Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

268. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, February 16, 1963, 2 p.m.

3293. Eyes only for President from Ambassador. Reference: Deptel 3900.¹ Many thanks following your kind words. I believe for purposes this message and to save space it would be best to concentrate on last question in your message, namely, whether De Gaulle is planning a systematic campaign to reduce American influence and presence on continent. In effect, answers to this question embrace the ones asked earlier.

You will of course appreciate extreme difficulty of getting any exact evaluation of future policies or actions of General De Gaulle. One of the characteristics of French scene at present time is absence of any certain knowledge of De Gaulle’s intentions even on part of Ministers closest to him. It is possible, however, based upon his writings, public statements and actions to set forth certain general considerations.

I do not believe that De Gaulle has a calculated deliberate aim to eliminate American influence and presence on the continent. This, however, requires a definition of what we mean by “American influence”. There is, I believe, in his mind a definite distinction between the normal policy activities of a particular non-European country in Europe as against what he would regard as temporary excess of control and direction. He will not in my opinion be inclined to oppose or work against as a matter of principle the first type of American influence. It does follow however that there will be many fields in which our interests would be opposed, i.e., in certain economic matters. I believe that we can count on continued French opposition to the exercise of what he would regard as excess American influence or control, particularly in the military fields. De Gaulle has consistently held the belief that the only permanent unit in international affairs is the nation. He is prepared to combine French power with that of friendly nations but not to integrate it. He believes that nationalism expressed in the leadership of essentially one man is a permanent element in the world. It was for this reason that he opposed so vehemently any supranational authority in Europe and has been and is continuing to work for a Europe which would be a union of states. I should say that his strong support of nationalism and opposition to any integrated collective organization (heavily accentuated by his memories of France’s humiliation in World War II which I might add is shared by virtually every French person) lies at the bottom of the differences we have and will continue to have with De Gaulle. He obviously envisages at some time in the far distant future a return to a situation in Europe in which there will be no Soviet menace and consequently no need for American military presence. Until that time he most certainly believes in US military presence in Europe. This I am convinced does not stem from any inherent hostilities toward the United States (although there are undoubtedly certain hang-overs from the war) but it is primarily his belief in the future course of events.

It is in the political implications of our military policy that we find the chief application of his views and contradiction to our own. He has made it abundantly plain that he will not participate in any multilateral force under the NATO umbrella which he regards as a mere disguised version of American control of European (in this case French) atomic power as well as our own. I think therefore we can count on his opposition to the MLF although I do not believe this will be very blatant or very open. What however remains the big question is whether or not he envisages at some future date a coordinated European atomic capability of which his force de frappe would be the nucleus or whether he intends firmly to retain this force de frappe entirely in French hands and under French exclusive command.

As to US action in the face of this situation, I shall leave to others any recommendations in the economic field since I see little that we can do [to] avert from dealing with current matters.

I do however have a number of views in regard to our policy in pushing forward with the MLF. It would seem to be extremely unwise for us to push with our like-minded allies on this matter until we have thoroughly thought through how far we ourselves are prepared to go. There are of course many aspects to this program but the chief one in my opinion is one that should be settled at least by the executive as soon as possible, i.e., whether we intend to request legislative changes which would remove our control over the use of the weapons for the MLF. If we intend to leave present presidential authorization for use of this weapon as is, then I believe the multilateral force will soon be exposed as a fraud. On the other hand if we are determined to give the multilateral force, whether under NATO directly or under purely a European component, a genuine automony in the atomic field, I believe we have a proposal which would certainly enlist the support of all of the European members with the exception of France and which would bring to bear on that country very strong pressures indeed. In short, without going into all of the aspects at this point raised by your questions, I would strongly urge, Mr. President, that we do not proceed very much further with our allies until we have come to our own conclusion on the central point of the right to use the weapon without specific US control. I would think that this aspect of the situation would fall well within the problems of the tasks which you have given Ambassador Bruce.

I have not attempted in one message to cover entire subjects raised in your telegram. I can however add any particular point you might desire.

Bohlen

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 15–1 Fr. Secret.
1. In telegram 3900, February 14, the President asked Bohlen for his current evaluation of de Gaulle’s present policy and future purposes, and in particular wanted to know whether he was “planning a systematic campaign to reduce American influence and presence on the continent, and if so, what steps he might be likely to take next.” (Ibid.)