Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

96. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)⁰

Washington, April 13, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

JCS 468-61. Exclusive for Admiral Dennison, General Lemnitzer sends.

1. Original concept for U.S. naval support of Bumpy Road was to ensure that when once embarked this operation must not fail. This concept modified by the later plan which provides that cancellation possible until landing phase actually starts. Concept further modified by provision in rules of engagement that if intervention by U.S. military element is required and actually takes place while CEF en route to transport area then operation must abort.

2. In view above a change of emphasis is now required. That is, it now important that premature U.S. intervention not occur which would be the cause for cancellation of this highly important and desirable operation.

3. To this end it is important to success of operation that commanders of all sea and air units of your forces engaged in protection of expedition clearly understand and apply rules of engagement along following lines:

A. It is desired to minimize the need to abort the operation because of U.S. engagement of Castro ships or aircraft in conduct of protective mission assigned to you.

B. Actual engagement of Castro ships or aircraft should be withheld until last possible moment and action taken only after it becomes clear that otherwise total destruction of friendly ship or ships may be imminent. For example, non-engagement in event of initial strafing or bomb run by Castro aircraft on friendly ship is acceptable rather than too hasty U.S. intervention with resultant need to abort the whole operation. Same applies importantly to intervention by U.S. surface ships. Initial firing on friendly ship by Castro surface ship is acceptable and U.S. engagement of Castro ship should await evidence that Castro ship is boring in for a kill or capture.

C. Preliminary maneuvering of U.S. aircraft or ships should take into account the above. Effort should be made to minimize blowing the operation by overly active intervention.

4. In the event actual U.S. engagement of Castro craft takes place, immediate report should be passed to Washington together with salient facts involved. Particularly desired are any facts which would support argument that it could be plausibly denied that U.S. intervention was in direct support of CEF.

5. In summary, hope is that over-all operation will not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantial risks.

0. Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Sent as a JCS/OSD telegram. According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Mitchell, which outlined the evolution of the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road, this telegram was drafted after General Cabell discussed with General Lemnitzer and General Bonesteel the rules of engagement set forth in CM-179-61, Document 85. Cabell was particularly concerned that U.S. naval forces might intervene before seriously needed, thus forcing abandonment of the operation. The message to Dennison printed here was cleared with Admiral Russell,USN, General Dean, J-3, and Admiral Wellings, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, and was then approved by General Lemnitzer. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)