Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

223. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, May 19, 1961.

PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AIMED AT WEAKENING THE Castro REGIME

I. Introduction

1. The proposals submitted in this recommended program of covert action directed against the Castro regime are based on a realistic appraisal of existing assets, both in and out of Cuba; on potential assets, both inside and outside of Cuba which are capable of development within acceptable time limits; and on certain assumptions with respect to United States policy.

2. For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that United States policy:

A. Will not contemplate the use of its armed forces to intervene directly or unilaterally in the absence of an aggressive military action on the part of Cuba directed against the United States or another country of this hemisphere.

B. Will not permit the organizing and training of a Cuban exile military force for further action against Cuba.

C. Will permit United States covert support of Cuban clandestine activities and the carrying out of covert unilateral operations as described herein, including the use of maritime and air facilities within the United States as the bases for the staging of sabotage, in-exfiltration, supply, raider and propaganda (including leaflet dropping) operations.

3. The Situation: The position of the Castro regime within Cuba has been significantly strengthened by the failure of the mid-April invasion. This is principally the result of two factors: (a) the psychological effects of the Castro victory on the Cuban people as a whole and the security forces in particular; and (b) a marked decrease in the capabilities of the anti-Castro forces, both in exile and within Cuba. It is probable, therefore, that there will be no major change in internal political conditions during the next six months.

Given the strength of the Castro military machine and the proven effectiveness of its security services, there is only the slightest possibility that the regime can be overthrown from within during the foreseeable future. With the expected arrival of MIG aircraft and the probable acquisition of a small fleet of fast naval cutters, the military capability of the regime will increase. Coupled with this is the fact that the opposition has lost some of its strongest forces; the underground has been badly hurt and will unquestionably take months to rebuild; and confidence in the United States has been shaken.

4. Background: The failure of the Cuban strike force in April 1961 to achieve its objective requires a careful re-evaluation of the extent of the problem and a re-assessment of the existing and potential assets which could be employed in a covert effort to weaken the Castro regime in order to accelerate its eventual overthrow.

There appears to be general agreement that there is no sure way of overthrowing the Castro regime short of United States military intervention. There is a possibility, albeit slight, that lesser measures—covert and overt—might result in the overthrow of the Castro regime from within. However, as long as Castro thrives, his major threat—the example and stimulus of a working communist revolution—will persist.

In summary, it can be said that Castroʼs position in Cuba is stronger than before the April 1961 invasion attempt, although more isolated in Latin America as a whole. The opposition has lost some of its strongest forces, its factionalism is greater, and its confidence in the United States has been shaken. Castroʼs armed forces and militia were effective to an unexpected degree in defeating the invasion. Increased police repression and terror has almost certainly badly weakened existing opposition and underground forces within Cuba. Castroʼs hard-core supporters are more heavily armed and more enthusiastic in his behalf, and the widespread support he has received abroad has probably increased his stature among many other Cubans. The abortive effort to unseat him will probably provide him with a useful excuse to justify further economic austerity, as well as a lever for additional Soviet aid. In general, unless Castro makes some major mistakes (e.g. direct armed attack on some other Latin American country or prolongation of an extreme reign of terror) or the United States scores some brilliant coup de main, Castro will probably be able to benefit from the fruits of his victory for some time to come.

II. Objective

To plan, implement and sustain a program of covert action designed to exploit the economic, political and psychological vulnerabilities of the Castro regime. It is neither expected nor argued that the successful execution of this covert program will in itself result in the overthrow of the Castro regime. This plan should be viewed only as the covert contribution to an overall national program designed to accelerate the moral and physical disintegration of the Castro government and to hasten the day when a combination of actions and circumstances will make possible its replacement by a democratic government responsive to the needs, the aspirations and the will of the Cuban people.

III. Tasks

1. To achieve these objectives a series of short-term and long-term tasks will be undertaken. Wherever feasible and possible, these activities will be carried out under the aegis of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. However, since this will not always be practicable or desirable, for a variety of reasons, unilateral Agency operations and independent operations by acceptable groups and elements outside the framework of the Council will also be undertaken.

Short Term Tasks

A. Operational Intelligence Collection: Every effort will be made to improve and expand our capabilities for the collection of operational intelligence on Castroʼs plans, intentions and capabilities; on specific industrial, military and communications targets; on candidates for defection; on the morale of the civil population and the extent of its support of and discontent with the Castro regime. This will call for the strengthening of existing internal agent nets; the recruitment of legal travelers; the recruitment, training and infiltration of new agents; liaison with Cuban exile groups and individuals with independent access to targets, and the continuation and intensification of existing special intelligence efforts.

B. Sabotage Operations Against Selected Targets: Sabotage operations will be planned and executed against such targets as refineries, power plants, micro wave stations, radio and TV installations, strategic highway bridges and railroad facilities, military and naval installations and equipment, certain industrial plants and sugar refineries. This will first require building up present capabilities through recruitment, training and infiltration of sabotage teams.

C. Operations in Support of Guerrilla Activities: Operations will be planned and executed in support of guerrilla bands which exist or may emerge in the hills of Cuba utilizing both air and maritime operations for the delivery of arms and supplies and for the infiltration and exfiltration of personnel. Since we believe that there is little likelihood of significant accomplishments by guerrilla activities for some time to come, we will discourage offensive guerrilla activities at this time in order that the strength of such forces may be preserved for a more propitious moment. Depending on success in building solid, reasonably dependable and reasonably compartmented assets, in establishing communication with them, and equipping them, the scale of sabotage and guerrilla activities will be stepped up. Our first concern is the rebuilding of our internal nets and of our capability for mounting significant operations.

D. Operations Directed at Defection of Castro Officials: Operations directed at defection, wherever possible in place, of well-placed officials of the Castro government and armed forces will be planned and executed. The objective is two-fold:

(1) in the cases of defections in place, to gain an insight into the intentions, plans and capabilities of the regime, and

(2) in the cases of open and publicized defections, to cause embarrassment and loss of prestige for the regime, especially in the rest of Latin America.

E. Operations Directed at Destroying the Popular Image of Castro: In the field of psychological warfare, operations will be planned and executed aimed at destroying the image of Castro as a true revolutionary interested in the welfare of his people and the replacement of that image with one of a ruthless dictator who, under the false banners of revolutionary reform, has deprived his people of their basic liberties and turned their country into a Soviet satellite. This will require expansion of existing covert press, radio and other media assets outside of Cuba and the strengthening of clandestine propaganda mechanisms inside of Cuba, including underground printed propaganda, clandestine radio broadcasting stations, radio and TV intrusion operations. Also required will be a re-direction of Radio Swan activities, with the Revolutionary Council playing an important part in the programming of the Cuban propaganda effort.

F. Operations Aimed at Strengthening the Prestige and Acceptability of the Revolutionary Council: Through all available propaganda warfare assets and mechanisms an effort will be made to strengthen the prestige of the Revolutionary Council and its programs, as well as the prestige of its individual members, in order to assure its acceptability as a provisional successor to the Castro regime. Through adoption of a program of political action an effort will be made (a) to maintain close and cordial contact with the Revolutionary Council for the purpose of providing unobtrusive guidance and material support for its organizational structure and its clandestine activities; (b) to improve the position of the Council by encouraging support of the Council by acceptable political groups and personalities who are now opposed to or do not recognize the Council as leadership of the opposition; (c) to encourage the Council to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards all acceptable political groups; and (d) to broaden its base to make it more representative of all political thought (with exclusion of extreme left and extreme right) and important social and economic sectors (church, labor, military, students, intellectuals, etc.)

2. Long Term Tasks:

A. Political Action: Develop friendly and close contact with leaders of the Revolutionary Council, and leaders (and/or potential leaders) of all political parties and social and economic sectors (church, labor, military, students, intellectuals, et al) in order to assure friendly and helpful contacts and attitudes towards the United States throughout the entire political and social spectrum during the post-Castro era.

B. Intelligence: From existing and potential assets in Cuba and abroad develop and train unilateral agent networks in all walks of life in order to assure the Agency a flow of reliable and significant intelligence during the confused and chaotic period which will exist during the post-Castro era.

C. Counter Intelligence: In coordination and cooperation with the Revolutionary Council create, train and support a highly motivated and professionally competent apolitical and career security service which will be dedicated to the preservation of the democratic form of government. Assign carefully selected and qualified Agency personnel to work with the service during the current and post-Castro eras.

D. Psychological: Maintain and strengthen the excellent contacts and relations which now exist with exile press and radio entities and personalities in order to assure friendly and helpful contacts and attitudes within mass media circles during the post-Castro era.

IV. Assets Available

The following covert assets are believed to be in existence as of 1 May 1961:

1. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. Political Assets: The primary political assets are the members of the Revolutionary Council with our secondary assets being the other exile Cubans on the periphery of political activities with whom we are or easily can be in contact.

V. Recommendation

It is recommended that the above described program of covert action, designed to exploit any economic, political and psychological vulnerabilities of the Castro regime, be approved.

Annex “A”

Washington, May 20, 1961.

1. Practical experience acquired over the past year has taught us certain lessons with respect to security and operational problems in carrying out a covert program of this magnitude. If errors are to be corrected and unwanted publicity avoided, there are certain realities which must be faced at the inception of the Project and certain “ground rules” which must be agreed upon. The more important of these factors are described below briefly but clearly in order that they may be given due consideration at the time this paper is submitted for approval.

2. Training: Training will have to be provided for relatively small groups. With one exception, we feel this must be accomplished outside the Miami area for security reasons. That one exception relates to the training of singleton communicators (W/T operators). Training of such personnel can be carried out in safe houses. If this is done in the southeast of the United States the training can be tied in with practical work with our major covert communications base in the Miami area.

Small Boat Operations: Secure and suitable areas within the United Stares for training in small boat operations are required. Such training will involve relatively few men at a time. We are exploring the possibility of using a deactivated Navy facility at [1 line of source text not declassified]. Other appropriate sites will be sought in the Florida Keys, the West Coast of Florida, and the Gulf of Mexico area. The point is the training should be carried out in the United States where maximum security can be applied.

Sabotage Training: We propose to train up to thirty men at a time in resistance techniques, including the use of demolitions and other sabotage devices. It will be necessary that a site or sites be selected that are either sufficiently remote from centers of population or of such a nature (military installation) that the use of explosives and demolitions will be plausibly explained. If areas in the United States cannot be found, this type of training might well be carried out in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (where we have certain facilities) or on the island of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has a number of separate training sites with capacity for training up to twenty men each in trade craft, resistance techniques (including sabotage). Because of the coral reefs, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would not be suitable for small boat training.

Radio Operators: In addition to the training of singleton radio operators (which must be closely compartmented), we also propose to train singleton W/T operators and specialist cadres [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified], although not necessarily in that order of priority.

3. Cuban Air Crews: We propose to maintain control over some Cuban pilots, navigators and ground crews for future operations. They would be placed under commercial air cover (our own proprietary setups) where they will be able to maintain their proficiency and where they will be readily available for operational missions such as re-supply air drops, leaflet raids and, if the need should ever arise, air strikes.

4. American Contract Air and Maritime Personnel: It has been our experience that Cuban pilots do not have the capability of carrying out, with any degree of assured success, night air drops. Most of the deliveries attempted during the past year missed their marks and were either lost or fell into enemy hands. Consequently, if the need arises for extensive air deliveries of arms and supplies to guerrillas in the Cuban mountains, authority must be granted to employ American contract personnel as pilots and navigators in conjunction with Cuban crews. American contract personnel, but to a lesser degree, will also be needed for the successful execution of maritime operations (supply deliveries, infiltration and exfiltration of agents) and, if the need arises, for participation in raider-type sabotage operations.

5. Use of Bases in United States: Geographical reasons, supported by our experience, dictate the need for the use of United States maritime and air facilities for the staging of sabotage, in-exfiltration, supply, raider and propaganda operations. While we may have access to the Nicaraguan base for occasional air deliveries to Cuba, the distance is too great and the political hazards too uncertain for us to place our entire dependency on that one facility, especially if the guerrilla and resistance movements reach such proportions that almost daily re-supply operations are called for.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given, but a note attached to the source text indicates that copies were sent to Dulles, Goodwin, and Berle. A May 24 memorandum from Barnes to Dulles identifies this paper as the covert annex to the policy paper prepared for the NSC on May 4 by the interagency task force chaired by Nitze. (Ibid., Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961) For text of the May 4 policy paper, see Document 202.