123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations0
Topol 968. We can expect US being shortly subjected considerable pressure in NAC to participate in consideration of complex of questions relating to NATO nuclear role. It can be assumed FedRep will press for early establishment ad hoc group to study MRBM’s. Further, we are committed to discussion end 1966 military requirements early in 1962; Council notation of MC 26/41 will not in itself postpone consideration of strategy and MRBM’s, to which MC/CS reserved. Also MC–95 on nuclear weapons control has already been postponed for NAC discussion. Finally, Rusk–McNamara presentation in Min Mtg invited Alliance to consider in effect modified strategic concept.
To cope with these pressures you are instructed, subject your concurrence, to make an early statement in NAC along following lines:
“In December NATO Ministerial Meeting Alliance recognized need for continuing prompt consideration of ways and means to establish [Page 354] further NATO participation and role in use of nuclear weapons. Included in this need is question of whether, and if so how, MRBM’s should be deployed on Continent of Europe and/or adjacent waters.
The United States continues in its strong conviction that best interests of Alliance are not served by further proliferation on a national basis of nuclear components or missiles systems serving predominantly strategic purposes. Believe reasons for this conviction well known and US appreciates most members of NATO share this view. US continues to hope this view will come to be shared by all, as intricate problems we now confront are thoroughly studied in period ahead.
It was in recognition of need for progress on constructive approach to these problems consistent with this conviction that Secretary said at Paris meeting that US was prepared to work hard on the questions bearing on how best to assure continuance of an effective NATO nuclear deterrent. US at direction of President is continuing its comprehensive and intensive review of all aspects of question. It is hoped that at end this special study, US will be able to make known its conclusions in course of consideration looking to eventual decisions, some of which might perhaps be taken by time of spring meeting.
In meantime US would not expect NAC to declare moratorium on consideration many issues involved. On contrary believe discussions in NAC should proceed without delay. Believe NAC should know, however, that US participation will during early stages such discussion be designed primarily to elicit and evaluate views of others and to indicate various factors and considerations involved in this range of questions. US continues in its opinion that, although time is of course important in considering these subjects and reaching decisions, fact remains that Western strategic nuclear capability will remain effective. Targets of particular concern to defense of Europe are and will continue to be adequately covered by US nuclear forces. Thus, in our view, we can afford time to carefully consider and decide these terribly complex and important questions relating to NATO nuclear role.”
Following your statement to NAC along above lines, it is also desired that US take initiative in recommending procedural steps to be taken by NATO. In this regard, we would hope that restricted NAC discussions would serve not only to consider the questions of NATO nuclear role, including MRBM force and the control issues involved in MC–95, but also to review existing strategic concepts which bear on the MC 26/4 stated requirements for MRBM’s as well as the need for conventional forces and the concept of graduated action in Berlin contingency military planning. Our objective in this discussion strategy would be to follow up on educational process initiated by Rusk–McNamara [Page 355] presentations and to set stage for consideration of MRBM and related issues in framework of revised strategy.
In substantive discussions you should avoid giving impression US nuclear policy, per se, undergoing fundamental change and be guided by Rusk and McNamara December statements. You should not, if issue US commitments arises go further than to reaffirm past US commitments—notably one in President’s Ottawa speech. However, if this proposal is brought up, you might point out US has not yet had formal or definitive comments from its Allies on this proposal and would welcome such comments. You should stress that US would not be prepared to provide MRBM’s for any forces not under multilateral ownership and multilateral control.
In all discussion suggested above, we believe that in addition to PermReps, would be useful have certain key individuals in governments engage in restricted NAC discussions. It is asked therefore that you propose that for these discussions on NATO nuclear role, MRBM’s, and strategy concepts, PermReps be augmented by country experts, both political and military, from capitals. We plan send separate messages major NATO capitals suggesting key people we would like to see participate.
If a proposal is made in NAC to establish special ad hoc group, we should be prepared to support formation of a group consisting of PermReps membership less than full NAC. Such group should, however, be appropriately augmented by experts from key capitals. FYI Only. We considering desirability having PermReps plus experts visit US after US position established to acquire first-hand knowledge what involved in maintaining and operating highly centralized control over US worldwide nuclear force. End FYI.
Your comments requested.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740, 5611/1–862. Secret; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Kranich (EUR/RA); cleared with Fessenden, Nitze, Seymour Weiss, Bowie, and Owen; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome.↩
- Not found.↩
- On January 9 Finletter replied that he welcomed “enthusiastically” these proposals and suggested some minor revisions in the draft statement. (Polto 872; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/1–962) He then arranged with Stikker to have the presentation made to the North Atlantic Council on January 17. (Poltos 921 and 926, January 18 and 19; ibid., 740.5611/1–1862 and 1–1962)↩