Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

91. Memorandum From C. Tracy Barnes, Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action, Central Intelligence Agency, to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger)⁰

Washington, April 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Cuba

I have mentioned our conversation to Mr. Dulles and Dick Bissell, both of whom are thinking about the two main points, i.e., how to answer the direct question regarding support or involvement; and, secondly, should anything further be done with respect to particular individuals “on the Hill.” The latter question might appropriately be raised at the meeting Wednesday afternoon.¹

With regard to the other question, if we have any brilliant thoughts we will pass along. In the meantime, I would like to list a few ideas, some of which repeat part of our conversation:

1. The support or involvement question unavoidably requires the answer to a specific issue, namely, do you want directly to deny or to avoid denial by using some less direct and therefore inevitably ambiguous form of words. The working press is too smart and, at the moment, too well informed to assume anything but an affirmative from an answer failing directly to deny. Assuming a denial is not feasible, I would suggest consideration of the following:

a. A statement that there have been many allegations regarding U.S. support, all of which have been denied and none of which have been proved. In addition, it might be said that any specific evidence indicating impropriety will, of course, be considered. (I believe that we can live with this one. You will remember that it is the same position all agreed should be used in New York.)

b. If possible, it would be fine to include in an answer a few of the good ringing phrases that were to be used by Stevenson in New York in case his speech does not occur. The ones I have in mind deal with the placing of blame on the Castro regime and the fact that the anti-Castro efforts, such as they are, are Cuban not American.

c. Roaʼs appearance is now definitely off until Thursday.² Moreover, there have been reports (Tuesday and Tuesday night) that he is very shaky, upset and possibly (repeat possibly) going to collapse. Also note the attached cable³ which, I think, is probably petty accurate. A point can at least be made that having come to New York like a lion with all sorts of bluster and fire, he has now failed to show twice when given an opportunity to state his case. If anything further develops, Iʼll let you know immediately.

d. I have been thinking about the opening phrase in Mac Bundyʼs suggested paragraph⁴ which has to do with not speaking of the doings of the Agency, and I hope that any such phraseology can be avoided. As you know, historically, intelligence activities have been denied but not with a preamble of this sort. I feel certain that such a preamble will not go down well with the press or the public. Moreover, it will always be construed, in the particular case where used, as evidence that the Agency is involved. The press is sophisticated enough to interpolate the preamble where a denial is given and would, in my opinion, prefer to do so than to have it explained.

2. The arrest of Rolando Masferrer may be brought up with an inference that he may have been discriminated against since he is persona non grata to the Revolutionary Council. The answer to this is pretty easy, namely, Mr. Masferrer was, indeed, one of Batistaʼs most notorious aides but a violation of the Neutrality Act⁵ was the reason that his asylum was rescinded by the State Department and that he was arrested by the I&NS and indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. There would be no harm in this connection in indicating that similar action would be taken against any other individuals where the evidence was sufficient to justify a comparable charge.

C. Tracy Barnes⁶

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Secret. Schlesinger passed the memorandum from Barnes on to McGeorge Bundy on April 12, under cover of a note suggesting that Bundy would be interested in the memorandum. (Ibid.)
1. April 12. The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that the President met with a number of the leaders of both Houses of Congress on April 12, along with the senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense, but no record has been found that indicates that the issue of Cuba or the impending invasion was discussed at that meeting. (Kennedy Library)
2. April 13.
3. Not found attached.

4. On April 11 Bundy sent a memorandum to Schlesinger in which he suggested the following answer for the President in response to a question regarding CIA involvement:

   “This Administration does not propose to discuss in public at any time the work of CIA, but I can say this: the people and the government of the U.S. have inevitably had a sympathetic interest in the plight of Cuban patriots—anti-Communist and anti-Batista. But no effort has been made—and none will be made—to put U.S. interests in the place of Cuban interests. As far as we are concerned, any revolt against the Castro dictatorship inside Cuba, and any return to Cuba by exiled patriots, will be altogether Cuban in spirit, membership, and purpose.

   “—And let me say one word more. There have been contingency plans, in another Administration, for U.S. armed forces to respond, if called on, in any Cuban civil war—on the side of freedom, of course. This Administration has shelved those plans. The armed forces of the United States will stand guard against any act of external aggression by the Castro dictatorship, and against any intervention in the hemisphere by foreign imperialists of left or right. They will not be used in the internal struggle for freedom of the people of Cuba.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61)

5. The Neutrality Act of 1939; 54 Stat. 4, et seq.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.