250. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Minutes of Meeting of Special Group, July 20, 1961
PRESENT
- General Taylor, Messrs. Johnson, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bundy (for items 1 and 2, and part of 3)
- Mr. Barnes was present for items 1 through 3
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]
3.1 Cuba—Covert Program
The DCI introduced discussion of this paper2 with the comment that the covert program must be keyed into over-all U.S. policy and that an aggressive set of clandestine actions should not be undertaken until it is clear what the general direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba is going to be. The Group agreed with this. Mr. Johnson expressed his understanding that essentially a stand-by attitude was in effect at the moment. In this connection, reference was made to the recent meeting of top-level authority with Dr. Miro Cardona, which evidently resulted in an understanding [Page 632] that the Revolutionary Council would continue to be supported, for the present at least.
Under Objectives, the Group accepted Mr. Dullesʼ suggestion to reword paragraph 2 a of the paper, to read as follows:
“a. The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S.”
Regarding the question of propaganda, Mr. Dulles said that he thought CIA Officials should sit down with USIA to coordinate plans to the extent possible; General Taylor agreed that this would be useful. Mr. Dulles cautioned, however, that USIAʼs appropriations for Latin America had been deeply cut and that, therefore, its capabilities were not very large.
General Taylor then raised a basic question as to where responsibility for approval actually lies, in the case of several possibilities cited under the paramilitary section. After some discussion, it was agreed that any major operations in this field would be subject to further approval by the Special Group.
It was also agreed that sabotage operations, particularly, require a close policy look. In this connection, the second sentence on page 8 of the paper was changed to read: “Actual sabotage operations will be carried out only after policy approval by the Special Group.”
There was then a lengthy discussion on guerrillas, the Group finally agreeing that over-all U.S policy must be more sharply defined on this point. It was the opinion of the Group, however, that supply of existing guerrilla elements, to the extent necessary to avoid dispersion, would be in the U.S. interest. This was interpreted to include such items as ammunition, food and clothing. Mr. Dulles undertook to take a sharp look at the recommendations and plans for guerrillas, with a view to discussing this subject at next weekʼs meeting.
The Special Group approved the budget as presented, with the following provisos: only 50% of each major item would be drawn down in the near future; the large item for boats, under Paramilitary, would be eliminated for the time being, before the 50% figure was applied; expenditures for sabotage and guerrilla operations would be deferred, and both activities would be subject to next weekʼs discussion. The DCI said that the Agency would come back to the Special Group with a progress report, across the board, in less than six months, at which time further authorizations would be considered.
[Page 633]It was the consensus that this whole program should be discussed with highest level authority.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 3, July 27, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott on July 21.↩
- Project to be carried forward to higher authority. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Dated July 17. (Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961) For text, see the Supplement.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.↩