Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

311. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State⁰

Rome, January 12, 1963, 2 p.m.

1362. Embassy telegram 1342.¹ Prime Minister Fanfani’s forthcoming visit to Washington offers us an opportunity to stimulate the Italian Government toward further activity and initiative in a useful direction. It comes at a moment of unusual fluidity in the Western political scene and at one in which the Italians, bestirred to play a more important role, seem uncertain regarding specific lines of policy they should follow. Accordingly, in addition to the usefulness of discussing specific subjects the Prime Minister and we may wish to raise (see below), helpful results may be obtained if we can use the opportunity of the visit to build up the prestige and self-confidence of Italy, thus helping her to overcome her chronic worries about the role of a second rate power in Europe, and at the same time encourage the Italian Government to set a course we believe to be in our own and general interest of the West.

In recent years, as it has played a growing role in the Councils of Europe, the United Nations and in certain areas around the world, Italy has shaken off some of its postwar sense of inferiority. But the Italians now fear that the balance within the NATO Alliance is about to undergo a new change. Many believe that although Britain may have lost its “special inside track” with the United States, it is nevertheless about to assume a primary role in a new nuclear relationship, which France might conceivably join. This conjures up the specter of the directoire,² and the Italians are again wondering and worrying whether they are about to be frozen into a new and more permanent state of inferiority within NATO.

There is throughout the greater part of the Italian political spectrum an inherent tendency toward neutralism which has been more in evidence under present Italian leadership than for some time past. (Some of this, of course, is for internal tactical reasons.) Yet, the Italian center left government and its political and press supporters appear to be moving closer to United States views with respect to certain elements of foreign policy than are anti-communist center and conservative elements, which traditionally support us here. For instance, the center Left spokesmen emphasize the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the importance of the development of an Atlantic community, and are more ready to accept United States leadership and control of Western military forces in a multilateral framework, while at the same time, of course, also seeking an enhanced role for Italy. Their support for British entry into the European community has been quite articulate.

Recognizing the dangers for us implicit in certain foreign policy views of the present Italian leadership and the inclination of some of its members toward neutralism, we believe we should encourage the Italian Government to play an increasing role in NATO and to make its weight increasingly felt both there and in the EEC, where it generally advocates policies we favor. The recent stir caused by La Malfa’s alleged plan for a Rome-London axis has moved Italy into a more exposed and possibly stronger position favoring United Kingdom membership and progress toward the political unification of Europe. Fanfani has given some evidence of wanting to make these major points of Italian policy.

Italian doubts about the Nassau agreement³ and whether this condemns Italy and other non-nuclear states to second class NATO status (Embassy telegram 1334)⁴ makes such encouragements as we can give Italy at this time even more important.

We therefore see the visit as an opportunity to overcome some Italian doubts and complexes and to get Fanfani and the Italian Government committed privately and publicly (e.g., through the communiqué and presumably inevitable press interviews) to policies and principles which we favor.

As for specific subjects which the Prime Minister may raise in Washington (Embtel 1342), we have the following suggestions:

1. On the post-Cuba and post-Nassau military and political outlook, Fanfani will primarily want to hear the views of the President and the Secretary: and it seems highly important that this opportunity be taken to clarify Fanfani’s (and Martino’s and Fornari’s) thinking on the main political implications of the Nassau agreement. Suggest it also be stressed that the results of the Cuban affair were obtained by a show of United States determination and strength, and not because both the President and Khrushchev are peace-loving, as Fanfani has put it publicly here.

2. On United Kingdom membership in the EEC, although Italy has already taken a strong position vocally, it might be useful to press the Prime Minister on what specific measures he has in mind to facilitate United Kingdom accession to EEC. We understand the Italian delegation has often been less than forthcoming at Brussels when its own interests were involved. It might also be useful to explore with the Prime Minister what his views are on ways to advance European political unification and his attitude toward, for instance, the La Malfa-Lippmann thesis that the only alternative to a “Gaullist Europe” is the spread of center-left type of governments based on collaboration between European DC and Socialist Parties.

3. On East-West problems, we understand Fanfani is especially interested in knowing more about our Berlin strategy, and this interest may be heightened by the fact that Khrushchev will be in East Berlin while Fanfani is in Washington. (It might be useful to give opportunity to the Prime Minister to make some public statement of Italian views on Berlin at this juncture.)

4. On disarmament, we should be prepared for a question from Fanfani as to whether postponement of the reopening of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva has some specific significance, as is currently thought by some Italian Foreign Office officials.

We have already forwarded our suggestions about the Civil Air Agreement if that subject arises (Embtel 1343),⁵ and the Pollaiolo paintings are sure to be mentioned (Embtel 1342). We feel it is very important because of internal political factors that the Unites States not overlook some mention in regard to neutralist pressures on the Italian Government, evident during the Cuban crisis. We should, for instance, while expressing our sympathetic interest in the center-left experiment, express concern about the possible long term impact of neutralist views held by some influential members of the Socialist Party (and by the implication of the left wing of the DC itself), in view of the fact that the Socialist Party is a potential member of a future Italian Government. The United States will, of course, wish strongly to express hope for increased Italian aid to LDCs (Embassy views on this have already been forwarded separately), and increased military contribution to Western defenses.

Reinhardt

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6511/1–1263. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, London, and Paris.
1. Telegram 1342, January 10, reported on the subjects that the Italians were likely to raise during Prime Minister Fanfani’s discussions with U.S. officials. (Ibid., 033.6511/1–1063)
2. A reference to de Gaulle’s 1958 proposals for a reorganization of NATO and the establishment of a U.S.-British-French directive committee. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 314 ff.
3. For text of the Nassau agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637.
4. Telegram 1334, January 8, reported on discussions with senior Italian Foreign Office officials regarding the Nassau agreement on a multinational nuclear force. (Department of State, Central Files, 375.75611/1–863)
5. Telegram 1343, January 10, reported that Fanfani had received recommendations from members of his cabinet to denounce the U.S.-Italian Civil Aviation Agreement. (Ibid., 033.6511/1–1063)