Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

227. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

CM-224-61

Washington, June 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Cuba

In response to your request, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency, has prepared an estimate of usable guerrilla areas, the political-police control mechanism, key pro-Castro sub-leaders, and possible guerrilla centers in Cuba, enclosed herewith.

L.L. Lemnitzer¹

Enclosure

CUBA

1. Preamble. It is impossible to estimate the amount of really hard-core pro-Castro residual which would remain in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro. Many factors would contribute to increase or decrease the guerrilla potential facing any successor government. Some of these factors are:

a. Degree of acceptability of new government to Cuban population.

b. Policy of new government with regard to good agrarian reforms instituted by Castro.

c. Extent of vindictiveness practiced by new governmental bureaucracy against Castroites.

d. Efficiency with which campaign to overthrow Castro was executed and degree of success quickly attained. Almost all factual information on Cuba is old. New information is very fragmentary and mostly laced with gossip, rumor, and propaganda. Current sources are not considered trained intelligence observers and their information is not subject to check or confirmation, hence is of little value. Any estimate on Cuba at this time must necessarily be based on background rather than current information.

2. Pro-Castro Areas of Cuba

a. Geographically. Pro-Castro sentiment exists throughout the island. The degree to which a particular area or province should be regarded as pro-Castro or anti-Castro cannot be determined with any precision. Localities which, on the surface, appear mostly pro-Castro might react violently anti-Castro if the political-police control apparatus were removed or if US forces were in the area. We have no reliable evidence upon which to base a precise judgment that certain geographic areas are more or less pro-Castro than others but Havana province and parts of Oriente province are probably the most pro-Castro localities.

b. Sociologically. Within the Cuban society, Castroʼs principal support comes from the peasant or campesino group and the underprivileged. Identification of these groups with the Castro regime has given them a sense of importance in the Cuban scene far beyond that which they formerly enjoyed. Continued identification with Castro promises them a far better life than they heretofore had any reason to expect. Many of these people have become so tied to the Castro regime by their own acts that their lives would be forfeit under any successor government. Hence, it is probable that many of them would at least attempt to flee to the hills and continue to fight if Castro was able to gain sanctuary in the mountains. Important Castro strength also exists in the ranks of urban labor and among the students although in both groups considerable anti-Castro sentiment is evident. The Havana Dock Workers Union and the Electrical Trades Union have both exhibited displeasure over working conditions and pay scales under Castro. The students are angry over the loss of autonomy of their institutions of learning, long a Latin American tradition, and there have been some anti-Castro manifestations as a result. However, offsetting factors include the infusion of many rural students by Castro who would otherwise have been unable to attend.

c. Governmental. The large governmental bureaucracy which extends into every province, city, town, village, and hamlet on the island can be regarded as staunchly pro-Castro, although defections do occur from time to time. All governmental officials including the rural police owe their jobs to loyalty to and support of Castro. However, it is probable that, faced with the overthrow of Castroʼs government, many of these people would immediately switch sides.

3. Areas Favorable for Guerrilla Activity. (See Appendix “A”)² Traditionally, the mountainous areas of Cuba have been used for guerrilla activity, and these areas still provide the most favorable areas from which to conduct this type of activity. Suitable areas exist in Pinar del Rio province (Sierra de los Organos and Sierra del Rosario), Las Villas province (Sierra de Trinidad, also known as Sierra de Escambray), and Oriente province (Sierra Maestra, Sierra del Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toar). Historically, the Peninsula de Zapata has also harbored guerrilla bands, but because of the difficulties of egress, especially in the rainy season, has not seen extensive use.

4. Political-Police Control Mechanism

a. Provincial Organization. The political-police mechanism in Cuba is based on the provincial organization and all provinces follow the same pattern. Each province has a rural police regiment whose headquarters is located in the provincial capital city. Subordinate to the police regiment are a reserve company and several police squadrons each of approximately 165 officers and men, varying in numbers according to the size of the province and the number of important urban localities in the province. Squadron headquarters are located in the principal towns in the province. Squadrons, in turn, establish police posts (usually 8-10 men each) in the smaller towns and villages, and patrol outlying areas and beaches. Communication is via both police and commercial facilities, including radio communication with patrol vehicles. Under Castro, a system of “block informants” has been established which keeps the police informed of anti-Castro or counter-revolutionary activities. Local part-time militia units are based on the local police post or squadron headquarters where their arms are normally stored and where orders are received.

b. National Organization. Rural police regiments are controlled from Havana by the Ministry of Armed Forces. The total strength of the Rural Police (a part of the Army) is 9,600. Within Havana itself, police power is exercised by the National Police, a force of about 9,000 whose current subordination is unknown. The National Police have not heretofore been a part of the Cuban Armed Forces.

5. Key Pro-Castro Sub-Leaders. In view of the paucity of credible information currently coming out of Cuba, any listing of key sub-leaders would necessarily be based on past, rather than current, performance. Further, given Castroʼs penchant for rapidly disposing of “friends” who do not fully agree with him, it may rapidly be outdated. However, the list of personalities at Appendix “B”³ represents some of the key second and third line leaders as nearly as can be determined at this time. Additional names are filed by the intelligence community and are watched as information becomes available. However, it can be assumed that all governmental and military leaders including local mayors, governors, cabinet ministers and sub-ministers could be considered in the key sub-leader category.

6. Possible Guerrilla Centers. As indicated in paragraph 3 supra, certain areas of Cuba lend themselves favorably to guerrilla activity. However, the exact location of guerrilla centers could only be determined after they develop, with one notable exception. In January 1961, a report from a trained observer in Cuba indicated that arms and ammunition were being placed in an abandoned mine in the Sierra Maestra in Oriente province. Since that time, additional reports have indicated that a military camp was under construction at the same place, the remnants of the only parachute-trained unit in the Cuban Army are reported stationed there, and the same area has been used to train Latin American youths invited to Cuba for revolutionary training. Significantly, this area was Fidel Castroʼs base before his successful seizure of power from Batista, and knowing the difficulties he experienced in obtaining arms and ammunition during his stay on the Pico Turquino in the Sierra Maestra, it is a logical place for his stockpiling weapons against the possibility of his overthrow. This location is known as Minas del Frio. It must be noted, however, that there is no evidence of recent date to confirm this analysis.

7. If the Cuban populace failed to support the overthrow of Castro and chose to support pro-Castro guerrilla bands, the following general areas could become guerrilla centers and might possibly support guerrilla populations as noted:

Province	Area	Supportable Guerrilla Population
Pinar del Rio	Sierra de los Organos	100
	Sierra del Rosario	100
Las Villas	Sierra de Trinidad	2,000
Oriente	Sierra Maestra	5,000
	Sierra del Cristal	300
	Cuchillas de Toar	200

Guerrillas in these areas would exist by foraging on the local population for food, clothing, and medical supplies.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamaraʼs office received the memorandum on June 9.
1. Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
2. Appendix A, not printed, is a map of Cuba with the areas cited in the text highlighted.
3. Not printed.