Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

221. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 18, 1961.

General Lemnitzer

General Lemnitzer: The thing I would like to say at the very beginning is that I consider the JCS role was one of appraisal, evaluation, offering of constructive criticism, and assisting CIA in looking at the training and detailed plans. Defense participated in the role of support.

Question: What action was taken on the over-all U.S. plan of action for Cuba developed by the JCS in late January?

General Lemnitzer: Well, we prepared a plan of action for Cuba and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense. Thereʼs some question of what happened to it up in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I did discuss it with Dean Rusk and Mr. Dulles at one of the high level Governmental meetings on the 22nd of January. Several attempts were made by General Gray, at his level, to interest State and CIA in preparing a national plan based on the Trinidad concept. State was pretty receptive, but the people at CIA were not quite as receptive because they were involved in planning this operation and were already pretty well under way, as a result of a previous decision taken way back in March 17, 1960.

Question: What was the JCS view of the military feasibility of Trinidad and Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: Well, Trinidad first. Assuming control of the air, we felt that the landing could be effective against a light opposition which was the most that was anticipated in that area, but like all other considerations, the ultimate effect centered upon the uprisings that would be generated throughout the islands and the reinforcements which would be gravitating toward this particular beachhead.

Question: Control of the air—what did that mean to you?

General Lemnitzer: It meant that the air plan would succeed in knocking out the limited facilities available to Castro.

Question: 100%?

General Lemnitzer: Not 100%, but a great majority of the aircraft.

Question: How could you deal with any remaining aircraft, since you had only B-26s?

General Lemnitzer: It was expected that the initial strikes would be generally successful, since Castroʼs aircraft were concentrated on several fields. Following the initial strike, it would be a matter of matching the aircraft that were allocated to this plan against what remained of Castroʼs aircraft.

Question: In recurring strikes thereafter?

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs right. We didnʼt intend to stop with just the strike on D-Day.

Question: It seems to me that several times there was a confidence in 100% control of the air and this just never happens.

General Lemnitzer: I never heard of a 100% success. On the other hand, you didnʼt have too many aircraft, and if we did some of the things that were anticipated and one important thing that I havenʼt heard discussed, the question of the diversionary landing has not received the attention that it deserves. Having been involved in this type of operation during the war, we always put great stress on diverting the enemy. This was a very important part of the Cuba plan but, unfortunately, it didnʼt go. When you only have one diversionary attack to attract the enemyʼs attention to another area and it doesnʼt get in, this is very detrimental to the over-all success of the plan.

Statement: There was a feeling that a 100% job would be done on Castroʼs air force, which just doesnʼt happen.

General Lemnitzer: I wouldnʼt go along with the idea that there was a feeling there would be 100% success in any kind of an operation.

Statement: This is Colonel Hawkinsʼ reply to a message: “Since the plan called for the destruction of Castroʼs aircraft, there seemed to be no point in putting anti-aircraft guns on the ships.”

General Lemnitzer: I inquired as to what machine guns, or anti-aircraft equipment they had aboard the ships, and they mentioned the 50 caliber guns, and so on, and this seemed reasonable for the type operation that was envisaged.

Question: Did the Chiefs approve Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt regard our actions as approval as such—Iʼd like to make clear that we have supported the thing, but we didnʼt consider that it was within our purview to approve the plan. However, we did believe the plan was feasible, therefore, the plan was all right to go.

Question: Was there any question about the feasibility of the plan in your mind?

General Lemnitzer: The guerrilla aspects of the Trinidad Plan were much more obtainable than the Zapata Plan. We felt that in the Zapata Plan the same importance was attached to the whole air operation to the extent that the landing could be effected and the beachhead held for a period of time, but there again the success of this plan was dependent upon the full gravitation of guerrilla forces to the beach area.

Question: The ultimate success, or were uprisings a pre-condition to getting ashore?

General Lemnitzer: No, not for getting ashore. Ultimate success would be determined by the invasion serving as a catalyst for further action on the part of the anti-Castro guerrillas or elements throughout Cuba.

Question: By ultimate success, do you mean the overthrow of Castro?

General Lemnitzer: Yes. I never did count on an indefinite maintenance of this beachhead. When you get committed to a beach, the question of ultimate success depends on whether you can pump in resources faster than the enemy can build up around you. I think we generally believed that the establishment of the beachhead would constitute a trigger to set off a series of other events. It was never intended that this entire force would lodge themselves on the beach and maintain themselves there indefinitely since there were no reinforcements coming in.

Question: Was it anticipated that the military would be able to land in force on the beachhead and maintain the beachhead for a period of time?

General Lemnitzer: That is correct, and if the enemy forces built up faster than they had planned, they would go into the Escambray Mountains under the Trinidad Plan.

Question: How about Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: It didnʼt stand out so loud and clear, but never-theless the same general type of ultimate action was contemplated. There were three alternatives in Zapata, after they got on the beach, if it looked as though the uprising would not occur. First, we were in a guerrilla type country. Second, the Escambrays were quite a long way away, but they could be used as a guerrilla base. Third, if we succeeded in getting rid of most of the enemy air, the force could have been withdrawn and reassembled for possibly another type of attack somewhere else.

Question: Do you think they could have been withdrawn without overt U.S. support?

General Lemnitzer: I didnʼt regard this as a single beachhead. This particular plan never involved a 36-mile beachhead with 1400 men—that would be absurd. Green Beach and Red Beach and Blue Beach were small lodgments that never involved a continuous perimeter.

Statement: In talking to a lot of the operators I find that they felt that they really had impassable obstacles and that anyone coming into the area had to come down the roads.

General Lemnitzer: That is correct. There was no intention that the beachhead would include this whole area.

Question: With regard to the question of being in guerrilla territory, was any independent study made?

General Lemnitzer: Well, so far as I was concerned, I didnʼt go beyond the information we got from the CIA and from my own staff, that this was an area in which the guerrillas had operated for over 100 years.

Statement: I think this was considered guerrilla territory about 100 years ago and then about 60 years ago, but not recently.

General Lemnitzer: There are few people living in it and few roads, and so on.

Statement: There is no place in which you can maintain yourself in that swamp.

General Lemnitzer: I suppose the same thing could be said about the Escambray Mountains. Iʼd like to make clear that we did not like this area as well as the Trinidad area, and one of the reasons was that it was more difficult to break out of there.

Statement: You mention the preference for Trinidad—Iʼm not sure whether youʼre aware of it, but the Secretary of Defense apparently never appreciated that point. In fact, he had the impression that the Chiefs thought that Zapata was the better of the two plans.

General Lemnitzer: I just donʼt understand how he got that impression. I can show you in my notes on two accounts where I called it to his attention. We also put it in writing that “of the alternate plans, alternative three is considered the most feasible and likely to accomplish the objective. None of the alternates involved are as feasible and likely to accomplish the objectives as the present paramilitary plan.” I donʼt see how you can say it any clearer than that.

Statement: I think itʼs just a question of too many papers and being confused.

General Lemnitzer: Iʼd like to go back to your question about guerrilla territory. This Zapata area is not much different from that in Vietnam, where theyʼre having the devilʼs own time chasing the guerrillas through the swamps.

Statement: There are several problems. First, in comparison with the area in Vietnam, there isnʼt an expanse where these people could move. This is more limited. Furthermore, the towns and villages are on the outside where the invasion forces couldnʼt reach. The second problem is that these people were never trained or told that they were supposed to become guerrillas.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt agree with that because they were trained as guerrillas for 9 months.

Statement: That was until November, 1960. There were only about 300 of them at that time, but then the great influx of about 1,000 came in after that time, and the great influx never received any instruction in guerrilla training.

General Lemnitzer: It was our understanding of the plan without any doubt that moving into the guerrilla phase was one of the important elements of the plan, and any idea that the Chiefs considered that they were making an indefinite lodgment on the beachhead is not right. Every bit of information that we were able to gather from the CIA was that the guerrilla aspects were always considered as a main element of the plan.

Question: What I canʼt understand is when it was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, why didnʼt it receive a great deal of attention?

General Lemnitzer: That was regarded as one of the alternatives if they werenʼt successful.

Statement: General, if you look at that area and talk with anybody who has been there, you couldnʼt possibly become guerrillas in that damn place.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt see why not.

Statement: Where are you going to get the water and the food? Itʼs not like Vietnam. They sent helicopters over and shot all these people down.

General Lemnitzer: In Vietnam, for example, they donʼt get any food. They sustain themselves in an area just like this.

Statement: As I understood it, they did, thatʼs why they put the wire around the villages.

General Lemnitzer: They put the wire around the villages to keep the food in, but there was also the possibility that these fellows would establish themselves as guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains or in the swamps and they would receive air drops.

Admiral Burke: Guerrillas couldnʼt sustain themselves in any of these areas until they got support from the populace. Supplies would have to be carried in to them until they received support from the populace.

Statement: The President had the same impression that you did—that if worst came to worst, this group could become guerrillas, but as weʼve gotten into it, itʼs become obvious that this possibility never really existed.

General Lemnitzer: Then we were badly misinformed.

Statement: Without training and instruction, they would never have gone guerrilla.

Mr. Dulles: I wouldnʼt wholly buy that. These people had a cadre of leaders—20% to 30% would be the leaders. They knew about guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas in World War II never had any training until they got into a guerrilla operation.

General Gray: It was always considered that the most feasible action was withdrawal from the beach by sea. This came up at one White House meeting when Mr. Bissell made the statement, that if we do have to pull out, the best course of action would be to withdraw from the beach.

Statement: But they had no plan to withdraw by sea. They had no capability to withdraw by sea, except as provided by the U.S. Navy.

General Lemnitzer: Well, itʼs a question of the time of withdrawal.

Statement: It still isnʼt clear to me how youʼre going to get them off if you wait until they are buttoned down on the beaches.

General Lemnitzer: Certainly as far as withdrawals are concerned, and I said this many times when the operation was on, the most difficult operation in the world is the withdrawal under enemy pressure from a beachhead. But that was not the kind of withdrawal that was anticipated, as far as I was concerned.

Question: Thatʼs the picture that shaped up and thatʼs one of the unhappy aspects of the picture. Letʼs go back to Trinidad. The JCS said that Trinidad had a fair chance of success. What was your estimate of the feasibility of Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: Still feasible, but less so than Trinidad. We considered Zapata feasible. I could put words together and say that we said that Trinidad had a fair chance and that Zapata had less than a fair chance, but actually we felt that Zapata had a fair chance but of a lower grade than Trinidad.

Question: If the Chiefs had had any question as to feasibility, the Chiefs would have spoken up. Is that a fair statement?

General Lemnitzer: Iʼm sure they would.

Question: To what extent had the Chiefs made a personal study of the final operations plan?

General Lemnitzer: The final operations plan was received two days prior to the final D-Day and it was too late for a personal study. Portions of Zapata were proposed on four occasions and approved on the basis of explanations that we got from the working group.

General Taylor: Is it fair to say that you gave it de facto approval on a piecemeal basis?

General Lemnitzer: No other solution was feasible at that time. The rainy season was approaching and one thing that I would like to mention here was the fact that they had 100 MIG pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia, and we didnʼt know when they were going to be returned, and our thinking was strongly influenced by this fact.

Question: Was any discussion given as to what would happen if a few MIGs appeared?

General Lemnitzer: No, all we could do was to go on the basis of the information we had that the MIGs had not yet arrived. We also felt that if this operation was going to go, it should go before Castro received two Soviet destroyers that we understood were being delivered.

Question: What would have happened if you had had a couple of MIGs there at the time?

General Lemnitzer: Their appearance would have pretty well complicated the operation.

Question: Were any steps taken in order to prepare for that possibility?

General Lemnitzer: None, other than the possibility that you might go to the Navy and ask the Navy for overt support, but that was very unlikely.

Question: What was the Chiefsʼ view on the suitability of the terrain?

General Lemnitzer: We discussed that somewhat. It was considered not as suitable as Trinidad for the reasons that I indicated. Their success depended upon their ability to seize the approaches to the swamp areas. Now the size of the beachhead question was emphasized before. There was a plan to put lodgments in the entry ways into the swamp area. The size of the area was dictated by the necessity of protecting the airfields, and to prevent access to the swamp. The large area wasnʼt considered desirable but acceptable if the approaches were held and control of the air was established.

Statement: When you commented on Zapata the first time, the air plan was for D-Day strikes only, but with no limitations.

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs correct.

Statement: Later there were limited strikes on D-2 and limited strikes on D-Day. Would you comment on this watering down of the air plan? Were the Chiefs satisfied with this?

General Lemnitzer: The D-2 strikes were added for non-military reasons. We would have preferred to do without the D-2 air strikes. They were never intended to accomplish the destruction of the Castro air force. They were to lend plausibility to the story that the D-Day strikes had been launched from within Cuba.

Question: Did you object to the D-2 air strikes?

General Lemnitzer: No, we did not object. We would have preferred not to have them, but for non-military reasons they were considered to be of great importance and they were approved.

Statement: They could have been quite disastrous because they could have alerted Castro and he could have dispersed his aircraft.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, but he didnʼt.

Statement: Yes, but that was just luck.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, but here again you get into the old battle of getting into an operation of this kind covertly, political and psychological considerations against military considerations. My conclusion here is, which Iʼll explain a little bit later, you have to be very careful about diluting military considerations in order to attain non-attribution and non-association with the United States.

Question: Do you feel that you or the Joint Chiefs were the defenders of the military aspects of the operation, or was CIA?

General Lemnitzer: The defenders of the military parts of the plan were the people who produced it and that was CIA. We were providing assistance, and assuring the feasibility of the plan.

General Taylor: What led to the idea that it was necessary to maintain that all of the air strikes emanated from Cuba?

General Lemnitzer: We were strong for the Trinidad Plan. However, about the middle of March during a meeting at the White House,¹ Mr. Mann was gravely concerned about the impact throughout the Latin American area of these air strikes coming from outside of Cuba. He hammered at the point repeatedly and wanted to know if there wasnʼt some area in Cuba where they could land on a ready-made area. At the conclusion of this meeting CIA was directed to review the whole idea and come up with alternative landing areas other than Trinidad, because Trinidad didnʼt have the kind of airstrip that was required to provide plausibility to the story that the aircraft had come from within Cuba. This was an important consideration.

Question: Was this approved beyond Mann?

General Lemnitzer: He was the one who expressed the views. I donʼt know how much Secretary Rusk or any of the other people were involved. As a matter of fact, it was a disappointment to me, because I thought we had a plan that had been thoroughly worked out and hated to see another delay and another complete evaluation of the island. It caused some concern both in my own group and in CIA. On March 16, when we had another meeting² and were discussing the Zapata Plan, Mr. Mann liked the Zapata Plan because of the airfield and indicated that it provided us with a plausible denial. I indicated that the JCS had gone over the alternatives and didnʼt think that any of them were as good as the original Trinidad Plan, but of the three to be considered, Zapata was the most achievable. Then I said this, that it was not clear to me why Zapata was any more acceptable from the political point of view than the Trinidad Plan. Whereupon Mr. Mann replied that it gave plausible denial to the launching of air operations from outside Cuba. He said we needed a facade behind which we could deny that these attacks came out of the United States, Guatemala, or Nicaragua.

Question: Why were they so sensitive about the fair name of Guatemala and Nicaragua?

General Lemnitzer: Well, his concern was how much this particular operation might upset or antagonize the other Latin American nations by doing violence to one of the members of the OAS. He was deeply worried about the impact of this type operation conducted with our support and assistance which he felt was generally known, and he was especially worried about the air aspects of the plan.

Question: With regard to the D-2 and the D-Day air strikes both of which were to be limited, did the Joint Chiefs feel they had an adequate plan?

General Lemnitzer: I wonʼt say they regarded it as adequate; it was a reasonable air plan. Iʼd like to point out that the D-2 air strike was never expected to wipe out Castroʼs entire force. It was the D-Day strike which was the important one. The D-Day strike involved fragmentation bombs, napalm, 50 caliber machine guns. This was an all-out effort and one of the critical aspects of the whole operation. The air plans for Trinidad and Zapata were the same. They were the same for the reason that the targets were identical. In the examination of the Zapata Plan, we were merely looking at the location of the landing. The same number of aircraft were on the three essential airfields and the air plan was not considered to be affected at all as far as the D-Day strikes were concerned.

Statement: I would like to make two points: First, there were three plans considered and the objection to one of the plans was the fact that the air strip wasnʼt adequate. That same objection was not made in connection with the Zapata Plan. The second thing is that the Zapata Plan as it was originally considered, anticipated capturing this airport and then have the planes take off from the airport.

General Lemnitzer: No, sir. Thatʼs wrong.

Statement: Iʼm just going by what the paper³ says.

General Lemnitzer: Are you saying that these aircraft were supposed to fly from Nicaragua and then land and load up and take off and bomb and so on?

Statement: I donʼt know. I wasnʼt there.

General Gray: I think itʼs wrong to base that whole Zapata Plan on one paper because this was just the first cut at the Zapata Plan. After that the Zapata Plan was considered again and again over a period of time, and all this became very clear as it went on.

Statement: Yes, I understand, but weʼre just talking about the beginning. The important thing is that you didnʼt turn one plan down because of the air strike situation, and yet you did turn another plan down because the air strike situation wasnʼt adequate. You didnʼt turn Zapata down because the air strikes werenʼt considered adequate, and yet the air strikes consisted of taking off after dawn.

General Lemnitzer: I didnʼt think there was any material change in the air plan. The targets were the same regardless of where youʼd land. On D-Day the air plan involved going after the Cuban air force; thereafter, they would take under attack any movements of troops to the area and they would attempt to knock out microwave communications stations on which the Cuban national communications were largely dependent.

Question: What did you think would happen if you werenʼt 100% successful and didnʼt get a couple of T-33s?

General Lemnitzer: In war, you never expect 100% success. However, a couple of T-33s are not going to be decisive elements in an operation of this kind.

Question: Were there any comments or discussion about the T-33s in particular?

General Lemnitzer: I think I had information that they were armed, because we had been trying to get some kind of equipment against the Pathet Lao and were considering what the distribution of T-33s was around the world. We saw that some of them had been armed as reconnaissance planes and it was suspected that the Cuban air force had armed theirs—but they werenʼt bombers.

Statement: Yes, but they hit targets.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, but the T-33s didnʼt sink any ships.

Statement: Yes, they did.

Statement: No, not the T-33s. I think they were Sea Furies. A Sea Fury was the one that hit the Rio.

General Lemnitzer: I have a long list of the reasons why we preferred Trinidad to Zapata: It was more distant from Havana, the closeness to the Escambray Mountains, there was only one access road into the area, the nearest Cuban army unit of any size was 100 miles away, and considerable support from dissidents was expected in that area.

Question: What was the understanding of the importance of control of the air?

General Lemnitzer: Absolutely vital to success.

Question: Were the Chiefs satisfied with the plan of pre-D-Day strikes?

General Lemnitzer: We first talked about some strikes on the day before D-Day, but the D-Day strikes were regarded as critical. We were particularly interested in napalm, or I was, because Iʼve seen the effects of napalm on aircraft when theyʼre parked close together; also fragmentation bombs. Of course, elimination of the D-Day strike greatly eliminated the insurance against attack from the Cuban air force.

Question: Were the Joint Chiefs of Staff involved in the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes?

General Lemnitzer: They were not. It came as a surprise to me.

Question: When did you hear about it?

General Lemnitzer: At 2 oʼclock on the morning of the 17th of April when General Gray and General Wheeler came to my quarters on another matter. They said they had received a call from CIA urging that they get air cover for the beachhead on the 17th. It was then that I heard that they had cancelled the D-Day air strikes. On that occasion I strongly supported putting U.S. Naval cover over the beachhead. I directed that Admiral Dennison be prepared to provide this cover. However, I recognized the major political implications involved and directed General Wheeler and General Gray to consult with the Department of State on this matter.

Question: Was the request for air cover an attempt to neutralize some of the effect of the cancellation of the D-Day strikes?

General Lemnitzer: The way it came to me was that it was an urgent call for putting U.S. air cover over the beachhead.

Statement: Maybe General Gray can tell us.

General Gray: At the time I was called over to the CIA, it was about 1 oʼclock in the morning. They informed me then that the air strikes were cancelled. Then General Cabell asked me if I would see what I could do to get air cover from the carrier. We eventually got permission for the Early Warning but not for the air cover.

Question: What was the understanding of the JCS as to the action of the landing force if it effected a lodgment but no uprisings occurred?

General Lemnitzer: Those were the three alternatives. Go guerrilla in the swamps; conduct guerrilla operations from the Escambray; or be withdrawn.

Question: What was the understanding of the ability of the force to go guerrilla?

General Lemnitzer: It might not have been ideal country but it had been used, and it was believed to be feasible guerrilla country.

Question: Did the JCS examine the feasibility of this course of action?

General Lemnitzer: No, no specific study. The Working Group studied the feasibility and presented it to the JCS on several occasions as being feasible.

Question: What did they think of the effect of the swamp on the operation?

General Lemnitzer: We felt that it assisted defense but it was also a double-edged sword—it aided defense but also made it more difficult to break out.

Question: How did the JCS follow the course of the operation?

General Lemnitzer: The Secretary of Defense and I attended briefing sessions held in the special War Room which we set up for this operation. Then Service liaison officers briefed their respective Chiefs with information from the War Room. There was a continual flow of information from the War Room and CIA. It came to our War Room by telephone calls, and messengers from their war room to this one.

Question: There was no electronic gear?

General Gray: Many messages came by teletype and some by phone, and then we had an officer on liaison duty with CIA.

General Lemnitzer: The Joint Staff met on the 17th and 19th of April and considered important action messages. On the 18th, Admiral Burke and I were at the White House for most of the day in conference, and we followed the operations from there. Thatʼs in general how we handled it.

Question: Would you say this was satisfactory?

General Lemnitzer: If we were running the operation, no. But we were in a support role. We were primarily concerned with logistic support. We arranged a rather elaborate extensive logistic support plan. We envisioned arming a hell of a lot of Cubans if the uprisings occurred. Our logistic plan was 4 or 5 times larger than the original. The Secretary of Defense was particularly interested in being sure that they had all the support that they could possibly require.

Question: What was the understanding as to the ammunition situation at the end of D+1?

General Lemnitzer: Our understanding was that it was critical. However, we knew there was ammunition on the LCIs and the LCUs, and there was an air drop planned by CIA on the night of D+1.

Question: There was one on D-Day night and one planned for D+1?

General Lemnitzer: Yes.

Admiral Burke: We also tried to get some C-130s.

General Lemnitzer: That is correct. We had some C-130s over at Kelly Air Force Base but they never got into the action.

Question: Did the Chairman know of the flight of the ships?

General Lemnitzer: I sure did. I knew of all the attempts by CIA and CINCLANT to try and round them up.

Question: What recommendations were made regarding U.S. help after D-Day?

General Lemnitzer: Well, Arleigh and I were over at the White House when the question of using U.S. destroyers to pick up people off the beach was discussed. The feasibility and the need was discussed right there, and the decision was made to order them in.

Admiral Burke: We didnʼt know what was going on at the beach so we asked for reconnaissance, and the reconnaissance was approved.

General Lemnitzer: The afternoon or night of D-Day 4 B-26s were made available which we had been preparing for the Laos operations. Then 4 more were made available on D+1. In addition to that, we offered 5 T-33s and CIA accepted 4. On D+1 action was initiated to use C-130s in dropping ammunition on the beachhead. The aircraft were moved to Kelly, the packing crews were on their way, and the crews were set up for the drops on the night of D+1 but they never went into action.

Question: Why werenʼt the T-33s turned over to CIA on D+1?

Mr. King: I believe it may have been a question of getting pilots. We were short of pilots by D+1.

Question: When did you sense that the beachhead might be going down?

General Lemnitzer: On the morning of D+2, I made a comment to the President that this was the time for this outfit to go guerrilla.

Question: How were your comments received?

General Lemnitzer: I received a surprise when Mr. Bissell said they were not prepared to go guerrilla.

Question: This was the first time youʼd known about that?

General Lemnitzer: Yes.

Question: That being the case, was there any discussion that we were going to lose the war or we were going to have to use the U.S. Navy? Was it realized that they were accepting defeat if that decision wasnʼt made?

General Lemnitzer: Iʼm not sure it was put in quite those terms.

Mr. Kennedy: Could I add something? I donʼt think there was complete information—all the messages showing the critical situation were not transmitted to the President. However, there was general knowledge that there was a shortage of ammunition. We were told on D-Day that the ships had gone out 15 miles and they intended to come back in that night. The President had said that day that heʼd rather be called an aggressor than a bum, so he was prepared to go as far as necessary to assure success, but we were always about 5 or 6 or 7 hours behind on our information. The next morning on D+1 we knew the ships hadnʼt come in for some reason we couldnʼt understand, and there was a serious ammunition shortage. At this time there was no assurance whether it would be possible to hold the beachhead even if the Navy was ordered in. So at one oʼclock Admiral Burke was instructed to send Navy pilots over to reconnoiter and send back a message stating whether they could maintain the beachhead. The message in reply stated there was no fighting going on, so there wasnʼt any point in going in that they could see. The next morning there was a message saying the beach had collapsed and they wanted to evacuate the men, so the President gave the order for the destroyers to go in, but by this time it was impossible to evacuate the men because the beachhead wasnʼt large enough, so then it was too late to do anything.

General Lemnitzer: It wasnʼt just the question of committing U.S. forces and saving the war—it wasnʼt that simple. It was question of whether or not the Navy could save it if you sent them in.

Mr. Kennedy: We didnʼt have any idea what the situation was there. The President said he used to walk around on that White House lawn thinking heʼd like to do something if he knew what was going on.

General Lemnitzer: This is just like all actions. The Commander didnʼt have the kind of information that heʼd like to have had.

Question: What weʼre talking about is the difficulty, in fact, the impossibility of running a military operation from Washington. Was this ever recognized during the preliminary considerations?

General Lemnitzer: The difficulty is that no Commander could have made these decisions down there because these were decisions to commit the U.S., and the only place that decision could be made was right here by the Commander-in-Chief. No matter where you had your command ship, you would still have to get the decision out of Washington because this was a decision to commit U.S. forces.

Statement: Thatʼs very true. But I thought you might have a number of representatives of different Departments on a first-class ship with first-class communications.

General Lemnitzer: But you would still have to rely on communications from the beach.

Statement: The men on the Blagar had a pretty good picture of what was taking place, but that picture never was transmitted up here.

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs certainly correct.

Question: Were the JCS satisfied to have CIA conduct this operation?

General Lemnitzer: As far as we were concerned, the job was a covert operation and the JCS couldnʼt legally conduct a covert operation.

General Taylor: I couldnʼt find that you or anybody else ever raised the question whether or not CIA should have run this operation.

General Lemnitzer: This thing started back in March of 1960, when this assignment of responsibility was made. I didnʼt get into it until many months after all of this had been decided.

Mr. Dulles: I think some JCS representative was at that meeting at the White House.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt know. I wasnʼt Chairman at that time. Maybe Nate⁴ was there. I was not there and I didnʼt know a thing about it, but nevertheless there were lots of times when various people indicated that this was something the military ought to run. But again it was a question of the dis-association of the United States.

Question: Well, the JCS could have been just as dis-associated as CIA was?

General Lemnitzer: How could you?

Statement: Didnʼt you turn over the training of these people to people from Defense? The only difference would be the responsibility for the execution of the plan.

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs one of the things we have to look at in the United States Government right now. Are we going to run this thing on a covert basis—I think we were trapped by words, by covert.

Question: Do you agree that an operation can be covert and still be conducted by Defense?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, we can. Weʼve conducted some. I think you can do it with CIA provided you provide them with the military staff that they need.

Statement: I think they had a lot of staff and they had what they needed.

Mr. Dulles: I thought we did. We had 38 trainers down in Guatemala that you supplied.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, we did.

Question: We would like to get your views on how you think paramilitary operations should be conducted in principle. Should we make the decision that covert operations of this sort be assigned to Defense?

General Lemnitzer: I think the answer to this question depends upon the size, the magnitude of the operation that is involved.

Statement: General Lemnitzer, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your ideas on where the line should be drawn with regard to covert operations.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt see how you can have covert activities by armed forces. I think itʼs a contradiction in terms. We can have military people that are sheep-dipped and put them in an operation of this kind. But you canʼt just take any officer and say heʼs going to be sheep-dipped unless he volunteers for it. He has family problems. The military would have a hell of a time contracting these people.

Question: But there was no question of transferring it—no suggestion?

General Lemnitzer: No.

Question: What is your view of the accuracy of the evaluation of the effectiveness of Castroʼs force?

General Lemnitzer: The evaluation of the navy was accurate; the air force, fairly accurate—it was inaccurate as to pilotsʼ capabilities, and also regarding the guns on the T-33s; concerning the army, I would say that the information was not accurate. My information was that most of the tanks were up around the Havana area, and how they moved their tanks down there that fast without having some in that area, I donʼt know and I havenʼt been able to get into it because Iʼve been away, but I would say the navy information was accurate; the air force, fairly accurate; and the army and the militia not too accurate in terms of reaction time and capability.

Question: What impression did the JCS have of the likelihood of an uprising?

General Lemnitzer: We had no information. We went on CIAʼs analysis and it was reported that there was a good prospect. I remember Dick Bissell, evaluating this for the President, indicated there was sabotage, bombings, and there were also various groups that were asking or begging for arms and so forth. All they needed were arms and equipment, and the impression that we got was somewhat over-optimistic; particularly in light of measures that Castro took.

Question: Can defeat be properly attributed to any deficiency in the intelligence?

General Lemnitzer: I would say only to a degree. For example, the estimates of the possibility of the population rising up, and I donʼt think we estimated the effectiveness of Castroʼs control of the people.

Question: May I just mention the attitude most of us have on that now. This is related to the fact that no call to rise was given, and that this was withheld until they could be sure that these people had someplace to go for support, so the idea of the uprising was never really tried.

General Lemnitzer: Iʼve seen all kinds of reports about the number of people theyʼve put under arrest, in the stockades and so forth, which would have certainly inhibited any uprising.

Question: How should a paramilitary operation be fitted into Governmental machinery?

General Lemnitzer: I think we ought to have a national plan for any one of these situations like we have for Laos. We have a man now who is Mr. Vietnam. He does the coordinating activities for the Department and much more effectively than was ever done in the past.

Statement: We have developed a little chart of the kind of things that we are considering. Would you like to make a comment on this?

General Lemnitzer: This is about what I have in mind. With a permanent Chairman with no other kind of job, you have the representation from the Departments; knowing the nature of the operation ahead of time and determining which department has the paramount responsibility, the Chairman should be selected accordingly.

Statement: We visualized that this framework would be applicable to any situation.

General Lemnitzer: No, I donʼt think this would be practical. For instance, right now. Weʼre enmeshed in Vietnam, Thailand and Korea. You can be Chairman of just so many things. No more than about one if youʼre going to do the job right. I think youʼd have to have more than just one Chairman.

Statement: This over-all Chairman would get everything all straightened out, say hereʼs your problem and send it to the President to make the decision.

General Lemnitzer: Secretary McNamara has some strong views about this, but I pointed out repeatedly that I had seen this tried and the Chairman can make the decision and then suddenly the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense finds that a big chunk of his resources have been allocated for something when he wants to put them someplace else, particularly when you get into the foreign policy field.

General Taylor: Then you feel it is good in theory but not in practice?

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs right.

Question: Do you feel that the Chiefs discharged their responsibilities as military advisors to the President in the course of this operation?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, I do feel that the Chiefs discharged their responsibility.

Question: I mean as military advisors?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, I do.

Question: Were the Chiefs ever consulted as to whether or not this operation was really necessary?

General Lemnitzer: This question was resolved way back in the previous administration.

Question: How do you feel situations should be handled when only the Chairman is present at a conference?

General Lemnitzer: Many times the Chairman has to go to an NSC Meeting and questions come up which he has to answer from a military point of view what the Chiefs would have answered if they were in body, but you canʼt have everybody at that level all the time. I think the Chairman has to speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, generally speaking. On special occasions, I think all the Chiefs should be present.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the 17th in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and was held at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting included Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, Burke, and General Lemnitzer. Notes on concluding testimony by two leaders of the Cuban exile community are not printed. A note on the source text reads: “The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.”
1. An apparent reference to the meeting that took place on March 11; see Document 59.
2. The Zapata plan was discussed on March 15 and March 16; see Documents 65 and 66.
3. This briefing paper is not further identified.
4. Reference is to General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, who preceded Lemnitzer as Chairman of the JCS.