Office of the Historian

298. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet0

Norfolk, Virginia, January 29, 1962, 8:20 p.m.

292020Z. Cuban Contingency Plans. A. CINCLANTOPLAN 314-61 (change 2). B. CINCLANTOPLAN 316-61.1

1.
SecDef has expressed dissatisfaction with reaction times envisaged in references A and B.
2.
Fast application of US air power against Cuban airfields, aircraft, missile and radar installations is required as first priority. The selective disruption of communications and transportation facilities is second priority with the limitation of avoiding destruction of populated areas. Air strikes against troop and armor concentrations is third priority. Reaction times from a condition of no warning are six hours, twelve hours and twenty-four hours. Armament is limited to conventional weapons only. Naval and Air Force tactical air will be employed. Additionally it is desired to reduce reaction times to 4 days for ref A and to 2 days for ref B.
3.
In order to achieve the required air strike capability it will be necessary to:
A.
Activate JTF 122.
B.
Require COMAFTASKFOR and COMNAVTASKFOR to be prepared to conduct tactical air strikes against designated targets as directed by CJTF 122.
4.
From previous studies of the subject it is known that the required reaction times for refs A and B can be achieved only by accomplishing certain of the alert and prepositioning of forces set forth in phases I and II of the referenced plans. Deployment of PACOM amphibious forces and some LANTCOM seaborne forces will be necessary.
5.
From previous studies in which adees and their staffs participated in CINCLANT is aware of the magnitude of effort required to realize and maintain the readiness goals set forth above. However, the Cuban military capability and the direct threat presented to the US and Latin America are rapidly increasing.
6.
CINCLANT desires action adees review their plans supporting refs A and B with the above in mind and comment by message at their earliest convenience. Specific information desired: [Page 733]
A.
Estimate of TAC aircraft required to achieve air strike capability described in para 2 above west of longitude 79W.
B.
Estimate of Naval aircraft required to achieve air strike capability described in para 2 above east of longitude 79W.
C.
Prepositioning requirements for 6A and B above.
D.
Alert and prepositioning requirements (related to phases I and II) to achieve a 4 day reaction time for ref A and a 2 day reaction time for ref B.
E.
Estimates of length of time ready posture can be maintained.
F.
Estimates of costs, and impact on other major plans and programs of achieving:
(1)
Reaction time of six, twelve, and twenty-four hours for air strikes.
(2)
The reduced reaction times of four days for ref A and two days for ref B.2
7.
Replies are desired by 5 Feb. based on best estimates available. Action adees should continue to study the problem and be prepared to participate in planning conference in near future.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 1/11/62-1/29/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to CJTF 122, CG USARLANT Ft Bragg, CG USARLANT Seymore-JohnsonAFB NC. Repeated for information to JCS, CINCSTRIKE, CG CONARC, and COMTAC.↩
  2. Neither of these operations plans has been found.↩
  3. In CINCLANT telegram 312156Z to CINCSTRIKE, Dennison cited CINCLANT telegram 292020Z and stated that the studies to be conducted in accordance with his instructions in that telegram “will, among other things, be concerned with the provision of combat-ready air force and army forces to this command.” He added: “The degree of readiness of these forces, and the speed with which they can move to or be assembled” at stated transfer points were matters of mutual concern. Accordingly, Dennison asked for CINCSTRIKE comments on CINCLANT telegram 292020Z, with particular reference to subparagraphs 6 D, E, and F. (Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historianʼs Office, Cable Files, Cuba, Jan-Aug 1962)↩