358. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harris) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)0
SUBJECT
- End of Phase I
In response to the questions posed in your memorandum of 11 July 1962, subject: End of Phase I,1 I have prepared 5 paragraphs each of which is directly responsive to your questions:
- 1.
- Statement of What DOD Hoped to Accomplish During Phase I.
- a.
- DOD hoped to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose during Phase I.
- b.
- DOD hoped to accomplish all the planning and essential preliminary actions necessary to establishing a decisive capability for US Military intervention in Cuba.
- 2.
- Accomplishments in Phase I.
- a.
- Establishment of a DOD Working Group. A Brigadier General was appointed to full time duty as the DOD/JCS Representative to handle Mongoose affairs. Each of the Services, JCS Directorates and DIA appointed full time representative to serve on the Working Group. Each of these representatives has direct access to his Chief or, in the case of the Services, the Operation Deputies as well. Office space cleared for Top Secret information was established in the Joint Staff area, and secretarial help was assigned.
- b.
- Establishment and Operation of an Interrogation Center at Opa Locka, Florida, on 15 February 1962. DOD assisted CIA in the initial planning for and the establishment of the Interrogation Center. Since the inception of the Center, the DOD has provided personnel support to the Center by furnishing 26 personnel (15 officers and 11 enlisted men) out of a total of 37 personnel manning the Center.
- c.
- PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other countries.
- d.
- Voice Radio Broadcasts from a Submarine. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] available to CIA for the conduct of voice radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA.
- e.
- Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA.
- f.
- Utilization of Avon-Park, Florida, by CIA as a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at Avon-Park for the training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare.
- g.
- [1 line of source text not declassified]
- h.
- Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer to duty with CIA [1 line of source text not declassified].
- i.
- Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANTʼs regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for implementation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces.
- j.
- Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba.CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piecemeal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk inherent in such an operation CINCLANT is seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment.
- k.
- Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed for the purpose of [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
- l.
- Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execution of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt.
- m.
- Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been developed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours after decision.
- n.
- Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared.
- o.
- DODʼs Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished without leading to general war and without serious offense to public opinion.
- p.
- [2 lines of source text not declassified]
- q.
- Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba.
- r.
- Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba.
- s.
- [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- t.
- Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the requirements of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, electronic collection and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political and economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission Center, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these sources was processed through the Intelligence Communityʼs channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle. Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps.
- u.
- Utilization of US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for Joint Navy/CIA Intelligence Operations. DOD investigated the possibility of using Guantanamo as a base of operations for the collection of national level intelligence, in light of the present policy limitations and possible policy changes in the future.
- v.
- Establishment of “Patrol Posts” in the Caribbean. In response to a request from the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, DOD examined the possibility of establishing “patrol posts” in the Caribbean.
- w.
- Psychological Operations: A survey was conducted in an attempt to increase Naval Base Guantanamoʼs role in psychological operations. As a result special OSD funds were made available for special baseball sportscasts over the base radio station.
- 3.
- Operational Estimate of the Potential for
Intelligence Collection.
- a.
- Reconnaissance—a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance
operation is given below:
[Page 867]
Completed Vehicle Code Word Frequency WV-2Q Melrose 13 A3D-2P/2Q Fitbolt 4 USS Moale Operation 19 Mar-12 Apr 62 RB 47 1 May 62 Submarine/UDU 5-6 May 62 Continuing F3D-2Q Call Money 6-11 per month AD-5Q Sleepwalker 2 per month C-130 Quick Fox 10 per month A3D-2P 6-8 per month Navy DD daily Navy P-2V twice daily In addition to these, there are two special operations per month. The results of all this reconnaissance are satisfactory as far as producing air and navy order of battle information. However, against ground order of battle, they are not able to contribute too much.
- b.
- Refugee Interrogation—Although the quantity of refugees proc-essed at Opa Locka has not diminished, the quality of the information that they have available is not as good as in the past. Particularly in the area of military intelligence, very few refugees can make major contributions. Occasionally, they do fill some gaps in military intelligence and they make considerable contribution in other areas. Therefore, this effort should be continued.
- c.
- Electronic Intelligence—The existing program is producing
limited information; however, it is suffering from not only
the insufficiency of the effort but also from the recent
shift to more sophisticated communication systems by the
Cubans. The approved new program should overcome these
difficulties and provide increased information in the
following areas:
- Organization and deployment of Cuban Army, Navy, Air Force and Militia.
- Troop, ship and air movements.
- Tactics and training Cuban armed forces.
- Patrolling and policing information on locations, installation or equipment.
- Materiel employed by Armed Forces.
- Evidence of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical support, training, volunteers and of the presence of Sino-Soviet military materiel (vessels) or aircraft.
- Activities of Department of State security.
- Evidences of GOC interception of Cuban resistance forces communications.
- Clandestine operations of Cuban government in the United States and other American Republics.
- Information on sabotage, dissident activity and defection of Cuban ships and/or personnel.
- Restrictive or punitive policies to be applied to Cuban nationals or their property in Cuba.
- Strikes, slow-downs and labor problems.
- Location and movements of principal Cuban government, military and para-military personalities.
- Plots against prominent figures.
- Reactions to probes, special activities and reconnaissance flights.
- Surveillance of the possible operations against Naval Base at Guantanamo.
- Organization, deployment and capability of Cuban communications.
- d.
-
Clandestine—The Intelligence Community has put considerable effort into improving their clandestine collection capabilities against the target island. However, these operations suffer from the lack of a definite target date and objective. With an open-end operation, such as Project Mongoose, specific military order of battle information is largely perishable especially when the Armed Forces are in a constant state of reorganization, re-groupment and redeployment. About 25 per cent of all reports on Cuba received from clandestine sources prove to be of definite value.
Collection of information through third-country sources varies widely as to quality. The number and competence of observers and the specific collection requirement levied on the third-country source determine the value of the information obtained. Some very valuable information on specific items has resulted from this effort and this source should continue to be exploited.
- e.
- Summary—Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off considerably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organization itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue.
- 4.
- Estimate of the Potential for Military
Operations within Cuba—Should a policy decision be made to
militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could:
- a.
- With 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.
- b.
-
Should the situation demand, a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows:
- 2 Airborne Divisions—5 days (para-drop units only)
- 4 Marine BLTs—7-8 days
- Following Forces—15-18 days
(This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk.)
- c.
- [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- d.
- Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft availability and desired intensity of attack.
- e.
- Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours with effectiveness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours.
- 5.
- Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of
the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to
Follow in Relation to Cuba:
- a.
-
Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.
Advantages
- (1)
- This would be temporarily economical in terms of funds, equipment and allocation of forces.
- (2)
- It would demonstrate the US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.
Disadvantages
- (1)
- This would be an acceptance of a Communist bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere and an admission that there was nothing that the United States could or would do about it.
- (2)
- This would be damaging to the prestige of the United States and would weaken the will to resist or fight against communism in Cuba, Latin America and elsewhere.
- (3)
- It would increase the probability of the establishment of Soviet military base(s) in Cuba which could ultimately prove to be an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.
- (4)
- It would become increasing difficult to protect the United States or the Western Hemisphere as Cuban military force capabilities increase.
- (5)
- It would prevent the United States from assuming a posture which would permit exploitation of any “breaks” that may develop within Cuba.
- (6)
- It would permit the Castro Communist regime to consolidate its gains and become even more firmly entrenched.
- (7)
- It might encourage the Communist regime to become even more bold in exporting communism to Latin America.
- (8)
- It would permit the Castro regime to prepare at its own pace the exportation of their revolution of other Latin American countries.
- (9)
- It could eventually cost billions of dollars as US defense forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet the increasing threat from the South.
- (10)
- It would virtually assure the permanent existence of a Communist base for subversion and espionage throughout the Western Hemisphere.
- b.
-
Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro Communist regime without overt US military commitment.
Advantages
- (1)
- Would demonstrate US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.
- (2)
- Would be in accord with the UN charter and stated US policy regarding the non-use of military force in settling disputes.
- (3)
- Depending upon the success of the pressures, in the short term, it would conserve US military forces and resources.
Disadvantages
- (1)
- Except in matter of degree, this has essentially been the US policy since the severance of relations on 3 January 1962, and it has not been successful.
- (2)
- This would give the Soviets time to develop Cuba as a base for operations throughout the Western Hemisphere.
- (3)
- It would give the Communists further time to develop military bases which could cost the United States billions of dollars in developing appropriate defenses.
- (4)
- This would require that US military resources and forces be tied up indefinitely to protect the Hemisphere against the continuing Communist threat.
- (5)
- This would permit the continued indoctrination of Cuban Youth and the progressive strengthening of the internal police state and military forces. These would combine to make the threat to internal revolt more remote and the price of US intervention more costly.
- c.
-
Commit the United States to help the Cubans to overthrow the Castro Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of US military force if required.
Advantages
- (1)
- Would permit the United States to control the timing of operations against Cuba and permit a progressive build-up which could be modified or terminated as circumstances require.
- (2)
- It would eventually show that we are willing to back anti-communist efforts and it would reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine.
- (3)
- US action against Cuba would be more acceptable to world opinion as it would cast the United States in the role of aiding Cuban freedom fighters.
- (4)
- Widespread revolution would simplify some of the problems of military intervention.
- (5)
- Revolution could produce leaders from within Cuba who could constitute the new Cuban government.
- (6)
- It would furnish new hope and incentive to anti-communist elements inside and outside of Cuba.
- (7)
- It would be economical in terms of military resources and forces by obtaining maximum support from the Cubans.
- (8)
- It would assure the eventual ousting of the Castro Communist regime.
Disadvantages
- (1)
- The time involved in this course permits additional Cubans to be indoctrinated thereby creating more problems during the invasion and after.
- (2)
- Contains the danger of “telegraphing the punch” and thereby putting Castro and the Soviets on notice, which could result in counter-action and possible escalation if the Sino Soviet Bloc provides open assistance. Furthermore, the longer US intervention is delayed, the higher the cost will be in American lives.
- (3)
- This course would further antagonize die-hard non-intervention elements within Latin America.
- (4)
- This would require the United States to establish, control, support and manipulate front organizations, develop Cuban leadership and run covert training and operations which carry the risk of extreme national embarrassment.
- d.
-
Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro Communist regime by US military forces.
Advantages
- (1)
- Would permit the United States to take action against Cuba at a time and place of our own choosing.
- (2)
- Chances of premature disclosure and compromise, compared with other courses of action, would be reduced.
- (3)
- It would demonstrate to anti-communists throughout the world the US determination to oppose communism.
- (4)
- It would reaffirm our adherence to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
- (5)
- It would stop further communist indoctrination of Cubans.
- (6)
- It would eliminate the possibility of Soviet bases being established in Cuba.
- (7)
- It would eliminate the utilization of Cuba as a base of subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere.
- (8)
- It would eliminate the possible requirement for a major outlay of funds in preparing to meet in increasing threat from Cuba.
Disadvantages
- (1)
- Without a truly plausible provocative act, the United States would pay a very considerable price in terms of world opinion.
- (2)
- It could inspire Soviet counter-action in other areas.
- (3)
- This course of action is contrary to the UN charter and the non-intervention doctrine enunciated at the Bogota Conference.