- May 12.↩