Office of the Historian

361. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)0

Washington, July 26, 1962.

Mr. Martin: Attached is the combined report on Phase I.1 Mr. Johnson has a copy.

I do not find Lansdaleʼs covering memo particularly enlightening. The comments of DOD and the other agencies on the “four courses of action” are worth noting. You will be interested to read that DOD would like to see the Monroe Doctrine re-affirmed.

I think the essence of the positions lies in the following:

1.
CIA believes that if assurances were given of US intervention, a revolt could be mounted by late 1963, but would be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not supported by substantial military force. No mention is made of the nature or magnitude of the revolt.
2.
Defense states it needs eighteen (or perhaps twelve) days of preparation, although some units might be available in as soon as five days.
3.
State believes it needs a virtual civil war situation in Cuba before intervention in Cuba with US military force might be considered politically feasible.

These three conditions do not appear to be easily reconciled.

Bob
  1. Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose—Phase I. Top Secret.↩
  2. See Document 360.↩