Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

277. Memorandum From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Paris, December 13, 1963.

I am setting forth a number of conclusions which I have reached after a year in this country in regard to the foreign policy of France (or rather of de Gaulle), its relations to the U.S., and a number of suggestions for U.S. attitudes. While this memorandum is primarily prepared for your use as background material in your talks with French officials here, it may be, if you consider it wise, worthwhile taking back to Washington for presentation to President Johnson. I shall endeavor to be as brief as possible.

1. The character of de Gaulle is completely formed by his education, experience and his own characteristics, which are highly egocentric [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Insofar as I can ascertain from conversation and reading, he has never been induced to change any of his basic views by conversations with others nor as a result of concessions or favors done him by other countries. The only conceivable circumstances that can produce a shift or change in his policies, if not his attitude, would be an actual change in the conditions under which he is operating. (This was noticeable in the case of the Algerian question.)

2. The relations with the U.S., as unsatisfactory as they are to us, are in my opinion the way that de Gaulle wants them. Given his strong emphasis on the nation as the only real international unit, and his deep dislike for this reason of any form of integration or any other association which waters down the sovereignty of a country, it is natural that he should stress the independence of France in all matters. In some inherited matters where he believes that France in her “weakness” of the post-war period allowed her sovereignty to be subscribed, he has sought to disengage the French Government from these commitments wherever possible, i.e., NATO. He undoubtedly feels that too close a relationship between a relatively small country (which he bitterly recognizes to be the case in regard to France) and the U.S. could in his view lead only to an actual derogation of the weaker country’s sovereignty.

3. Therefore (leaving aside what conceivably might have been the result of an early agreement by us to provide France with atomic secrets), I am quite convinced now that de Gaulle is not interested in any conceivable offer we might make on atomic matters. I do not mean that he would not perhaps be willing to pick up items here and there which would have some immediate value to the French atomic program and might save France some money, but rather that France’s policy under de Gaulle would not be changed in any important aspect by a major concession in this field.

4. It is noteworthy that the relationship of France has not improved with any country in the world since de Gaulle came to power. The Franco-German Treaty is in a sense an improvement but has been extremely soured by recent German attitudes towards the U.S., and in particular by the current Common Market quarrel. This, I feel, is part of de Gaulle’s emphasis on independence and a genuine preference in many ways for going it alone, and I consider that many of his acts, particularly in some of his public statements—where action is not possible for France—have been motivated purely by a desire to strike out on a difficult line for French policy than that pursued, for example, by the U.S. or even by other allies. His statement on Vietnam of last August I believe falls into the first category and his refusal to talk to the Soviets with the British and ourselves into the second.

Having outlined what might be called negative elements in de Gaulle’s policy, I should like to counterbalance these now with some of the positive ones which I do not feel are widely understood and are certainly not accepted in the U.S.

1. De Gaulle does not for the foreseeable future desire in any way to see the U.S. leave Europe, especially militarily. We have some 180 installations in France and approximately 35,000 troops, and apart from current problems which arise in any country there has been no sign of any concerted French move to push us out or to make life difficult for our forces here.

2. De Gaulle believes very strongly in the Atlantic Alliance, but for the reasons given above in view of his dislike of integration he does not like the NATO organization as it now stands. It is by no means clear what he has in mind, if indeed he has anything in mind, in regard to the reorganization of NATO. I am inclined to believe that he simply does not like a NATO Supreme Commander (especially if he is an American), the international staff and the elements of integration.

3. I believe personally that there is no possibility that de Gaulle would try to double-cross the Alliance by a deal with the Soviet Union. He undoubtedly looks forward to a time many, many years hence when the Soviet Union will cease to be a cause and merely become a Russian country. At that time obviously he would expect France to welcome Russia back into the community of European nations. This, however, is problematical and so far into the future as to be unnecessary even to consider.

4. In keeping with his desire to show independence he is undoubtedly at the moment creating at least the impression that he is contemplating some move in regard to Communist China. I do not think at the moment that this involves any conscious step in the direction of diplomatic representation but merely some developments in trade and cultural affairs. This in part is again based upon his desire to show independence from the U.S. and also is connected with his belief that a settlement in Southeast Asia is only possible with the consent of Communist China.

There are in fact about four levels in France in regard to relations to the U.S. which can be discerned.

1. There is first of all General de Gaulle himself, operating from the Elysée and basing his actions on his own thoughts, his own instincts, analysis of information received, and according to all reports withdrawing more and more from any intimate contact with his colleagues. He quite literally has no close friends or even associates.

2. There is the Government, and I would say by and large, with particular reference to the Foreign Office, that the members of the Government are on the whole favorably disposed towards the U.S. They are disquieted and some are alarmed by de Gaulle’s attitude and frequently go out of their way personally to show that they do not share his attitude.

3. There is a particular vicious and uninstructed group, in the UNR especially, who swallow 100% the worst features of de Gaulle’s attitude towards the U.S. (This includes a very small number of ministers, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Their views are expressed in numbers of speeches and also have a certain penetration in the state-owned RTF and very much less so in the press.

4. Finally, there is the great mass of French people, and I would like to state that in all the times I have been in France I have never seen more genuine pro-American sentiment among the people of France as a whole. This was completely borne out by the strong reaction and the nature of the reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Conclusion

I have sought here to set down very briefly the pros and cons of current French policy, but it seems to me that they add up to the following considerations as far as the U.S. is concerned:

1. To recognize that no concession or courtesy or personal contact will have any effect upon de Gaulle’s policies or attitudes, that the relations with the U.S. are about where he would like to have them, that he will accept any concessions or courtesies as a natural right and as a recognition of his “greatness.” However, he should be at all times, as indeed should the French Government, treated with the utmost courtesy. I would recommend great care in the avoidance of any derogatory statements in regard to de Gaulle which he will be able to use for his own purposes.

2. Attempt to avoid wherever possible action which would cast doubt upon the U.S. determination to defend Europe in the event of war. In this, I should tell you that I believe that the theory of the “pause”, introduced in the spring of 1961, has more than any other factor played into the hands of de Gaulle in promulgating the theory that the U.S. could not be relied on to use nuclear weapons in Europe if necessary because of the threat to our states. I shall be very glad to discuss this at further length with you.

3. We should continue of course to work for our own interests with France, keeping in mind that apart from the attitude generated by de Gaulle and a number of key questions, i.e., atomic defense and the formulation of European unity (to which should be added the French refusal to talk on Germany, although this seems to me to be a rather empty subject for the moment), the working relations between France and the U.S. are not any where nearly as bad as they are frequently painted in the press.

Finally, I should do nothing, repeat nothing, about the question of a meeting between de Gaulle and President Johnson and I would certainly be strongly against any possibility of President Johnson coming over to visit de Gaulle (unless of course he is planning for other reasons a European trip, which I imagine would be very difficult in view of the election).

The foregoing deals only with the immediate prospects for 1964, assuming of course de Gaulle is still in power, and does not go into the post-de Gaulle events.¹

Charles E. Bohlen²

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2350. Secret. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting December 16–18.
1. Secretary Rusk met for 40 minutes with de Gaulle on December 16, but their conversation was confined to a discussion of Southeast Asia. (Secto 25 from Paris, December 16; ibid., CF 2345)
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.