Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

206. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, July 11, 1963.

SUBJECT

• The Next Steps on the MLF

The President has read and approved your undated memorandum to him on the subject of follow-up on the June 24th meeting with Chancellor Adenauer.¹

I reported to the President your supplementary comment that it would be useful in these discussions to keep before the participants the set of considerations from which the proposal of the MLF has emerged. The President expressed his cordial agreement with this view. He believes that lack of enthusiasm for the MLF in many cases can be traced to a failure to work through the alternatives, and he believes that alternative proposals should be tested by discussion in the same way as the MLF itself, wherever there is apparent support for them.

The President desires that these talks be conducted in such a way as to fulfill all the understandings into which he entered in his European trip. At the same time, he does not wish the negotiations to go forward in a way which would recreate any impression that the United States is trying to “sell” the MLF to reluctant European purchasers. We support the MLF and believe that it is a sound answer to a very difficult political military problem; we have taken the leading role in developing and testing this proposal which our special responsibilities make necessary; we will continue to use our best efforts in support of this proposal; but the decision on participation will have to be made by each nation for itself.

The President wishes us to be particularly on guard against the development of any notion that if the MLF should fail, there might be some implied obligation to proceed with land-based MRBMs. Our negotiators should make it very clear that in the view of the United States landbased MRBMs are not a good answer to the problem of deterrent missile strength for NATO.

The President is also doubtful about the early practicability of any “European” deterrent, but in this area he is quite willing to let discussion and analysis test the case; he does not believe it wise for the United States to appear to oppose any such force if in fact the nations of Europe can find the political instruments of control which would make such a force genuinely European.

Finally, the President agrees that it would be very useful to organize the discussions this summer in such a way as to include British participation, and he would be willing to see the subject matter of the talks as set out in paragraph 2 of your memorandum broadened and softened if necessary to ensure British participation.

McGeorge Bundy²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, MLF. Secret.
1. A copy of this undated memorandum is attached to a July 7 memorandum from Smith to Ball, which bears a notation that the Under Secretary carried it to the President on July 10. The memorandum envisaged low level informal talks with the Germans and Italians and any other interested countries on key aspects of the MLF, hoped that the British would participate, and attached a paper entitled “Basic Elements of Future MLF Agreement.” (Department of State, Central Files, Def(MLF))
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.