Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

125. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 5, 1962, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NATO Nuclear Questions

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Foy D. Kohler
  • Amb. Thomas K, Finletter
  • Mr. Russell Fessenden
• NATO
  • Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General
  • Mr. George Vest, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General

In response to the Secretary’s question, Mr. Stikker said that the atmosphere in the NATO Council today is good and progress is being made, with the exception of remaining difficulties over economic countermeasures for Berlin. The important discussions of nuclear questions and strategy have started well; however, it will be vitally important that these discussions be pursued to a successful conclusion. Opening up this range of very sensitive questions in NATO requires that there be some form of decision; otherwise, the effect on the Alliance could be very damaging indeed.

Mr. Stikker then described his plans for handling NATO discussion of these matters. Mr. Stikker said that he felt it most important not to challenge the existing Political Directive. He argued for the pragmatic approach, as contrasted with the theoretical. He admitted that it might, after the practical problems of providing for a forward strategy had been solved, be possible to change the Political Directive. Mr. Stikker said that he planned to start the effort to increase the conventional capability of the Alliance by having General Norstad, during his February 14th briefing on Berlin contingency planning, stress the fact that we today have no forward strategy and then to outline the specific steps required to make it a reality.

The next step, Mr. Stikker said, will be discussion of political control of nuclear weapons. In this connection, Mr. Stikker said he hopes it will be possible for the US to agree on something with respect to (a) guarantees on the maintenance of US nuclear weapons; (b) guarantees that the US will take care of targets directly relating to the defense of Europe; and (c) guidelines with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Prompt agreement on these matters will provide time for more gradual consideration of some of the more difficult questions. Agreement on these matters would also provide something specific for the Athens meeting. Mr. Stikker said that he had also listed for the Council’s consideration various ideas which have been proposed on decision-making, including weighted voting and a smaller group. He had done this because he had thought it was necessary for the Council to consider all these matters thoroughly; he did not anticipate, however, that any of these would be agreed on.

[1 paragraph (13–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Stikker briefly mentioned the mechanism for wartime consultation. He said that he had mentioned this subject to Macmillan, who had told him to discuss it bilaterally with the United States. He had also mentioned it to the French NATO Ambassador twice and had told him that he would be willing to discuss this subject with de Gaulle at any time; however, de Gaulle had shown no sign of interest.

The Secretary asked Mr. Stikker whether it would be desirable for the US itself to come forward with a specific US plan on NATO nuclear questions. The Secretary thought such a move by the US could be deeply divisive within the Alliance. Because of the dangers of the US prematurely backing any specific plan it might be better to have the subject discussed thoroughly by others first.

Mr. Stikker agreed, but added that someone must start matters going and this is what he had attempted to do in his recent paper on political control of nuclear weapons.¹ Mr. Stikker said that he did need to know, however, whether the US attitude on finding a solution to the NATO nuclear questions was a positive one. He also needed more information on these matters which could be obtained only from the US. In this connection, he mentioned a comprehensive list of questions he had submitted on MRBMs.

The Secretary said that there were two matters that he wanted to stress on which the US was very sympathetic:

a) On the exercise of the Presidential authority, we were prepared to agree to the two guidelines which had been cited in the Secretary’s presentation to the December Ministerial meeting. We were also prepared to consider very sympathetically any further guidelines which could be agreed among the Allies.

b) We were also prepared to consider with interest and sympathy any proposals on which the Allies could agree, which would be an alternative to the present de facto arrangement in which the decision essentially rests with the US.

The Secretary said that he wanted to comment on European doubts concerning our determination to use nuclear weapons. He said that, if tomorrow all access to Berlin were stopped, he had the feeling that no NATO Government would ask us to go to nuclear war. The Secretary said that he had the feeling—stressing that he was speaking quite informally and unofficially—that the fact of what nuclear war really means hasn’t “bitten home” in most NATO countries.

Mr. Stikker said that he felt the uncertainty, regarding our determination to use nuclear weapons, exists in Europe. He agreed with the Secretary that no country would ask us to go to nuclear war if access were blocked in Berlin, but said that it is really a matter of how hostilities develop and how they progress. The uncertainty in Europe today is perhaps addressed more to the question of how far the US would let matters deteriorate before using nuclear weapons. Mr. Stikker criticized recent talk about large-scale limited war in Europe. Mr. Stikker said that something of a paradox exists: If the Europeans are not sure that the US will use nuclear weapons and are not certain that we will maintain and improve those weapons that now exist in Europe, they will not agree to a conventional build-up. If, however, they are reassured about our attitude on these nuclear matters, then the atmosphere will be much better for a conventional build-up.

Mr. Stikker cited again the talk about changing the Political Directive as a cause of the uncertainty. The Secretary commented that he saw a danger in attempting to rewrite the Political Directive because of the effect on the Soviets interpretation of the Alliance’s intentions.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/2–562. Secret. Drafted by Fessenden, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on February 18. Stikker visited Washington February 5–7; a memorandum of his conversation with Kohler at 9:30 a.m. on February 5 is ibid.; memoranda of his conversations with McGhee and the U.S. Working Group on NATO strategy on February 5 are ibid., 375.75/2–562 and 375/2–562. A memorandum of his conversation with Ball on February 7 is ibid., 375.75/2–762. A memorandum of his conversation with the President on February 6 is printed as Document 126.
1. Under reference here is NDP 62/2, January 23, 1962, on the political control of nuclear weapons, which was discussed at NAC meetings on January 24 and February 1, without any definite conclusions being reached. (Poltos 945 and 1003, January 25 and February 1; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/1–2562 and 2–162) No copy of the paper itself has been found.