Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

27. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, January 26, 1961.

CUBA

A. Concept of the Operation:

1. We believe the present plan can establish a beachhead on Cuban soil and maintain it for a period of two weeks, possibly as long as thirty days. It will be of sufficient size to enable a provisional government to be introduced and exist without being under small arms fire. It will contain an air strip and will permit access by sea.

2. There is reasonable chance that the success of the above plan would set in motion forces which would cause the downfall of the regime.

3. There is a greater than even likelihood, however, that, although the consolidation of the beachhead would elicit wide-spread rebellious activities and great disorganization, it would not by itself and with such other support as could be rendered by Agency resources cause the downfall of the regime. Nevertheless, supplemented by the infiltration of other PM teams in other parts of Cuba and by harassing air activity, it could produce a set of affairs describable as continuing civil war.

4. Under these conditions and assuming that the provisional government had been recognized by the United States, there would appear to be a basis for an overt, open U.S. initiative to institute a military occupation of the island by a composite OAS force in order to put a stop to the civil war. This would almost certainly have to be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the OAS to hold supervised free elections reasonably promptly.

5. The provisional government would indicate its readiness to cooperate with such an OAS force whereas the Castro regime would almost certainly refuse to permit a period of OAS pacification followed by an OAS supervised election. Thus the initiative referred to above would in fact lead to overt military intervention against the Castro regime.

B. Immediate Decisions Required:

1. Activities now in progress include (a) political preparations to form an acceptable junta representing all groups; (b) propaganda; (c) the final recruitment and training of PM forces; and (d) active softening up operations in Cuba, including infiltration of teams, maritime resupply, sabotage, extension of agent communication nets, and air resupply and leaflet missions.

2. The softening up activities listed under paragraph 1. (d) preceding are essential not only as preparation for the final effort to overthrow the regime but also to test the temper of the Cuban people, to enable operational assessment of the actual and potential strength of the resist-ance and furnish other hard intelligence. If these activities are continued for another two to three weeks, it should be possible to form a far better judgment than at present of the chances for the success of the operation outlined in part A. above. Both the continued evidence to the world of active resistance in the island and the intelligence thus obtained will be of equal value as preparation for the operation outlined above, or for overt U.S. or OAS military action or as continuing pressure in the event that paramilitary or military action is substantially delayed.

3. It is recommended:

a. That the activities currently in progress set forth in paragraph B.1. above be continued for three weeks pending a reassessment of the chances of success of the operation as planned.

b. That the detailed military planning be reviewed by not more than one or two senior officers on behalf of the JCS with a view to confirming or modifying the military estimate contained in paragraph A.1. above.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba. Top Secret. Drafted by Bissell for a Presidential briefing. The briefing apparently was that provided by Dulles to President Kennedy and other members of the new administration on January 28. For records of that meeting, see Documents 30 and 31.