Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

37. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 6, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Views of Opposition Leader: Dr. Antonio Varona

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Antonio Varona
• Dr. Carlos Piad
• Ambassador Bonsal—ARA/COAS
• ARA:CMA—Mr. Vallon
• ARA:CMA—Mr. Stevenson
• ARA:CMA/C—Mr. Hurwitch

Dr. Varona said he had come to discuss a very serious and unfortunate development affecting the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) of which he is the leader. He related the following:

He had some time ago appointed Colonel Martin Elena as the Frenteʼs military expert in charge of training and military planning. Despite repeated requests, neither he nor Col. Martin had been permitted to visit the “camp” where Cubans are being trained under the control and supervision of U.S. officials. On the latest occasion when Col. Martin, on Varonaʼs instructions, had sought permission to visit the camp, he was bluntly told by a U.S. official named Roderick that the “training camp” activities were of no concern to the Frente. The primary function of the Frente, Roderick continued, was that of recruiting new members and supervising civilian activities of its members. Suggestion by the Frente of the possible composition of the future Government of Cuba was criticized by Roderick as an inappropriate Frente activity. In short, Martin was clearly given to understand that the U.S. was engaging in activities involving Cuban exiles and had plans affecting Cuba that the Frente was not entitled to know.

Dr. Varona took strong exception to the development. He insisted that Cubans in training should be placed under Cuban control, and that U.S. officials act only in an advisory capacity. He considered his organization as allied with, but not subordinate to, the U.S. He was extremely concerned that training activities at the “camp”, carried on with the collaboration of Cuban military officers who were not controlled by the Frente, might result in the eventual establishment of a government in Cuba after Castroʼs overthrow in which the Cuban military elements would have a preponderant voice. A post-Castro government of this nature would be unacceptable to the majority of the Cuban people.

The U.S. attitude revealed to Martin was especially untimely in that the Frente Executive Committee was in the process of expanding to include other opposition group leaders such as Miro Cardona, Luis Conte Aguero, Alvarez Diaz and Carlos Hevia. Varona concluded by stating that the Frente would not accept this new state of affairs and would resign en masse if the present relationship of the Frente to the “training camp” were permitted to persist.

Ambassador Bonsal expressed his pleasure at the opportunity to talk again with Dr. Varona, but told him that he had no knowledge of the above matters and could therefore make no useful comment. He added only that situations of this kind are frequently the result of a misunderstanding. He then drew Dr. Varona into a general conversation on the situation in Cuba and invited him to call on him again on his next visit to Washington. Dr. Varona appeared most appreciative of the fact that he had been received by Ambassador Bonsal.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-661. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch.
1. Varona returned to see Bonsal on February 9 following a meeting he had just had with “certain United States officials.” He complained that the attitude of these officials remained as it was before, and it was clear that the Frente was not to have any influence on activities at the “camp.” Varona likened the situation to a time bomb, and said that he could not return to Miami unless a solution acceptable to the FRD was reached. He asked to see Berle, and Bonsal said that he would relay the request. (Ibid., 737.00/2-961)