420. Editorial Note

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone was on a honeymoon holiday in France when the August 29, 1962, U-2 mission established that surface-to-air missile sites were under construction in Cuba. The discovery, which was reported to McCone in the daily briefing cables sent to him by Deputy Director Marshall Carter, reinforced McConeʼs concern that the Soviet military build-up in Cuba presaged the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles. He concluded that the development of a costly surface-to-air defense system in Cuba could only be explained if it were designed to mask and protect the introduction of ballistic missiles. In a series of cables sent to Carter [text not declassified], McCone pressed his concerns and supported an expanded program of reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Return cables from Carter indicated that CIA analysts had considered McConeʼs concerns but concluded that the Soviet Union would not run the risk of provoking a military reaction from the United States.

In a cable dated September 7, McCone urged frequent reconnaissance operations and added: “My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could command important targets of Southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas.”

On September 10 he argued in a cable that the costly defenses being prepared in Cuba were difficult to rationalize unless they were “for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to [Page 1053] be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights.”

On September 11 Carter cabled that the CIAʼs Board of National Estimates was still persuaded that the costly crash program to install SA-2s in Cuba was more reasonably explained by reasons other than a desire to hide the introduction of ballistic missiles.

On September 13 McCone reiterated his concern about the establishment of an offensive weapons capability in Cuba.

On September 16 he urged that “we must carefully study the prospect of secret importation and placement of several Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight.”

On September 19 Carter cabled to McCone the conclusions from SNIE 85-3-62, which was issued that day to assess the military build-up in Cuba (Document 433). The estimate concluded that a decision to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba “would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far.”

In the final cable in the series [text not declassified], September 20, McCone took exception to the conclusion drawn in SNIE 85-3-62. He argued that “an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks to establish such a position.”

The cables exchanged between Carter and McCone are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4,DCI-DDCI Cables-Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962, and ibid., Job 80-B01676R, Box 17, Mongoose-Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights. The relevant portions of these cables are in the Supplement.