121. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- 27th Meeting, NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session, Summary Report (U)
1. Since you unfortunately were able to attend only a portion of the National Security Council meeting, 19 December 1961, you did not hear my briefing on the NATO Military Committee meetings of last week. Accordingly, I take this method of providing you with the highlights of these important meetings.
Introduction
2. The 27th Meeting of the NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session was held on Monday and Tuesday of last week in Paris. As you may know, the Military Committee, which is the senior NATO military authority, meets in two types of sessions. The so-called Permanent Military Representatives, selected by the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO nations, meet regularly in the Pentagon. Additionally, on a twice yearly or more often if necessary basis, the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO nations (except Iceland) meet in Chiefs of Staff session. Chairmanship of the Chiefs of Staff session rotates alphabetically. It being the U.S. turn, I served in an international role as Chairman of this meeting, having taken over from Admiral Mountbatten last June. General Ruffner, our Permanent Representative, acted as U.S. Military Representative. For the first time in the history of NATO, all of the Permanent Representatives, as well as the Chiefs of Staff, participated in such a meeting.
Formal Session
3. Some of the more important items of the agenda of the formal session and their related documents were:
- A.
- The Intelligence Appreciation, prepared as a primary function by the Standing Group, and presented orally by its Chairman. This document is the agreed intelligence estimate upon which NATO military planning is based.
- B.
- The 1962 NATO Common Infrastructure Program. This item was consideration of a document which is the submission of the annual military requirement for facilities to the North Atlantic Council.
- C.
- The most important item on the formal agenda was consideration of the paper, MC–96, Force Requirements for End–1966 and Tentative Country Breakdowns Thereof.1 This document is the statement of force requirements projected five years ahead, as determined by the NATO military authorities. This paper includes a break-out of forces on an individual country basis and, although agreement to the document does not constitute a firm country commitment, it does provide the basis for force development and it is the standard against which progress is evaluated. The Committee approved this paper and submitted it to the North Atlantic Council.
Informal Session
4. This was the third time that an informal session has been held, It was recognized some time ago that free, frank expression of views was sometimes lacking during formal sessions. For this reason, we experimentally tried an informal session during our meeting last December. It went so well on that occasion and again in April and this session that I believe the informal session will become the most useful reason for the Military Committee meetings. Incidentally, for the informal session each principal is permitted only a limited number of subordinates in attendance, and no formal record of the discussion is made.
5. This time our discussion was centered on the current East-West crisis over Berlin. Four interrelated and complementary items were considered:
- A.
- The NATO Build-up.
- B.
- The Soviet Build-up.
- C.
- Berlin Contingency Planning and Progress in NATO Planning Related Thereto.
- D.
- SACEUR’s presentation on Nuclear Capability.
6. In the following paragraphs certain items from both the formal and informal sessions are covered in greater detail.
Intelligence
7. Following the presentation of the Intelligence Appreciation by Admiral Douguet, Chairman of the Standing Group, the German representative, General Foertsch, read a rather long paper. The gist of this paper was that, from German intelligence sources, they had concluded that the Soviet forces available to oppose NATO are substantially greater than estimated by the Standing Group. This view was essentially as expressed by Chancellor Adenauer and Minister Strauss during their meetings with you in November. In concluding, General Foertsch proposed that countries not members of the Standing Group be permitted a greater participation in the development of NATO intelligence estimates.
[Page 348]8. You will recall that the second item on the informal agenda was, The Soviet Build-up. To key-note this discussion, the Chairman of the Standing Group presented in detail the Soviet build-up since the Berlin crisis. Again the German representative reiterated his view that the estimate was inaccurate, and broader participation in the intelligence field should be considered.
9. In summarizing this item as Chairman, I directed the Standing Group to study this problem in conjunction with the Military Committee in Permanent Session.
MRBM’s
10. The matter of a NATO MRBM force was discussed in relation to the committee approval action on MC–96, Force Requirements for End1966 and Tentative Country Breakdowns Thereof. At that time the German representative read a second paper. In this paper he stressed three primary points:
- A.
- It is important that all countries fully meet their requirements.
- B.
-
Germany agreed to MC–96 with great reluctance because they consider that the MRBM force had been excluded. (The key sentence in MC–96 upon which they base their view is as follows: [5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
[1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]
General Foertsch proposed that military authorities study the military and technical problems involved in incorporating MRBMs in NATO forces.
11. Following the German statement, SACEUR, SACLANT, and several countries expressed disapproval of and proposed the deletion from the MC–96 paper of one sentence in paragraph 3 and that part of paragraph 6 which deals with the same point. In their view, these sentences reduced the strength and effectiveness of the document as a valid statement of military requirements. These sentences are as follows: “Nevertheless, it is possible that force requirements for end-1966 may have to be reviewed in the light of the conclusions of the current studies on NATO strategy,” and “In developing country breakdowns, the Military Committee is mindful of the numerous nonmilitary factors which, in the case of some member nations, may prevent the early full attainment of the proposed force levels or compositions for the nations concerned. Further, the tentative breakdowns are not necessarily to be regarded as commitments but, rather, as a guide to forward planning.”
12. The Military Committee action in respect to this paper was:
- A.
- To approve the MC–96 document without alteration or deletion for submission to the Council.
- B.
- In order to save time, pending receipt of political guidance, to direct the Standing Group to study the military aspects of the integration of MRBMs into NATO.
Control of Nuclear Weapons
13. In keeping with our policy of informing the Alliance of our nuclear capability vis-à-vis the Soviets, SACEUR gave the same presentation he gave to the North Atlantic Council recently. This briefing includes very broad and general coverage of the following:
- A.
- The number and type of nuclear launching vehicles now available to SACEUR. Specific numbers of weapons were not included but the fact that planning for allocation is completed was mentioned.
- B.
- NATO nuclear targeting and the general geographical location of nuclear storage sites.
- C.
- A schematic representation of the atomic strike communications system with its [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for release purposes.
14. Following SACEUR’s presentation, the German representative made a third rather long statement that included three main points:
- A.
- NATO conventional forces are inadequate; nuclear weapons in truly balanced forces are necessary;
- B.
- The key problem of nuclear weapons is the matter of control; and
- C.
- NATO must have the shortest possible reaction time.
He concluded by recommending that “The Standing Group should continue, in greater detail, its study on a suitable system for the control and release authority of nuclear weapons now available in NATO, using MC–95 as a basis.” (MC–95 is a document titled, Military Control of Nuclear Weapons,2 prepared by the Standing Group, approved by the Military Committee, and now in the hands of the Permanent Council.)
15. A lively discussion followed which centered primarily upon the matter of political decisions which were necessary before further progress could be made by military authorities in the study of this item.
16. Finally, the Committee agreed:
- A.
- To record recognition of the importance from a military point of view of the subject and the need for political guidance at a reasonably early date so that planning may continue.
- B.
- That the Standing Group should continue study of this subject after the Council has acted on MC–95 and issued political guidance.
Contingency Planning—Tripartite Planning
17. I mention a further item to give you a feel for the great interest that exists among the NATO military authorities regarding contingency planning for the use of NATO forces for operations short of general war, [Page 350] and particularly the relationship of tripartite planning to NATO planning.
18. On 25 October the North Atlantic Council approved a directive to the NATO military authorities concerning planning for the Berlin emergency.3 Specific direction was given to coordinate NATO planning with the Tripartite Military Contingency Planning (Live Oak). Prior to the meeting the major Allied Commanders had been requested to report their progress.
19. SACEUR reported first, outlining conceptually the various operations for which his Live Oak “Catalog of Plans” was being prepared. Further, he explained the relationship of Live Oak to SHAPE planning and the degree of coordination which must occur if planning and operations were to be effective. This evoked a lengthy discussion, finally terminated by a request from the Committee that I determine from the Secretary General if SACEUR’s briefing could be fitted into the agenda for the Ministerial Meetings. (As it turned out the UK and France disagreed [Secretary Rusk agreed]4 so the Secretary General decided not to include this briefing for the Ministers. Instead, the Military Committee agreed that General Norstad should furnish the members of the Military Committee a sanitized version of his briefing so that all may brief their Defense Ministers on an agreed, accurate basis.)
20. SACLANT reported next. He explained that although his headquarters had only recently received the directive, he had previously on his own initiative prepared suitable plans for most conceivable contingencies. For this reason he was prepared to initiate contingency operations on relatively short notice. However, in that SACLANT forces are earmarked for assignment rather than actually assigned, and since for country reasons his forces are maldeployed, certain practical delays were inevitable.
21. In the discussion following SACLANT’s report the main points of interest were:
- A.
- The degree of coordination that is required and occurs between SACEUR and SACLANT headquarters.
- B.
- The mechanics of conveying national forces to SACLANT control during emergencies of less than general war magnitude.
- C.
- Quality and quantity of LANTCOM forces.
In remarking on the last point, SACLANT stated very frankly that his forces were seriously deficient in manning, equipping, and logistic support. He urged action to provide earlier availability of better forces.
[Page 351]Portuguese Statement
22. Incidentally, as a last minute addition to the formal agenda, the Portuguese representative, General De Araujo, presented a statement in which it was explained that military operations in Angola required withdrawal of a portion of the NATO committed forces. The forces withdrawn consist of 5 destroyer escorts, 5 infantry battalions, and 2 artillery companies (approximately 50% of the force committed to NATO by Portugal).
Summary
23. You have undoubtedly noted that the Germans were the source of three important initiatives for this meeting. In actual fact, they proposed yet a fourth—that a study of the requirements for conduct of and defense against biological and chemical weapons be undertaken. It appears clear to me that we may expect increasing effort by the Germans to be accepted fully into all aspects of NATO military activity.
24. It was a very useful meeting’, I believe, more successful than any of the seven I have previously attended. Particularly noteworthy was the informal session during which the representatives conducted a most comprehensive and frank discussion.