255. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- JCS Briefing on Cuban Contingency Planning
- The briefing was given by Captain Hadden USN, with General Dean backing up.
I. Contingency Planning Against Violence at Guantanamo Base
It was stated that this plan1 had approval of DOD, State and the President. It calls for response appropriate to character of attack. CINCLANT has interpreted this to include returning fire as appropriate if anyone shoots at US, and extending the base perimeter as required. In other words the Base Commander is now authorized to protect himself to the extent necessary, including going out and silencing guns in the hills if they are shooting at him. He doesnʼt have to check with anybody before he does so. Query—Do we want to leave him this authority? (Wym Coerr says anti-Castro Cubans are reportedly thinking of faking attack on base in order to embroil US.)
Water supply seems well in hand; with austere use local stores could last three weeks. By this time tankers available on short notice could bring in more. There are 3100 non-military personnel, mostly depend-ents, on the base. A Marine BLT (1500) afloat is never more than 48 hours away, and usually closer.
II. Contingency Plan for Response to Cuban Provocation Leading to Open Hostilities
In this case CINCLANT will (a) defend Guantanamo; (b) support or re-establish a Cuban government friendly to US; (c) restore and maintain order. The progression of events would be blockade, then reinforcement of Guantanamo, finally air and amphibious attack.
Force tabs include 15,500 Marines and a 9000-man Marine air wing; 23,000 Army, mainly 18th Airborne Corps (82nd Airborne Division and an infantry brigade); a naval covering force, and an air task force including fighters and troop carrier wings.
III. Alternative Contingency Plan for Larger-scale Action
JCS also have a plan which is based on a concept of generating forces far beyond Cuban capabilities to resist. This plan in effect calls for overthrowing [Page 639] the Castro government by an overwhelming land, sea and air operation. It includes the above forces plus substantial add-ons, e.g. a total of 53,000 Army troops (two airborne divisions plus) and overwhelming air strength. JCS estimate these forces could take all of Cuba within ten days and secure it in five days more (though of course guerrillas in hills would take longer to flush).
Reaction Time Needed. Both plans are now based on 18 days total response time from date of decision. However, some forces can be generated much more rapidly:
- 4-24 hours—can get a 1500 man BLT to Guantanamo.
- 24 hours—could drop 2 airborne battle groups supported by 7 DDs and 4 fighter squadrons.
- 48 hours—11,800 man task force of 4 battle groups, backed by 2 carriers, 36 destroyers, and 8 fighter squadrons.
- 5 days—2 airborne divisions with 23,000 men.
- 15-18 days—sealift elements come in. Up to this point the forces dropped lack heavy equipment for offensive punch. It (tanks, etc.) comes in by sea and US forces then move out to occupy Cuba.
Assumptions are that the necessary base rights and overflight clearances have been gotten (one airbase in Bahamas is essential and we are checking with UK on it); forces from Puerto Rico must fly over Haiti and Dominican Republic.
All of the above plans are for unilateral US action. Though the JCS hope there would be some OAS support, the underlying thought behind both plans was to be ready to do something overwhelming soon. In this case sizable OAS forces would only slow us down, though the plans do contemplate token contributions. Query—Shouldnʼt we have alternate plans based on substantial LA contribution, so that in case we want to make it an OAS rather than strictly US operation, weʼll have some idea of how to fair [phase?] the LAʼs in?
Above plans call for only conventional weapons. They are based on immediate neutralization of whatever Cuban air strength exists so no requirement exists for nuclears (it would be a political disaster anyway). There are CIA and military government annexes, but no use of Cuban forces is contemplated. No Soviet reaction is assumed.
One weakness in the plans is that the military will be prepared only to provide five days support for the indigenous personnel, i.e. Cubans in occupied areas. Obviously after five days we will have an awful lot of Cubans to care for. The plan merely says this would be responsibility of the State Department!
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Top Secret. Prepared by Komer. Another copy of this memorandum has a handwritten notation that indicates the briefing was for President Kennedy, General Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., Subjects, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/61-10/4/63)↩
- None of the plans cited in the memorandum has been further identified.↩