Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

31. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State⁰

Brussels, March 22, 1962, 11 p.m.

1774. Paris for USRO. Spaak and Foreign Commerce Minister Brasseur convoked Ambassador last evening and handed him formal note (translation in following cable)¹ protesting strongly against our tariff increase on carpets and glass. They said our action was not only a major economic blow against Belgium but would have most serious social and political consequences in Belgium. It had created such a crisis that Brasseur had been obliged to cancel his long scheduled official trip to London with Prince Albert this week.

Speaking with great heat and bitterness Brasseur then reminded Ambassador of support he had given Acting Secretary Ball in connection with GATT, OECD, cotton textile and other matters. He recalled it was Belgium, acting on our urgent request (Embassy telegram 497)² that had first initialed cotton textile accord, thus preparing way for rest of Six to do so. Belgium, he said, had mistakenly believed that US regarded her as a friend and partner. Now it was clear US Government does not regard cooperation as two-way street and has no understanding of Belgium’s problems. US obviously views Belgium as small insignificant country that can be disregarded since it has no retaliatory power. He remarked how differently we behaved when large, important country such as Japan was involved, and noted that whereas all four items President had considered (carpets, glass, ceramic tiles and baseball gloves) are important to Japan, we had balanced our action with respect to Japan by only acting unfavorably on two whereas we had shown no consideration for Belgium. Furthermore, since Japanese carpet industry wages were much lower than in Belgium, net effect of our action on carpets would be to exclude Belgian carpets totally from US and permit Japan to fill this import gap. He thought we would soon find a universal belief in CM countries that we had acted in bad faith.

Brasseur said he assumed we knew our action would oblige Belgium to retaliate. He deeply regretted this, because inevitably it would weaken NATO solidarity and create serious problems between US and Europe. Europe was no longer a weak non-entity and had ability to retaliate. In fairness he wanted us to know that insofar as he is concerned Belgium will not sign and implement Geneva cotton textile agreement where we apparently are going to act in similar fashion as in carpet and glass matter and place additional 8–1/2 cent per pound compensatory tariff on imports of cotton textiles. Belgium is also already in touch with other five members of Six urging them also to refuse sign and implement cotton textile agreement. Furthermore, Belgium has also requested Six to make urgent and immediate study of recently concluded GATT negotiation commodity list with view to have CM countries take supplementary retaliatory action against items in recently concluded GATT negotiations, which are of particular importance to US.

Brasseur concluded by stating our action in raising duties on carpets virtually 100 percent and on certain types of glass almost 150 percent would wall these products totally out of American market. Belgian Government fully understood US Government under some pressure from carpet and glass manufacturers just as Belgian Government is under pressure from some of its industries to raise tariffs against certain American and other foreign products. If we had felt it essential to take some action we could have granted partial increases in tariffs on both carpets and glass, which would have given some relief without taking action to exclude all Belgian carpets and glass from American market since these industries totally dependent on US market. Our action would result in the loss of jobs of some 4,500 to 5,000 Belgian workers, and a reduction in Belgian exports to US of 14 to 16 million dollars worth of carpets and about 8 million dollars worth of glass. While we might derive satisfaction from these results he thought in long term we would pay an infinitely greater price in terms of NATO solidarity and trade and commercial relations between US and Europe.

Ambassador defended our action making reference to Acting Secretary Ball’s message to Spaak (Department telegram 2512).³ However, Brasseur brushed explanations off, saying material which Belgian Embassy had submitted to Department clearly refuted basis on which we alleged our action was necessary, and that for us to invoke “urgency” on a matter which had been under consideration for months with not undue damage to American industry was “inadmissible.”

Spaak then spoke briefly with restraint but deep concern repeating comments he made to Ambassador March 19 (Embassy telegram 1749),⁴ saying our action had created deplorable impression re lack of good faith and would place great stresses and strains on unity and cooperation of West. At a time when wounds to US-Belgian relations from Congo were healing it particularly deplorable. He would be sending a personal message to Acting Secretary Ball very soon in response to latter’s message.

Comment: We have reported violence of Belgian reaction in detail as there is no useful purpose in trying to minimize it in this restricted message. Our action has, as Spaak says, opened up old wounds in Belgian-American relations stemming from Congo, and there is mounting protest and bitterness. We do not know if anything can be done to soften blow but we urge any possibilities be considered as much more serious than reopening Congo wounds is potential adverse effect on Atlantic unity and future economic and trade cooperation. We do not know whether Belgium will be successful in dissuading other Common Market countries from implementing cotton textile agreement, but suspect that if we add eight and one-half cents per pound compensatory tax on cotton textiles, the six may refuse to implement it as a mark of solidarity with Belgium.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 411.004/3–2262. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Geneva, Paris, London, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague, and Bonn.
1. Telegram 1776, March 22, not printed. (Ibid.)
2. Dated September 19, 1961. (Ibid., 394.41/9–1961)
3. See footnote 2, Document 29.
4. Document 29.