Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

274. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, September 15, 1963, 5 p.m.

1455. For Secretary. I asked Couve de Murville this morning if there was anything he could tell me on his talk with Schroeder and what views if any that he had in regard to post-Adenauer Germany from the point of view of foreign policy. Couve de Murville said in his discussions with Schroeder in regard to the talks with the Soviet Union it was his impression the Germans were primarily interested in not appearing to block the possibilities of a “détente” (a view which Couve said did not trouble the French Government), but in order to protect German interests would always insist that reunification figure as the purpose of any discussions with the Soviets on German matters. He said he had told Schroeder that he would be interested to know what success he would have with Rusk or Home in adopting this procedure with the Soviets. In regard to post-Adenauer Germany he said that all of the difficulties which might arise in this field were largely due to domestic German politics within the CDU.

At this point Couve on his own initiative launched into quite a complaint in regard to U.S. policy in regard to Germany. He said that American policy was entirely directed to presenting Germany with a choice between France and the U.S., that we were conducting a major propaganda campaign in Germany against France and Franco-German association, that these “activities” in Germany were causing resentment here in Paris since the French thought that the real choice for West Germany should always be between Western oriented policy or Soviet Union, etc., etc. I told Couve that I did not know where he got this information, that we had no policy or propaganda in Germany designed to interfere with Franco-German collaboration and would be very interested to have him give me some specifics in support of his charges. I also suggested that he might care to discuss this with you and even the President. Couve de Murville then made the remarkable statement that he was sure that the President and you would deny it and be in completely good faith but that activities of this nature were going on in Germany (his implication being that some American services there were acting in contravention of governmental policy). When I pressed him further on his statement he had no evidence or information to support it beyond saying it was what some Germans had told him. He maintained throughout that U.S. policy in Europe was directed primarily to weaning Germany away from close association with the French.

We then had rather a lengthy discussion in regard to Franco-American problems. I pointed out that most of the questions that had caused difficulties between us had been on French initiative, mentioning in this connection French actions in NATO, statements by de Gaulle giving as an example de Gaulle’s statement of mid-August in regard to Vietnam which will be covered in a separate message.¹ Couve de Murville continued to maintain that the purpose of U.S. policy in Europe was to prevent the serious consolidation of Europe and to retain for the U.S. a position of authority in defense, economics, and elsewhere. It was quite easy to make a case against this view but what was curious was the persistency with which Couve de Murville maintained his attitude.

Comment: Since it is relatively uncharacteristic of Couve de Murville to launch into such a statement I would be inclined to attribute it to some special concern in the French Government over their relations with Germany. It has become clear that the discussions with Schroeder last week did not produce any real agreement, particularly on East-West issues, and that the French therefore are attempting to blame the U.S. and its policy for a lack of development in Franco-German relations. He also took mild exception to a speech of mine in Bordeaux last weekend in which I said the U.S. was for a liberal “open” Europe as against a closed inhibited one. Couve said it was critical of French policy. In any case it will be extremely interesting to see what line Couve de Murville will take when in Washington.²

Bohlen

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol US-WGer. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn.
1. Not found. For text of de Gaulle’s statement on Vietnam, August 29, 1963, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964, p. 241; see also American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 869.
2. In a separate message to Rusk on September 25 Bohlen reported that it was clear to him that Couve de Murville was very concerned about the state of French policy and sought to throw the blame onto the United States for the difficulties France was encountering with Germany. Bohlen suggested that it would be very useful for Rusk and the President to have a “frank and serious conversation” with Couve de Murville during his visit to Washington. (Telegram 1465; Department of State, Central Files, Pol Fr-US)