355. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)0
Washington, July 19,
1962.
I. What we hoped to accomplish in Phase I
- A
- —Increase U.S. intelligence with respect to Cuba and Cuban activ-ities in the Hemisphere.
- B
- —Undertake as many political, economic, psychological and other actions as feasible, designed to weaken the Castro regime and isolate it from the rest of the Hemisphere.
II. What was accomplished in Phase I
- A
- —With reference to A above, the following were accomplished:
- 1.
- An increased number of reports from friendly embassies in Habana and improved mechanism for distribution of these reports to agencies concerned.
- 2.
- Greater vigilance on the part of our embassies and improved reporting on Cuban activities throughout the world.
- 3.
- Regular de-briefing of U.S. and foreign newsmen as well as foreign diplomats who have visited or are posted in Cuba.
- 4.
- An improved program of acquisition of Cuban newspapers and other publications.
- 5.
- Provision of a list of U.S. citizens now in the U.S. who have lived in Cuba, as possible sources of intelligence information.
- 6.
- Publication and dissemination of several intelligence reports covering Cuba (as well as contributions to USIB reports).
- B
- —With respect to B above, the following were accomplished:
- 1.
- Political
- a.
- As a result of the major U.S. effort at the Punta del Este meeting, Cuba was excluded from the OAS, and two Special Committees were established to deal with Cuban-Communist subversion. (For the actions taken to implement the Punta del Este decisions, please see Annex #1.)
- b.
- Fifteen American republics no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba.
- c.
- Overwhelming defeat in the UN of Cuban sponsored resolutions charging U.S. with planning an invasion of Cuba.
- d.
- As a result of efforts by the Secretary and Mr. Rostow, NATO has become more aware of U.S. concern over Cuba. No significant actions that might materially affect the situation in Cuba are expected from NATO in the near future, however, since NATO continues generally to regard Cuba as a U.S. problem.
- e.
- A wide variety of conversations held both by Embassy officers throughout the Hemisphere and by Departmental officers in Washington with government officials, politicians, labor, student and other groups have constituted an important factor in their greater awareness of Castro-Communist subversive techniques as well as their increasingly low opinion of Castro and Castroism. These conversations have contributed to influencing the policies of the governments concerned and stimulating a large number of anti-Castro statements throughout the Hemisphere which were then exploited for their propaganda value (for a sampling of such statements, please see Annex #2).
- f.
- The Presidentʼs trip to Mexico which demonstrated dramatically for the Castro regime the close relationship between the peoples and governments of the two nations.
- g.
- Special reference to the plight of the Cuban people by Latin American clergy during religious services.
- h.
- Examples of labor activity include a symbolic work stoppage in Costa Rica on 7 January 1962 designed to call attention to the plight of Cuban laborers. The Archbishop instructed priests to toll church bells at the beginning and end of the five-minute period. On 3 June 1962 in Venezuela, Jose Gonzalez Navarro, President of the Venezuelan Federation of Labor, decried conditions in Cuba and organized demonstrations in support of President Betancourt. In July 1962 a Chilean labor leader, recently returned from Cuba, spoke of the disillusionment in Cuba. During February 1962, seventeen Secretaries General of Campesino Unions in La Paz approved a resolution against Cuba. In March the La Paz Federation of Teachers chastised the Bolivian National Federation for its pro-Castro attitude. In January 1962 the Venezuelan Labor Confederation adopted a resolution condemning the Communist dictatorship in Cuba and, finding the Cuban CTC not a free labor movement, abrogated its mutual assistance pact of 1960. In April 1962 the National Congress of Bolivian Railroad Workers rejected a resolution supporting the Castro regime. A number of other actions, initiated outside this project, are designed to assist Latin American Unions and will contribute indirectly to this project.
- i.
- Instructions to all posts emphasizing the importance of developing youth assets in the cold war struggle and urging the inclusion of student and other leaders in the exchange of persons program.
- j.
- Instructions to block Cuban accreditation to the ECE.
- k.
- Instructions to deny Cuban participation in the ILO.
- l.
- Instructions to block Cuban entry into the proposed Latin American Free Trade Area.
- m.
- Examples of actions initiated outside of the project which contribute indirectly include arrangements for sending eight U.S. coaches to thirteen Latin American countries for a period of three weeks in each country to assist in training for the Caribbean games and world-wide guidance on the Helsinki Youth Conference, to which the Cubans reportedly plan to send a large delegation.
- 2.
- Economic
- a.
- U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.
- b.
- General decline of trade between the free world and Cuba. (While a variety of factors have contributed to this situation, U.S. Embassy activities in this field have made a substantial contribution to the decline in trade. For a list of specific actions taken, please see Annex #3.)
- c.
- Tightening of transshipment controls, particularly in Canada and Mexico.
- d.
- Extension of technical data controls to include Cuba.
- e.
- Extension of U.S. Customs control procedures to U.S. ports in addition to Miami for the purpose of guarding against transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba.
- f.
- Application to Cuban or Cuban-chartered vessels of port security measures in force for Soviet Bloc vessels.
- g.
- Denial of bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessel under Sino-Soviet Bloc charter carrying cargo between Cuba and Bloc ports.
- h.
- In the early stages of the project an inter-agency committee consisting of representatives of State, Commerce, Treasury and CIA met to explore further possibilities of economic action against Cuba. As a result of following up with the individual members, the above listed actions were accomplished. Mention should be made of the thorough study undertaken to determine the feasibility of entering the tanker charter market. The results of this study indicated that since there was an over-supply of tankers, preclusive action on our part would prove very expensive without compensatory effect. It is difficult to predict when opportunities might arise in the Cuban situation in which economic warfare would be effective. If Cubaʼs convertible currency position continues to deteriorate (and the poor sugar crop would so augur), we can look for a continued decline in trade between Cuba and the free world, thus reducing the opportunities (and perhaps necessity) for economic warfare. Nonetheless, we should develop this capability in advance, so that opportunities, when and if they arise, can be exploited.
- 3.
-
Psychological
(The Department chairs a working-level inter-agency psychological warfare committee which supports the Cuba project, although it is not an organic part of the operation. The Committee coordinates the propaganda activities of the agencies involved, determines themes for exploitation and assigns operational responsibility.)
The principal themes that have been emphasized are:
- a.
- the failures and betrayed promises of the Castro regime;
- b.
- the suppression of human rights, economic deterioration and social injustice in Cuba;
- c.
- Cubaʼs domination by Communism and alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
- d.
- Cuban subversive attempts elsewhere in the Hemisphere;
- e.
- Cubaʼs isolation from the rest of the Hemisphere;
- f.
- opposition to Cuba at international conferences;
- g.
- activities of democratic anti-Castro groups;
- h.
- the Castro regime is not permanent.
The Committee has had a role in bringing about the following accomplishments:
- a.
- Indictment of the Prensa Latina representative in New York.
- b.
- Exposure of author Waldo Frankʼs acceptance of money from the Cuban Government.
- c.
- Exploitation of the poor quality of Soviet Bloc medicines in Cuba.
- d.
- Widely distributed pamphlet on the subversion of the University of Habana.
- e.
- Effective anti-Castro activity at the UNESCO-ECLA conference on education in Santiago, Chile, March 1962.
- f.
- Exposure of the Cuban “troika” attempt to appear pro-Western, neutralist and pro-Communist at the same time.
- g.
- Publicized Cuban charge declared Persona Non Grata by Philippine Government in October 1961.
- h.
- Dissemination of reports on Cuban attempts to subvert a peaceful solution of the Dominican problem after Trujilloʼs assassination.
- i.
- Establishment of a program under which U.S. Embassies in Latin America forward clippings from all available publications, which indicate anti-Castro attitudes.
- j.
- Compilation of material for magazine length article on Cuba in all languages by Readers Digest.
- k.
- U.S. television programs on Cuba.
- 4.
- Refugee Matters
- a.
- Cuban Groups—Since the adoption of the policy of open liaison with the CRC and other exile groups, the Department has been the focal point of innumerable visits from Cuban exiles who raise a wide variety of problems. The Department uses these visits to re-assure exiles that Cuba has not been abandoned and to resolve policy problems as they arise. Constant liaison is maintained with HEW. At present, the Department is assisting in the arrangements for the training of a small group of exile military officers at advanced US military schools.
- b.
- Pan-American Airways is seeking financial assistance through the Department to ameliorate the loss PAA sustains from its Miami-Habana-Miami run. PAA reports it has 2,500,000 pesos in Habana which it is unable to convert and that this sum is increasing at the rate of approximately 900,000 pesos annually. In addition, PAA maintains it loses approximately $1,000 a day operationally, since their aircraft fly to Habana virtually empty. PAA appears reluctant to continue the service indefinitely without US assistance. The Department believes that since the PAA flights are the main avenue of escape for anti-Castro Cubans, the US has an interest in seeing that the flights are maintained both from the standpoint of our public posture and of intelligence collection. Investigation of the availability of funds for this purpose, including discussions with the CAB, have not proved fruitful to date.
- c.
- Prisoner Exchange—The Department has assisted the Cuban Families Committee to the extent possible in the Committeeʼs efforts to obtain the release of the Brigade prisoners. Tax deductibility was arranged and official public statements favoring its efforts were stimulated. During the trials public statements from a number of Latin American Presidents and from the Prime Minister of Canada urging humanitarian treatment were arranged and were probably largely responsible for the fact that no death sentences were passed. Indirect efforts to obtain the prisonersʼ release in exchange for food were attempted through the Cuban UN Ambassador and through the Families Committee.
III. Operational Estimates
Political and Economic
Given the present attitude toward the Cuban problem of friendly nations in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, and barring the unforseen, the potential for accomplishing significant and effective, new, overt political and economic measures against Cuba (unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally) appears limited. In the economic field, there may arise opportunities when we might covertly engage in economic warfare with good effect. The present unavailability of funds specifically designed for economic [Page 857] warfare purposes would prevent us from taking advantage of such opportunities.
Robert A.
Hurwitch1