Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

142. Instructions for the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Finletter)⁰

Washington, undated.

MRBM Instructions. Eyes only Ambassador Finletter.

At the recent Athens meeting, the U.S. presented its views on the most central military issues facing NATO. It also provided information on a number of the major weapon programs the U.S. is carrying forward in order to support the Alliance. Today, my government would like to address again the subject of nuclear forces in relation to the defense of the European part of NATO and, in particular, the need for a new MRBM force.

It is our view that major nuclear war is the only kind of war in which 1000 to 2000 mile range MRBM’s would be likely to be used. We cannot conceive of a significant exchange involving weapons of this range and character being a partial or limited one.

Major nuclear war, in turn, would be basically a single operation involving an over-all series of attacks against an over-all target system. In this context, the requirement for a major NATO nuclear weapons system—such as the proposed MRBM—can only be evaluated as a component of all the nuclear assets available to NATO, including external as well as committed forces.

The evaluations which the United States has made of over-all nuclear requirements and the programmed forces support the view that the presently programmed system is adequate, and is appropriate to handle the opposing nuclear forces—whether they threaten Europe or other Alliance territory outside Europe. We conclude, therefore, that MRBM’s are not urgently needed for military reasons. Nevertheless, MRBM’s would have some military utility and they could be of considerable political importance. The U.S. is willing, in any case, to continue to bear the primary responsibility for providing the nuclear support of the Alliance. However, other members of the Alliance may wish to participate in the building of a NATO MRBM Force to contribute to this mission; if so, the U.S. is prepared to join in creating such a Force.

I shall outline the basis for these views concerning the proposed military requirement for MRBM’s in Allied Command Europe. I shall deal with the adequacy of programmed forces in terms of, first, countering major Soviet nuclear forces and, second, countering other Soviet military forces. Then I shall discuss the types of systems which make up the longer range elements of the programmed forces and the criteria which are relevant to their selection, so that you can judge why we believe that the programmed mix is appropriate for the purposes which these longer range elements are designed to serve.

[Here follow sections on other subjects.]

Summary on Military Need

To sum up our view on the military requirement. The Alliance position on the MRBM should be viewed in the context of global nuclear war. In this context, the U.S. believes that already programmed, rapidly growing, nuclear forces are adequate to meet Alliance needs, and the U.S. is willing to continue to bear the responsibility of dealing with targets which its forces plan to cover, if the other members of the Alliance do not wish to take part in the building of a NATO force to deal with some of these targets.

• —We believe that these programmed forces are sufficient to deter any rational Soviet initial resort to nuclear weapons or all-out non-nuclear attack.
• —If deterrence fails, these programmed forces have the capability to destroy the greater part of Soviet nuclear forces, albeit at high cost in terms of possible resultant damage to the West.

We believe that such a devastating nuclear exchange would bring any advance of Soviet ground forces toward Western Europe to a halt. If not, the capability of programmed forces of varying kinds and ranges to master their Soviet counter-parts and to attack Soviet ground forces and supply lines would meet the Alliance’s tactical needs.

Therefore, the coverage of Soviet targets, including SACEUR’s threat list, will remain effective, despite the fact that Europe-based strike aircraft will be declining in utility during this period as a means of delivering nuclear weapons.

And we believe that the alliance forces which can accomplish these tasks represent about the right mix of different systems.

The U.S. does not believe, therefore, that MRBM’s are urgently needed for military reasons.

The Multilateral Force

We realize that our views may not be wholly shared by all members of the Alliance. This difference need not prevent the Alliance from taking useful action in the MRBM field, if a sufficient desire for such action exists in the Alliance. Such a program for expanding our nuclear striking power would, of course, have military utility; and it could have considerable importance politically.

If our allies wish to add MRBM’s to NATO forces and to participate in an MRBM force, the U.S. is prepared to join them in creating a multilaterally owned, financed, controlled, and manned sea-borne MRBM force. The force should be sea-borne to avoid the political problems associated with land-based deployment, to minimize vulnerability and collateral damage, and to permit genuinely multilateral control and manning. When we say a multilaterally manned force, we mean that the manning of each vessel, and of the missiles aboard each vessel, should be genuinely mixed; obviously, this does not mean that each vessel need have fifteen nationalities aboard—three nationalities should suffice to create a balanced crew in which no single nationality is predominant.

If such a force were established, presently programmed alliance nuclear forces should, of course, be reviewed from the standpoint of possible resultant reduction in these programmed forces.

Planning for the use of any such MRBM force could be worked out by the Alliance in the light of its continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors. In this process the views of SACEUR—especially concerning targeting—would naturally be taken carefully into account.

It would be essential that construction of such an MRBM force, if it should take place, be undertaken parallel to a continuing vigorous buildup of NATO non-nuclear forces. Establishment of such an MRBM force would be contra-productive if it diverted resources from that buildup. There would, of course, be substantial costs to NATO associated with an MRBM program, even if we cannot now estimate this magnitude with precision. Because of these substantial costs and the availability of other forces which I have mentioned, we do not believe that an initial sea-based MRBM force should be larger than about 200 missiles. Whether further steps might eventually be useful is a question which the Alliance need not decide now.

FYI: You will have to evaluate in light of tactical situation at the time how to introduce additional elaboration of U.S. views on MRBM force set forth in earlier instructions. We wish to avoid appearance of U.S. taking initiative to submit “U.S. plan.” We do not wish, however, there to be any misunderstanding re U.S. unwillingness consider any mode of allied deployment other than multilaterally owned, manned, and controlled sea-based force of size approved by President, and you may include this point in above initial statement, in language of Presidentially approved policy paper, if you believe this useful. With this exception, we believe preferable that additional views be advanced subsequently, after others (e.g. Belgians) have taken initiative on multilateral MRBM force.¹

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF-Instructions to Finletter. Secret. The source text, which was attached to Document 141, bears the notation “Final Version.” On June 2 the Department of State sent a 15-page telegram to Finletter containing a preliminary draft of these instructions and asking for his comments. (Topol 1853; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5612/6–262) The following day Finletter replied that he was “delighted” with the instructions and offered a few comments on the draft. (Polto 1611; ibid., 700.5612/6–362) On June 8 a revised text, approved at the staff level of the Departments of State and Defense, was forwarded to Secretary Rusk and to the White House for final approval. (Memorandum from Kohler; ibid., 711.5611/6–862) Omitted here are sections on Soviet nuclear and other forces, alliance systems, and costs.
1. On June 15 Finletter reported that he had read the instructions to the North Atlantic Council that morning and distributed copies to the other delegations, the International Staff, and the Standing Group. (Polto 1675; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF)