Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

191. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 24, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President on the Multilateral Force, Wednesday, April 24, 1963, 10:30 A.M., in the Cabinet Room

PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Messrs. Tyler, Chayes, Kitchen, and Gerard Smith; Messrs. Nitze and McNaughton, Admiral Ricketts, Admiral Anderson; Mr. Bundy and Mr. Kaysen

The President opened by praising Admiral Ricketts and Mr. McNaughton for their effective missionary work in Germany.¹ In response to Secretary Rusk’s suggestion, Admiral Ricketts said that he had no doubt that the German Navy and the Ministry of Defense were both unequivocally behind the surface ship mode. This was also true of the Deputy Foreign Minister. The Germans were sending a team of technical people, both military and civilian, who will arrive on Monday to look into matters of ship construction, equipment, costs and training. They are doing this for technical reasons and because they need material to convince the German legislature. Admiral Anderson observed that underlying all the discussions in Germany was the hope that in the future the door could be opened for the additional nuclear submarines in the force. Admiral Ricketts observed that he had told the Germans that, although he had no authority to commit the government on this point, he was sure that there could be a future evolution of the force. However, the immediate issue was the surface ships, and he had urged the Germans to go ahead with the surface ships now without worrying about how it would evolve. Mr. Tyler pointed out that his instructions² had directed him to say the same thing and that, in speaking with Schroeder and Adenauer, he had. Secretary Rusk remarked that it was clearly necessary to hold out this hope. The President observed that there was a delicate matter of wording involved, and we had to be careful just how we said what we said, but he agreed that something had to be said. Admiral Ricketts said that in his discussions he had put no date to the process of evolution into another mode—neither five, nor seven years, nor any other time.

The President turned to the question of size of the force. Did we need to maintain 25 ships for technical reasons, and would this be a sticking point? Secretary Rusk said that he could not speak to the technical point, but that politically there was no need for a force as large as 25 ships, carrying 200 missiles. We wanted to be sure that the cost question wasn’t a barrier to membership in the force, especially for the Italians and the Germans, and that therefore it might be desirable to have some flexibility on the size of the force. Mr. Nitze observed that the vulnerability problem, which was related to the size of the force, affected its political credibility. If the force were too small in technical terms, then the political effect we were seeking would be lost, because it would not be considered an effective force by the Europeans. Secretary Rusk asked whether we could at some later stage talk of a range of 15–25 ships, rather than stick with 25 as the necessary minimum size. Mr. Nitze wondered whether 15 ships were enough from the military point of view. Admiral Ricketts said that as long as we talked in terms of a pure surface ship force, a force of fewer than 20 ships raised technical questions.

The President asked how important in mathematical terms was the increase in vulnerability if we talked about a smaller force as compared to a 25 ship force. Admiral Ricketts said that he could not give a precise answer. Many variables, including the ability to deploy ships in different kinds of waters, make 20 a good minimum figure. The President asked for a detailed examination of the relative vulnerability of 15, 20 and 25 ship forces, and Admiral Anderson agreed that the Navy would be responsible for one. Mr. Bundy suggested that we stay with 25 as a number for public discussion now, but we take no fixed positions within the Departments concerned as to whether, how, and when to fall back to a lower number.

Secretary Rusk said that the next step was to see what points had to be covered in a preliminary agreement, and he went over the nine points of Mr. McNaughton’s draft memorandum.³ Our immediate problem was the question of consultation with Congress. He expected that he would have a response from Adenauer on May 3. He thought that we should talk with the Congressional leaders, at least, before that. The President asked whether Adenauer’s response on control would be satisfactory. Mr. Bundy replied that he was certain it would be, and that what we had to say to Congress is that we had agreement on unanimity, or, if there was something less than unanimity, the change would be on the European side and would in no way limit the U.S. veto. The President asked again whether the Germans would agree to this, and Mr. Bundy said “Yes.” Mr. McNaughton observed that perhaps the Germans were not quite as firm as was suggested. The conversations on control in Germany took the shape of Ambassador Dowling’s asserting the U.S. position, and the Germans offering no objection. This was a shade less affirmative than a position in which the Germans had spoken out positively on the issue. Mr. Bundy observed that the Germans, however, had no worry about the U.S. veto. Any worries they had about unanimity arose from the possibility of a Harold Wilson veto. Secretary Rusk said that he had put our position perfectly plainly to Schroeder in a private conversation in Paris, and Schroeder had expressed no objection. The President said he did not want to talk to Congress until the German agreement was in hand. He feared the discussion with the Congress would leak, and the Germans would react to the reports by denying that what they heard was what they had agreed to. Therefore, he wanted to wait on Adenauer’s letter.

The President then turned to the questions of ownership, custody and security of the warheads, and asked whether they would continue to be in U.S. custody. Mr. Chayes said “No.” The whole crew would in effect be the custodians. It was clear that we would want to have a transfer in ownership, and this would require legislation. We had a semantic problem of how we wished to describe the new situation. Secretary Rusk said that it was much more desirable for the warheads to be owned by the force as such, and not by any of the individual nations in the force. It was certainly clear that in relation to the Soviet Union, we didn’t want a situation in which the Germans own warheads themselves. The President asked whether it was necessary to transfer ownership explicitly. Messrs. Chayes and Smith both responded strongly that it was. There was a great expectation in Europe that ownership would be transferred. Meeting this expectation was a necessary condition for a political deal. Mr. Nitze observed that the Europeans wanted the transfer of ownership, and that of course the Russians would be content to see us continue ownership. Secretary Ball and Mr. Chayes remarked that what we wanted was corporate ownership by the MLF as such, rather than a partnership in which each partner participated in ownership. Mr. Bundy remarked that Congressman Holifield would probably be on the side of the Russians in respect to ownership, and that this was a symbol of the problems we have to deal with in changing the law. Mr. Smith observed that we would probably have to have agreements with the MLF similar to the agreements we had with some of our NATO Allies. We would probably have to have an atomic energy agreement with the MLF which provided for the disclosure of certain restricted data to the MLF.

The President asked whether we could give ownership to the MLF which in turn would entrust custody to the United States. This appeared to be excessively complicated to several in the group. Admiral Anderson observed that the process of inspection and maintenance of the warheads would have to remain in U.S. hands. Mr. Chayes pointed out that there were various technical guards that were possible against tampering, photography and the like while the warheads were on the ship.

The President asked what provisions for security would be made on the ship itself, in the way of custodial guard. Secretary Rusk and Mr. Chayes pointed out that U.S. personnel could continue to be part of the custodial group. Mr. Smith emphasized that there was a difference between the question of legal custody, which should be in the MLF as such, and the practical involvement of U.S. officers and crew members in the custodial and safety forces aboard the ship. Secretary Rusk said that the indirect method of U.S. involvement was preferable from a political point of view. Mr. Bundy asked whether the physical security of the warheads and design data would be as good in the MLF as under present NATO arrangements.

There was a great deal of discussion on this point between Messrs. Chayes, Smith and Bundy. The President remarked that it is clear that we need to be well prepared on this matter in detail before we go to the Congress, and we have to compare the risk potentials in the present NATO arrangement with those in prospect under our proposed arrangements with the MLF. We must respond in some detail on matters like photography, opening of the warheads and the like. Before we went to Congress, we had to settle at least the political control question with the Germans and, if possible, the Italians, and we had to be fully prepared on the issue of security. He asked who should do it. Mr. Bundy observed that the matter should be under the general direction of Ambassador Merchant, but that on the security and design consideration, it would be most helpful to involve Commissioner Ramey as a participant. The President agreed on this point. He asked Secretary Rusk to organize a meeting to cover these points with him before there was any Congressional consultation.

Mr. Bundy observed that in addition to this question there is a further question of just what we should set as a goal for June—achieve the preliminary agreement on the detailed observations by Mr. McNaughton, or something less. He remarked that Ambassador Finletter and Ambassador Merchant had certain differences of view in this matter, and that they should be heard. The President responded that he would like to hear them next week when they are both here. He remarked that we have open to us a choice in the whole range from a communiqué to a detailed preliminary agreement as a goal to achieve by the time of his visit, and we need not necessarily choose now.

The meeting ended about 11:00 o’clock.

C.K.⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF. Secret.
1. Ricketts and McNaughton had begun discussions in Bonn on the military aspects of the MLF on April 17. Reports on these meetings are in Department of State, Central Files, Def 12 NATO, and Pol 7 US/Merchant; a copy of Ricketts’ instructions, dated April 9 and approved by the President the following day, is ibid., Def(MLF).
2. See footnote 1, Document 185.
3. Not found.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.