Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions⁰

Washington, May 25, 1962, 3:36 p.m.

2005. In aftermath of very successful NATO Ministerial Meeting, Department believes we should consider next steps to be taken in North Atlantic Council to consolidate and follow up on gains made at Athens.

Defense

In field of defense policy, Athens meeting marked end of important phase of Council activities, phase which has absorbed attention of Alliance for more than year. We are hopeful that “Athens package” re guidelines, assurances and information will prove adequate to satisfy for time being desires for greater sense of participation in nuclear matters. (This will, however, require energetic follow-up by US in supplying meaningful information to NATO nuclear information committee.) We can anticipate, however, that guidelines-assurances information package will not suffice permanently to satisfy pressures for nuclear role. Multilateral MRBM issue in particular must be dealt with. Following next steps appear required:

(a) We should immediately undertake necessary action to make nuclear information committee work and work well. This will entail, first, assuring that CABAL system and US security arrangements are reconciled. Most important, however, we should continue process begun in December and continued in May of supplying significant information to the Alliance.

(b) Multilateral MRBM force question should be dealt with in a constructive framework with US prepared to participate in accordance with outstanding instructions.

(c) We should continue our efforts to implement NATO’s forward strategy and to build up NATO forces to meet non-nuclear part of MC 26/4 goals.

(d) Discussion of NATO strategy should be appropriately pursued, with US continuing to advance its views for Alliance consideration in manner not calculated to provoke divisive debate, but nonetheless designed to advance educational process. We should resist efforts to invoke Political Directive to oppose US views. It should become increasingly apparent that US no longer accepts fundamental basis of Political Directive. At same time, we should not ourselves initiate efforts to revise Political Directive. In brief, Political Directive should be “set aside” for present. Constructive interpretation of Directive should be governing principle.

Political

In political field, we believe we should encourage NATO members to step up consultation, taking lead from Stikker’s Annual Report reinforced by Secretary’s comments at Athens that there is room for improvement and that US hopes to increase number of close exchanges between NAC members and senior US policy making officials. Seems to us that in addition to strong US support and initiative, Stikker and Hooper are keys to more effective political consultation in NAC and POLAD respectively. USRO therefore at early date should discuss possibilities of improving NAC and POLAD political consultation with Stikker and Hooper, drawing at your discretion on results of recent analysis prepared by Department for Secretary which points up poor record of other larger NATO countries; i.e., not only French, but also British, Germans and Italians. (This analysis contained Athens position paper NMA–D–1/7.¹)

Urge Stikker and Hooper to attempt in both NAC and POLAD meetings, as well as private conversations with NATO delegates, to point out need for broadening and deepening consultation, specifying if possible those areas in which consultative process can be strengthened.

Although we recognize sensitivities involved, suggest you also sound out Stikker re possibilities his suggesting that NATO representatives of Six as well as UK provide Council with reports on various Heads of Government meetings re European political and economic integration. In past, this has not been an area either for political consultation or for exchange of information. We should not initially expect more than token reports from participating countries. However, seems to us that although these reports might contain limited amount of substantive information, they might serve several purposes: they would help establish principle that all members of NATO Alliance have legitimate interest in being kept informed on developments in field of European integration; such manifestation of collective NATO interest would help in offsetting French separatist tendencies re NATO; they would help to establish consistent policy under which all NATO member countries would be expected fill in Council on significant Heads of Government meetings, practice US has been following in case of major meetings such as President’s talks with Adenauer, Shah of Iran, Macmillan, etc. On basis Stikker’s reaction and USRO’s assessment of practicality, we will decide whether to pursue this possibility further.

You should also advise Stikker that in keeping our desire to consult Council even more fully re US policy developments, if Council wishes we will arrange for Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland again to consult with Council re major issues at forthcoming UN General Assembly. (At present late June seems most feasible date.) As feasible, other senior officers from the Department might also be able to visit Council for policy consultations. We hope that Stikker will request other delegations to send top officials to Council to consult on special or regional problems, hopefully at same time as comparable US officials attend.

In field long range planning and in keeping with Secretary’s statement at Athens, we hope USRO can get together at early date with UK colleagues and with Stikker in order to launch Atlantic Policy Advisory Group. We suggest first organizational meeting of APAG be scheduled within next few weeks in order consider methods of approach and topics for consideration. Advise Stikker that Walt Rostow, Chairman of Policy Planning Council, has expressed willingness to attend organizational meeting of APAG and recall for Stikker that two subjects have already been suggested for APAG consideration—“Neutralism” (by Lord Home) and “Sino-Soviet Conflict” (by Secretary Rusk). Both through Stikker and directly, US should stress to key Allied Governments need for effective high level representation on APAG, as per US lead in this respect.

Science

Finally, we hope that progress can be made on International Institute of Science and Technology, proposal which Secretary and a number of other FonMins endorsed at Athens. While we do not expect any formal NATO action, believe informal discussions which will in first instance result in approach acceptable US and UK should be pursued and idea of Institute generally promoted and publicized.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/5–2562. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden and Van Hollen; cleared by Johnson, Kohler, Schaetzel, Seymour Weiss, Rostow, Owen, UNP, ARA, RPE, AF, FE, and the Department of Defense; and initialed by Rusk. Transmitted to missions in 14 NATO countries.
1. A copy of this paper is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2101.